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Summary
The first decade of this century witnessed a transformation of the German financial
system from a hitherto bank-based system towards a hybrid system containing
elements of both bank-based and market-oriented systems. This hybrid structure was
decisive for the German banking sector having been comparatively severely affected
by the global financial crisis of 2008, as it had generated an environment partially
prone to inadequate risk-taking of some banks. For that reason, the causes for the
development of such a hybrid structure are critical in understanding the later
development. While much has been written on the German financial system, both
before and after the latest crisis, the existing research is less clear on the underlying
factors that have actually led to the development of such a hybrid structure. Using a
single case study approach to trace the important changes within the German financial
system between the late 1990s and 2008, the thesis develops the following line of
argumentation:
 The globalization and Europeanization process particularly affected the
banking sector in Germany. This is because:
o Market-driven sectors such as financial sectors are particularly
susceptible to economic changes.
o The German financial sector was and still is dominated by banks (bank-
based financial system).
o The dynamic changes of the competitive environment ignited by the
globalization and Europeanization process exposed and intensified the
competitive weakness of the hitherto rather “repressive” German
banking system.
 The globalization and Europeanization process, however, had varying impacts
on the different banking groups of the German financial system, because:
o The German banking groups differed in their institutional frameworks
(ownership and legal structures, business models, etc.) that made them
varyingly susceptible to external changes in the economic environment.
o Depending on whether they had the suitable means and instruments to
face those challenges, they, correspondingly, yielded different
adjustments.
xo The institutional interaction between the economic and political actors
was supported by very different, historically evolved structures, which
facilitated or complicated those adjustments.
 Three different adjustment performances and behavioral changes can be
identified among the German banking system:
o The private big banks changed their business focus from the traditional
loan business to a more market-oriented and riskier business strategy,
i.e. they got involved in the investment banking and securitization
market business.
o The Lander-owned Landesbanken shifted their business focus from
corporate lending to national banks and non-banks towards corporate
lending to foreign banks, holding of securities of foreign banks, and
engaging in proprietary trading on the securitization markets.
o The regionally organized savings banks and cooperative banks largely
stuck to their business models of deposit-taking and lending to private
households and corporate firms and experienced no major changes.
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11. Introduction
“German banks were traditionally more likely to be criticised for their conservatism and narrow
domestic focus than for the recklessness that sent British and American banks belly up.
Moreover, the country largely avoided the property price bubble that caused so much trouble
elsewhere in Europe, let alone the US. The country caught a cold from the American sub-prime
mortgage debacle, nonetheless. […] They were not the only institutions fooled by these assets’
glowingly high risk ratings, which have caused massive write-downs everywhere from
Switzerland’s famously conservative UBS to big insurers such as AIG. But German banks
bought enough of them for the whole banking system to be brought to its knees.” (The
Economist 2009b).
“[…], the high vulnerability of the system should not be seen as a simple historical accident.
Rather, it can be understood as ‘built-in’ in a system that tried to combine the structural features
of a ‘bank-based’ system with an increased market exposures of bank operations.” (Enderlein
2013: 30).
These two quotes adequately summarize the puzzle Germany faced at the outbreak of
the 2008 financial crisis.1 Germany’s financial system2 had always been considered
stable and sound, hence the comparatively hard impact of the crisis on its banking
sector took many by surprise. The German newspaper “Die Welt” named Germany as
the biggest loser of the financial crisis, referring to data collected and calculated by
DZ Bank and Berenberg Bank (Die Welt 2013). According to those calculations,
Germany lost almost 500 billion euros in failing to benefit from an expected global
economic growth between 2008 and 2012 that essentially did not take place because
of the crisis. Moreover, according to the IMF fiscal monitor, financial sector support
in Germany during the financial crisis in terms of gross public debt and other support
1 The financial crisis had already started to unfold in 2007, but had reached its peak with the demise of
Lehman Brothers in 2008. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, I will be referring to the 2008
financial crisis throughout the thesis.
2 This thesis uses the terms financial system/sector as well as banking system/sector. In general, a
financial “system” includes both the supply of financial services by the financial sector – i.e. central
bank, other banks, non-bank financial institutions, organized financial markets, and the relevant
regulatory and supervisory institutions – and the demand side for those supplied services, usually
private households and companies (e.g. Schmidt/Tyrell 2004), whereas the financial “sector” only
constitutes the supply side. Since German banks have been the dominant financial intermediaries,
other non-bank financial intermediaries such as insurance and investment companies have been
neglected in this case. The general focus of this thesis is the German banking “sector” as the supply
side of financial services, or, when discussing the interdependencies of the relevant actors, the
German banking “system”.
2amounted to 12.8% of GDP, which was almost twice as high as the average of 6.9%
(see Table 1 below).3
Table 1 – Financial sector support of selected countries
Financial sector support was granted in terms of recapitalization measures, guarantees
on liabilities, or underwriting to various banks, including Landesbanken (e.g. HSH
Nordbank, former WestLB, or BayernLB), private commercial banks (e.g.
Commerzbank, Aareal Bank), and various mortgage banks (e.g. Düsselhyp, HRE, etc.)
(FMSA 2014).
This thesis rests on the presupposition that the development of the German hybrid
financial system, i.e. a system that contains elements of both market-based and bank-
based financial systems, had been decisive for Germany’s problems during the crisis.
This was because the hybrid had kept its strong bank-dominance in financing the
German economy (banks’ liability sides) and had consequently also kept its traditional
banking structure and its creditor-protection schemes, while at the same time having
introduced market-based elements such as increased investor-protection. Essentially,
this led to an “over-protected system” that created moral hazard, thus incentivizing
excessive risk-taking by some banking groups (Enderlein 2013). This presupposition,
however, prompts the question how and why the hybrid model emerged in the first
place, especially considering the fact that the hybrid constituted a much more feeble
construction than the previously very stable and coherent financial system. While the
causes and triggers for such a development have been carefully analyzed and studied,
3 There are multiple statistics showing and comparing measures of financial sector support across
various nations. A direct comparison of those statistics is difficult since they use different definitions,
and because the measures can really only be compared after all stabilization measures have ended and
the re-privatizations of the participations can be fully evaluated.
Impact on gross public debt and other
support (in % of GDP)
Recovery to date
(in % of GDP)
Impact on gross public debt and other
support after recovery (in % of GDP)
Belgium 7.6 2.5 5.1
Cyprus 10.0 0.0 10.0
Germany 12.8 1.9 10.9
Greece 21.8 6.4 15.4
Ireland 40.4 5.7 34.7
Netherlands 15.6 10.7 4.9
Spain 7.6 3.1 4.5
UK 6.6 2.2 4.4
US 4.6 4.6 0.0
Average 6.9 4.1 2.9
Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor October 2013: 16.
3the processes of how and under what circumstances these developments took place,
are – to the best of my knowledge – less clear and understood.
My hypothesis was that the globalization and Europeanization process4 (external
events) exerted such pressure on the German banking system that it was no longer
sustainable. In addition, I suspected that those external factors had varying impacts on
the different pillars the banking system was composed of, which led to different parts
of the system drifting in different directions. Reasons for these assumptions were that
the German banking system was and is composed of different banking groups that
greatly differ in their entire historical development and institutional set-up (legal
status, corporate form, business model, etc.). Given those differences, it was therefore
safe to assume that their susceptibility to certain external events would vary, too,
depending on their ability to shield themselves from or cope with those influences. The
less able the banking groups were to shield themselves from those influences, the
greater the pressure for the actors to change and adapt to the demands of the external
influences. It furthermore rested on the notion of path dependence5, according to which
actors are most often moved off their paths by some kind of external event.
Combined, these elements constitute the content of the thesis. It portrays the “original”
bank-based system, the challenge the globalization and Europeanization processes
posed to the system, and, in particular, the responses to those challenges by the major
banking group and the political actors. Those responses were analyzed on the basis of
the actors’ histories, their respective situational contexts, their interactions among each
other and the political side, and the resulting possibilities for actions to cope with and
adapt to the challenges posed by the external factors. By empirically reconstructing
the developments in the German banking system during the late 1990s to late 2000s
by means of a consistent analytical framework, the thesis explains how the banking
system eventually ended up in a hybrid structure that made it particularly vulnerable
to the ramifications of the 2008 financial crisis. The timeframe of the late 1990s to the
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, which is the period of what Enderlein referred
4 Both the globalization and Europeanization processes are processes that had already started many
years before the timeframe of discussion in this thesis. Though they are continuous processes, there
were a few immediate aspects of the globalization and Europeanization processes that had influenced
the developments and actors’ decisions for each banking group. They will be explained in detail in
chapters 3-5. For the sake of simplicity, the factors are subsumed as “globalization and
Europeanization processes” at this point.
5 See section 2.3 on path dependence.
4to as the “banking financialization” process (Enderlein 2013: 11), was deliberately
chosen. It was especially crucial, because it witnessed the changes in the business
models and corporate strategies of particularly private big banks and Landesbanken,
which was supported by the political arena that, too, saw the necessity of a fundamental
overhaul of the banking system in order to remain competitive.
The thesis is structured as follows. This first chapter introduces the research topic, the
research questions, the method, as well as the analytical framework chosen for the
thesis. The second chapter provides a general overview of the “original” German
financial system in its post-WWII-state characterized by its distinctive 3 pillar banking
sector, the “Hausbank” relationships between suppliers and demanders of financial
services, the corresponding governance structures, the insider accounting system, and
the like, as well as an overview of the changes in the German financial system during
the 1990s and 2000s. It furthermore sets up the premises for later explaining the
economic and competitive pressure the German banking system and the German
economy as a whole faced during the turn of the century. Chapter two also gives an
overview of the current state of research regarding the German banking system and
possible research gaps. Chapters three to five each deal with the different adjustment
performances of private big banks (chapter three), Landesbanken (chapter four), and
savings and cooperative banks (chapter five).6 For each of the banking groups, the
impact of globalization and Europeanization on that respective banking group has been
examined with regard to their specific situational contexts relevant to their respective
business environments. Based on that, the resulting conceivable action possibilities for
both the banking group’s side and the political side are discussed and contrasted with
the ultimate different reactions of each banking group to the situation explained.
Finally, chapter six concludes by summarizing the empirical findings and evaluating
them. It offers suggestions on the empirical and practical implications of this particular
case for other cases and possible future research areas. This includes a brief overview
of the regulatory framework that has been introduced in the aftermath of the 2008
6 The German 3 pillar banking system consists of the group of private commercial banks, the savings
banks group and the cooperative banks group (see chapter 2.1 for details). For the sake of clarity, I
made a small adaptation to that grouping when structuring the thesis. Instead of Landesbanken and
savings banks being discussed in one chapter (which both belong to the savings banks group), the
development of the Landesbanken is covered in a separate chapter, while both savings banks and
cooperative banks are being discussed together in a different chapter, as their developments were
similar in outcome.
5financial crisis so far, both on the European and the national level, and the preceding
international agreements on financial market regulation, such as, for example, the
various G20 summits on financial markets and the world economy. Also, in light of
the discussions on the increasing importance of supranational solutions to financial
market regulations, I touch upon the challenges of an increasingly harmonized and
aligned European regulatory framework for the German banking system. Though the
EU had started the “harmonization process” of regulatory standards across the EU
Member States with the introduction of the Financial Services Action Plan in 1999,
the harmonization process has reached a completely new dimension and dynamic with
the financial crisis. Many of the previously passed directives have been amended (or
are still in the process of being amended), and new directives and regulations have
been introduced. But just like Germany exhibits a unique banking structure with its
still existing 3 pillar structure, other countries may face similar problems. Hence, this
part attempts to provide new impulses for future discussions.
1.1. Research Topic
The content of the thesis is set against the general context of discussions on financial
systems.7 Financial systems, i.e. both the supply of financial services by the financial
sector (e.g. banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) and the demand side for those
services (e.g. households and firms) can be analyzed from different angles. Schmidt
and Tyrell (2004), for example, identified four different approaches to analyzing
financial systems: (1) by looking at the institutions that provide financial services and
constitute the supply side of the financial system (banks, investment funds, central
banks, financial markets, etc.), (2) by analyzing the financial system according to the
extent the respective financial intermediaries are able to provide liquidity and manage
liquidity risk (e.g. Sirri and Tufano 1995), mobilize capital to exploit economies of
scale (e.g. Sirri and Tufano 1995), and perform maturity transformation, (3) by
analyzing the different functions of financial systems (e.g. Merton and Bodie 1995),
or (4) by combining the various elements of the other approaches to derive a systematic
7 Financial systems consist of institutional units (i.e. an “entity, such as a household, corporation, or
government agency that is capable in its own right of owning assets, incurring liabilities, and engaging
in economic activities and transactions with other entities”(IMF 2006: 11)) and markets “that interact,
typically in a complex manner, for the purpose of mobilizing funds for investment and providing
facilities, including payment systems, for the financing of commercial activity” (IMF 2006: 11). Put
differently, the concept of financial system is the “interaction between the supply of and demand for
the provision of capital and other finance-related services” (Schmidt and Tyrell 2004: 21).
6approach that analyzes financial systems according to the interrelations of those
elements and their level of complementarity (see Schmidt and Tyrell 2004).
Understanding the workings of financial systems is important as they fulfil necessary
and valuable functions, which, according to Merton and Bodie (1995), are clearing and
settling of payments, providing mechanisms for the pooling of resources and for the
subdividing of shares in various enterprises, transferring economic resources through
time, across borders, and among industries, managing risk, providing price
information, and dealing with incentive problems that arise from asymmetrical
information between parties.
The importance of well-functioning financial systems is timelier than ever and the
significance of functioning financial systems for the public welfare and economic
growth of nation states has been well known for a long time now (see, for example,
Hilferding 1910, Schumpeter 1934, Gerschenkron 1962, Schmidt and Tyrell 2004).
Though the causalities between finance and economic growth have been debated (see,
for example, Lucas 1988, Rajan and Zingales 1998, King and Levine 1993, Levine
1999, or Levine and Zervos 1998), the existing evidence so far suggests that markets
that are able to meet the needs of savers and investors efficiently, generally support
economic growth (e.g. Gorton and Winton 2002, King and Levine 1993, Levine 1997).
The topicality has reached a new peak since the latest financial crisis, not just regarding
the beneficial contributions of financial systems to the economy, but also regarding
the detrimental effects they can bring about when spinning out of control. The
interrelations and interdependencies between the supply and the demand side and the
intermediaries are huge. The more “interwoven” and dependent the “real economy”
on the financial sector, the bigger the influence. The crisis has certainly intensified the
discussions on suitable political and, consequently, regulatory tools to keep financial
markets stable. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, national and supranational
lawmakers, governments and supervisory authorities, as well as scholars and scientific
researchers have been debating about the “right” kind of financial regulatory
framework to prevent future crises like the one of 2008. However, debates on the
effectiveness of national regulatory measures to channel global capital flows in an
environment of eroding national borders are nothing new and have been led even prior
to the crisis (see, for example, Lütz 2002, Eichengreen 1999, Frenkel and Menkhoff
2000, Kreile 2000, Evans 1997, Bernauer 2000). Hence, no matter if considering the
7“beneficial” contributions of financial sectors to their national economies, or looking
at the inflicted “pain” by the financial sector onto the economy by financial crisis
scenarios, finance is important and plays a role in everyday life.
This thesis attempts to provide a detailed case study of the developments in the German
banking system during the 2000s. A research topic that is concerned with
developments in the German banking sector before the latest financial crisis would
naturally have to answer to questions of relevance. Following the ad hoc financial
sector rescue measures in 2008 and 2009, Germany and the other EU Member States
have passed and implemented comprehensive and numerous regulatory measures
aimed at stabilizing the global financial markets and setting the cornerstones for less
vulnerable financial and capital markets. Interestingly, comparing policy discussions
today with those of the late 1990s and early 2000s, there are some parallels. Aside
from the chances and opportunities that came with the globalization and cross-border
transactions and financial activities, risks associated with an increasing
“interconnectedness” and a greater dynamic of financial transactions became the
object of numerous critical discussions (Soros 1998, Lütz 2002). The latest global
financial crisis has currently eradicated any support of further liberalization tendencies
in the financial sector (particularly in Europe). While functioning capital and financial
markets are still considered essential, the risks associated with the interdependencies
of financial actors and the “real economy” on a global scale have seemingly
outweighed its benefits in many opinions. While scientific debates and political
discussions already in the late 1990s and early 2000s had considered questions how to
keep financial systems stable, Lütz (2002) pointed out that the means how to do so
mainly included considerations of product prohibitions, better monitoring by creating
global institutions, and similar measures, while neglecting regulatory measures that
would more effectively “guide” financial actors towards more considerate and
responsible behavior and generally minimizing their business risks (Lütz 2002: 22).
This certainly changed with the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis (for an overview,
see section 6.2). The sheer number and the speediness with which regulatory measures
have been implemented after the 2008 crisis are unprecedented, particularly regarding
comprehensive and far-reaching regulations, such as Basel III. Hence, in order to be
able to establish sustainable regulatory measures in the long run, it is crucial still to
8understand the exact processes and triggers behind the developments that made the
financial systems so susceptible to the crisis.
While the events of the 2008 financial crisis have principally been linked to have found
their sources in a general trend towards liberalization policies, the lax mortgage
lending policies of the United States, a subsequent overheating of the US housing
market, new speculative financial instruments that fed on that development, and an
increased global interconnectedness of the financial markets that made the spreading
of the products and subsequently the crisis possible in the first place, the processes of
how and under what circumstances German banks got involved in that process is less
clear. The motivations for the involvement of predominantly private big banks and
Landesbanken in Germany have generally been said to be the banks’ preferences in
the “riskier” investment banking and proprietary trading business in search for the
highest profits. This thesis does not seek to dispute this notion, nor does it attempt to
justify the actions of certain actors. However, it does attempt to disclose a more
complex and complete picture of the causes that have led to those developments and
have triggered the hybridization. Simply pointing to various financial actors’
“greediness” as a source for shifting the business focus seems to be an insufficient
explanatory variable, nor does it explain the asymmetrical development in the German
banking sector leading to the hybrid structure or the role of political actors in the
process. Instead, one has to understand and look at the entire context of the respective
actors’ situations.
The hypothesis that the globalization and Europeanization processes had been the
decisive trigger for the shift in the German banking sector also calls for an elaboration.
Whereas the Anglo-Saxon countries, most prominently the US and the UK, typically
had market-based financial systems, the German financial system, like many other
continental European financial systems, was bank-based (for details, see chapter 2).
Hence, when the European Union had set out to create the single market in financial
services and aimed at harmonizing financial regulation across all Member States, it
had oriented itself towards the Anglo-Saxon model. Together with the globalization
process that was also driven by liberalization tendencies, the bank-based systems
experienced a “clash of cultures”.
The German financial system has always been rather unique with its three historically
evolved banking pillars and its strong ties to both the German economy and German
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over-capacities and low profitability in the 1980s and 1990s (chapter 2 elaborates upon
that in further detail). Ultimately however, it was the rapid globalization and especially
the Europeanization and IT development towards the late 1990s, in combination with
a rather difficult economic situation at home that provided the context that eventually
led to the strategic business changes of the German banks. While the German banking
system had been relatively shielded before, the competitive pressure through the
Europeanization process and IT development became so big that the deficient
profitability of those banks that had to be operating in this new global environment
became a rather big problem that needed to be addressed and solved.
The increased competitiveness would naturally have led to a market adjustment and
the singling out of unprofitable institutions that would either have gone out of business
or been swallowed by other institutions through mergers or takeovers if the attempt to
adapt had failed. However, these European and global market liberalization forces
collided with an already unique structure in the German banking system that
consequently resulted in an asymmetrical adjustment process across the different
banking groups. Whereas privately organized big banks had to face the purely
competitive environment and had to find ways to adjust, savings banks and cooperative
banks were regionally organized institutions whose legal status made takeovers by
(domestic and foreign) private banks impossible. In addition, the non-profit-
orientation and lack of private shareholders, as well as the regional principle that
prevented competition within the respective banking groups, allowed them to operate
under conditions that may not have been possible in a perfectly competitive market
environment.
Landesbanken, on the other hand, were the central institutions to savings banks and
were forced into finding a new business model as the grounds for their old business
model had been abolished with the abolishment of maintenance obligation and
guarantor’s liability by the European Commission, thus effectively exposing them to
the same competitive market private big banks were facing.
Hence, the asymmetrical adjustment process of the different banking groups
eventually resulted in the unique hybrid structure. One could reasonably claim that it
was an internal change process as, for example, Deeg (2005) had argued studying
various financial systems including the German one. By maintaining that it was
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essentially the banks themselves that had made the decision to switch the business
models and to get more engaged in business activities characteristic for market-
oriented systems, Deeg consequently found this process to be endogenous. However,
this perception falls short of accounting for the reasons for those shifts in preferences
by various financial actors and politics, namely the changed economic conditions
under which those banks had to operate, caused by the globalization and
Europeanization processes, which were essentially exogenous causes (see section 2.3
for an elaborate discussion of the state of research).
1.2. Research Questions
The understanding of the hybridization process of the German financial system
required the consideration of both economic and political science questions. This is
because German banks were essentially firms operating in a social market economic
system and therefore had economic interests at heart. Hence, in order to understand
the competitive pressure of the German banks in light of the environmental changes
that came about through the Europeanization and globalization processes during the
late 1990s/early 2000s, the microeconomic perspective of the banking groups had to
be addressed.
However, this perspective would not have sufficed to be able to fully explain the
eventually chosen actions by both financial actors and political actors, because many
of the economically feasible options to adjust to the challenges had been barred – or at
least made less desirable – for political and historical reasons. Hence, the political
science perspective of the research foremost entailed examining and setting up the
institutional connections between the political side and the banking groups, their
historical evolutions, etc. Without the political science component, the heterogeneous
reactions of the banking groups to the globalization process could not be explained
well enough.
The following research questions had therefore been considered:
 What consequences did the globalization process during the late 1990s and
early 2000s have on the different German banking groups?
 Why was the impact of the globalization and Europeanization process
asymmetrical among the three major banking groups?
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 What factors were decisive in some of the banking groups changing to more
market-oriented business strategies while others continued largely as before?
 How did the political actors in Germany react to the economic challenges for
the economy as a whole and for the banking side?
 Which historically evolved structures contributed to the asymmetric reaction
of the banking groups and thus, the development of the hybrid German
financial system?
 What aspects of the actor constellations contributed to this hybridization
process?
1.3. Method
Single Case Study
Though in social sciences as in natural sciences, particularly in comparative research,
it is customary to analyze multiple cases and preferably a great number of them in
order to be able to compare and contrast various issues, control for certain parameters,
validate causal claims, and to refute rivaling explanations, this thesis is designed as a
single qualitative case study8. More precisely, the case study is concerned with the
development of the hybridization process – essentially a change process - of the
German financial system in the late 1990s through most of the 2000s until the outbreak
of the financial crisis in 2007/2008. Naturally, when doing a single case study, the
question arises whether this particular case can be deemed representative for other
cases, or whether something valuable can be generalized from this one particular case.
What can be inferred from the German hybrid financial system? How is that relevant
for other financial systems? The outcomes of a single case study are seemingly only
relevant and interesting to the subjects in the particular case. I have nevertheless
chosen this approach for a number of reasons. First of all, case studies have proven to
be rather useful in qualitative research as they are fit to adequately answer “why” and
“how” questions.9 Thus, instead of asking “if” a certain event or social phenomenon
has taken place, or “if” something happened or not, case studies generally give answers
and insights to the reasons and underlying processes of an event: “Qualitative case
8 For definitions, classifications and characteristics of case studies, see, for example, Hitchcock and
Hughes 1995, Smith 1978, Robson 1993, or Ying 1994.
9 For detailed discussions on qualitative research methods in social science, see King et al. 1994, for
example.
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study research enables us to study the intricacy and the particularity of social
phenomena” (Hsieh: 111). The question whether the German financial system had
undergone changes and whether the transformation towards a hybrid system had taken
place, was largely undebated. Various authors and researchers have given evidence to
that (see section 2.3 for the state of research). Hence, the more interesting question
was how that hybridization process took place and what the underlying causal
relationships for that process were.
Second, an extensive and detailed analysis of the development of the German hybrid
allows for a much greater in-depths and detailed description of the decisive causal
connections and logical linkages that other studies are unable to accomplish. Though
oversimplifications and generalizations may be helpful in explaining general trends or
reducing complexity, generalizations will always fall short of reality. In the end, each
case in reality will still be different from other cases for cultural, historical, legal, or
socioeconomic reasons, and for reasons that can be considered a unique sequence of
many events and influences in a concrete historical situation (Streeck and Höpner
2003: 35). By making use of a strategy in qualitative social science research known as
process tracing10, I am able to exploit one of the major strengths of case studies, namely
its “ability to trace changes over time” (Yin 1994: 113), to reconstruct “precisely how
one thing led to another in the specific case” (Scharpf 1997: 27/28), and by doing so,
establish exactly those causal chains. The hybridization process entailed partially
sequential and partially parallel developments. In order to be able to actually describe
how the hybridization process in the German financial system unfolded, it is essential
to present “good snapshots at a series of specific moments” (Collier 2011: 824),
meaning I had to be able to identify and describe a series of key steps and key events
that played together to have led to the hybridization process. For that reason, I looked
at the respective situation context during the late 1990s and early 2000s for each
banking group, i.e. the private big banks, the Landesbanken, and the savings and
cooperative banks, studied and searched for the motivations of the actors in question,
analyzed the various actor constellations, and evaluated the feasible action possibilities
10 Process tracing can be defined as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and
analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011: 823).
It has been recognized as a valuable mechanism to “contributed decisively both to describing political
and social phenomena and to evaluate causal claims” (Collier 2011: 823). For detailed information on
process tracing, also refer to George and Bennett 2005, Ford et al. 1989, Checkel 2008, or Tansey
2007, among others.
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that had presented themselves for the respective banking group as well as the political
actors. Finally, the action possibilities were then being evaluated on the basis of the
actors’ motivations given the situational context and being contrasted with the action
that had essentially been taken by the respective actors. For the case at hand, the
hybridization process of the German banking system was the result of a number of
different causal mechanisms. The set of variables in each of the causal mechanisms
were different, or the relationships among them were different, meaning that, for
example, the relationships between private big banks and political actors were very
different from the relationships of savings banks or Landesbanken and political actors.
Third, I believe that this single case study can nevertheless provide a valuable
contribution to the comparative capitalism literature. The political agenda on financial
and capital market regulatory issues both on the national and international level is still
dominated by the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. Though measures have been
and are being implemented manifold, little attention is being paid to the exact
development in Germany preceding the crisis. Though the imminent features, i.e. the
excessive risk-taking and engaging in uncomprehended business activities, primarily
by some big banks and Landesbanken, have been analyzed and explained, little is
being discussed on the underlying reasons and factors contributing to those activities.
Hence, this case study is to serve the purpose of improving the general knowledge on
the German financial system for researchers, but also the broad public and policy-
makers, thus helping them make adequate policy choices in the near and far future.
Moreover, it may be beneficial in adding to the debate on the efficiency of hybrid
financial systems. Before the crisis, there was a general inclination of researchers to
argue that “mixed” financial systems, i.e. financial systems that are able to incorporate
both elements from market-based and bank-based financial systems, may be more
efficient, Germany having been named as one of the primary examples (e.g. Krahnen
and Schmidt 2004). The extreme vulnerability of the German financial system in the
2008 crisis in consequence of that hybridization process may add to the debate on that
notion.
Also, the single case study presented here should be considered part of a greater
research scheme, meaning that other researchers have dealt with the analysis of the
German financial system and the changes it has undergone. Hence, this case study
should be considered a contribution to the general research on financial systems, and
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the German financial system in particular. Furthermore, it should be viewed as an
important addition to summarizing historical detail and descriptive inference regarding
the German financial system.
Single case studies are always useful when they constitute a precedent or have a unique
role. This certainly holds true for the German financial system. Besides Japan, the
German financial system has historically been considered the prominent example of
bank-based financial systems, and has been analyzed extensively for precisely those
reasons. After it had begun to gradually change, the German case was again considered
a primary example of a functioning hybrid being able to successfully incorporate bank-
based and market-oriented elements. And finally, during the crisis, it was considered
a surprising case as it, despite its economic stability and assumed stability of its
banking system, was among the most severely affected economies. The German case
is unique as it was the only banking system in the OECD world that combined three
important elements conducive to excessive risk taking by the banking sector, namely
a large share of government-owned banks, high systemic relevance of the big private
commercial banks, and a legal system protecting both creditors and shareholders
(Enderlein 2013).
Furthermore, the hybrid structure has survived the crisis largely unchanged. The
German banking system with its three pillars, two of which (savings banks and
cooperative banks sector) are very specific and in no country as distinct as in Germany,
continues to experience problems of over-capacities and low profitability. At the same
time, it still poses a challenge to the EU regarding how to treat the uniqueness of this
case in the attempt to harmonize EU financial market rules. Conversely, it is also a
challenge for the German side with regards as to how to keep that unique structure
intact in light of the European pressures.
Moreover, like Streeck and Höpner (2003) argued in their work on the winding-up of
the Deutschland AG in Germany, financial intermediaries operate through
institutionalized rules, i.e. legally established rules and also societal norms, which are
naturally subject to interpretation. The financial system in the EU is a perfect example.
While European financial market directives and regulations are implemented in all
Member States, they are still subject to a certain degree of interpretation, e.g. through
the actors (banks) who apply those rules in practice, through the authorities supervising
those actors, who may be more liberal or more strict, which, in turn, may also be
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influenced by the general “Zeitgeist” of the time, etc. Hence, single case studies are
beneficial in understanding the peculiarities of a given institution or sector, and give
insights to local properties and characteristics.
Last but not least, case studies are generally flexible in regard to data selection,
collection, and analysis. Most important about this kind of flexibility is that it allowed
for a reevaluation of certain parameters along the way. The thesis uses primarily
qualitative data. Useful qualitative data were written documents, such as press releases,
journal contributions of political and corporate actors, annual bank reports, as well as
reports of public authorities, official printed records, legal documents, and other
publicly available documents. A few interviewees provided some documents that had
been created for internal use only. Besides the analysis of documents, data collection
methods used in qualitative social research have been used predominantly. 20 expert
interviews had been conducted with people involved in the transformation process.
The experts, who used to hold (or are still holding) important offices in their respective
organizations during the timeframe 1995 through 2008, were representatives of federal
ministries, members of parliament, the German Bundesbank, representatives of banks
of all three major banking groups (private commercial banks, savings banks group,
and cooperative banks group) or bank associations, as well as corporate investors. For
the purpose of those interviews, a specific guideline for the respective interviewee had
been developed (non-standardized guided interviews) and used during the interviews.
The interviews gave information on factual data, but were also rather useful with
regards to the interviewees’ perception of situations and personal observations on the
basis of recollections of the past (actor-orientation). Insofar citations are used, they
have been anonymized (see annex 1).
In addition, statistical data from the German Bundesbank, the IMF, the World Bank,
the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), and the Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht was used for three primary purposes:
1) to illustrate the detrimental effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the German
banking sector quantitatively,
2) as partial evidence to show that a transformation process had indeed taken place,
and that the developments differed among the major German banking groups – as far
as this was deductible from the balance sheet data, and
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3) to quantitatively support various arguments and statements that illustrate the
problems encountered by the German financial system in comparison to other financial
systems. As some of the explanatory variables contain economic elements, e.g. the
question of competitiveness of German banks, the inclusion of statistical data was
necessary, for example, to portray the economic situation German private big banks
were in against the backdrop of other bank groups in Germany and internationally.
Analytical Approach
In order to answer the posed research questions and adequately examine the emergence
of the German hybrid, I had to find an analytical approach that would allow me to
adequately reconstruct the causal chains and events that were decisive for such a
development.
Explaining the course of the hybridization process necessitates a detailed
reconstruction of the developments in the banking system and its premises. The thesis
is constructed as an analytical narrative, which allows for a detailed discussion of
marginal changes that occurred within a given institutional framework, which is
essential for the purpose of the thesis. In addition to providing just a simple narrative
of the sequence of events, the approach should make it possible to also incorporate the
involved actors’ motivations and individual situations as explanatory variables, which
constitute relevant factors in the course of the developments. It therefore requires an
analytical approach that is appropriate for explaining the course of the transformation
process and its results.
For that purpose, I chose a mixture of the historical institutionalism approach and a
simplified version of the so-called actor-centered institutionalism approach developed
by Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf (for an elaboration on the approach, see section
2.3).
An important factor of the thesis is its focus on various actors and the actions they
chose to pursue in certain situations. Naturally, those actors were constrained by
institutions and the institutional context they were in at a given time. Furthermore,
those actors also constantly interacted with each other. For example, Landesbanken
and savings banks were affected by the EU Commission’s decision to abolish
maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability, which was at least partially a
consequence of the private banks’ filing a complaint with the EU Commission. This
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complaint, in turn, stemmed from the perceived inequality in competition on the
German banking market for the same customers. Hence, the actions of one actor
naturally influenced others around him, positively or negatively. The thesis, therefore,
attempts to touch upon the approach of actor-centered institutionalism. While my case
covers a fairly large timeframe, which makes it impossible to adequately reconstruct
all decisions, thought processes, actor constellations, and situational contexts in the
required detail as designated by Mayntz and Scharpf’s approach, it nevertheless
attempts to follow the intentions of the approach in a simplified form.
When reconstructing the causal chains of the hybridization process of the German
banking system, the analysis follows the actor-centered institutionalism approach and
includes a variety of relevant corporate and collective actors involved in the decision-
making processes, such as the various banks of the German banking system, the bank
associations representing the different bank groups (e.g. the Association of German
Banks, the German Savings Banks Association, the Association of German
Cooperative Banks, or the Association of German Public Banks), the ministry of
finance, the federal financial supervisory authority BaFin, the coalition government at
the time (Social Democratic Party/Alliance ‘90/The Greens), the political opposition
(Christian Democratic Party, Free Liberals), etc. The analysis includes assumptions on
their rational preferences and interests, the institutional context they faced, as well as
the specific situation those actors operated in at the given time.
Their action-orientation was largely derived from expert interviews, publicly available
documents, speeches, annual reports, press releases, journal contributions, legal
documents, and the like (see above). Furthermore, the historical development of the
German 3 pillar banking system played a particular role in understanding the
motivations and interests of the involved actors.
Though many different institutions could have been considered, particular emphasis is
placed on the legal framework, especially the ownership structure of the German banks
and the regulatory framework. It certainly plays a big role in explaining the actions
and motives of the aforementioned actors, particularly when it comes to the large
number of state-owned banks, the specific tasks assigned to them, and the
interconnectedness between members of parliament and their locally organized
savings banks and cooperative banks, e.g. regarding supervisory board representation.
Also, the legal set-up of private big banks in light of the growing influence of
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international investors and the growing interconnection of the financial markets played
a significant role in influencing banks’ behavior. Furthermore, the regulatory
framework placed a legal constraint on banks’ behavior, their available action
possibilities, etc.
Finally, the globalization and Europeanization processes accelerated by the
technological process certainly depicted a situational context, which altered the
parameters and conditions under which the German banking sector had operated up
until that point, and consequently, called for an evaluation of the status quo.
Thus, globalization and Europeanization and the institutional constraints were
considered the independent, given variable, which confronted the German banking
sector with new challenges, whereas the changes or consistency of behavior in the
different banking groups constituted the dependent variable.
The concept of actor-centered institutionalism has been used by various researchers on
single cases to illustrate and analyze comparable phenomena. For example, in
Telekommunikationspolitik im deutschen Einigungsprozess. Steuerung und
Eigendymanik sektoraler Transformation, Tobias Robischon (1999) analyzed the
transformation process of the German telecommunications sector after the German
Reunification on the basis of the actor-centered institutionalism context. By similarly
focusing on a specific timeframe, he combined the various analytical elements of the
involved actors in the transformation process, their respective initial situations, the
various constellations of the actors towards one another, and the institutional relations
among these actors to reconstruct the early stages of the sector transformation process
in three states. Jürgen Wasem (1997), too, put his focus on various actors, their action
capacities in light of their respective situations and mutual dependencies when
analyzing the transformation process from a public to a statutory health insurance
system in Germany. Also, Daniel Seikel (2011), used the actor-centered
institutionalism approach to reconstruct in detail the events and decision-making
processes that led to the EU Commission’s decision to abolish maintenance obligation
and guarantor’s liability in 2001 from the German point of view. Hence, the actor-
focus of the actor-centered institutionalism approach as a suitable explanatory variable
in itself in combination with elements of a historical narrative seemed adequate to fulfil
the aim of the thesis.
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2. The German Hybrid Financial System
As stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis rests on the notion that the
development into a rather unique hybrid financial system during the 2000s was the
reason for the relative affectedness of the German banking sector during the 2008
financial crisis. But even before the hybridization process, the German financial
system had been unique in its set-up and strong bank-based focus, both from the
demand and the supply side.
Hence, this chapter serves the primary purpose of providing the reader with the
background knowledge on the German financial system and its development into a
hybrid. It starts with a brief discourse of the “traditional” bank-based German financial
system, which is particularly important for the later chapters as it provides the
historical context of the distinctive 3 pillar banking structure, which plays a major role
in the hybridization process. I proceed by explaining the changes the system
underwent, which is enriched with factual statistical data. Furthermore, this chapter
also entails a discussion of the current state of research and its gaps on this subject
matter.
2.1. Germany’s Financial System – General Set-up and Characteristics
Germany’s supply side of the financial system, i.e. its financial sector, has traditionally
been dominated by banks as the main financial intermediaries.11
Germany’s banking sector was and still is characterized by a so-called 3 pillar structure
consisting of three major banking groups dominating the banking landscape. Those
banking groups have evolved historically and are the group of private commercial
banks, the savings banks group including both German savings banks and the
Landesbanken, and the cooperative banks group. Together, they make up
approximately 97 % of the total number of bank institutions in Germany. The other 3
% of bank institutions are special purpose banks, mortgage banks, building and loan
associations, housing enterprises with savings facilities, guarantee banks and other
credit institutions. Most banks are universal banks meaning they engage in activities,
such as deposit-taking, lending, discounting bills, providing securities brokerage
11 Financial institutions (e.g. banks, investment funds, etc.) “intermediate between those that provide
funds and those that need funds”, which “typically involves transforming and managing risk” (IMF
2006: 11). Hence, financial institutions are often referred to as financial intermediaries.
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services and trust services, factoring, financial guarantees, funds transfer, or payment
services. In addition, they provide typical investment banking services, such as
underwriting, wealth and asset management, or proprietary trading. They also provide
insurance products through subsidiaries or closely connected insurance firms (Schmidt
and Tyrell 2004).
Generally, all credit institutions in Germany are subject to federal legislation and
require a banking license, which is to be authorized by the federal banking supervisory
authority. The primary banking act is the German Banking Act (“Kreditwesengesetz”),
which was signed in 1961, entered into force in 1962, and has since been amended
many times. It lays down the “rules for banks which they have to observe when they
are being established and when they are carrying on their business. These rules are
designed to prevent undesirable developments which might disrupt the smooth
functioning of the banking system” (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
2014). Furthermore, all banks – public-law institutions, private, and cooperatives ones
– are subject to ongoing banking supervision, which has been carried out in shared
responsibility by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin, German
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) and Deutsche Bundesbank. Before the
establishment of the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht in 2002, banking
supervision was carried out by the Bundesaufsichtsamt für Kreditwesen (BaKred,
Federal Banking Supervisory Office, founded in 1962), the Bundesamt für
Wertpapierhandel (BaWe, Federal Supervisory Office for Securities, founded in
1995), and the Bundesaufsichtsamt für Versicherungswesen (BAV, Federal Insurance
Supervisory Office, founded in 1951).
Private Commercial Banks
The group of private commercial banks essentially encloses the so-called big banks,
the regional banks, private bankers, and German branches of foreign banks.12
The establishment of private banks dates back to the 16th and 17th century. During the
16th and 17th century, it was very common to establish firms that were involved in both
freight forwarding and trading goods but that also dealt with currency exchanges (Pohl
1976: 12). Those firms were typically run by families. Only later were the different
business activities separated from each other and private bankers (Privatbankiers)
12 Grouping according to German Bundesbank.
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emerged. There is no exact point of time where “pure” banking activities were
separated from other business activities, but private bankers started to emerge
particularly at the beginning of the 18th century. They remained the dominant form of
doing banking business in Germany until the years of rapid industrial expansion at the
end of the 19th century (“Gründerzeit”) started. The then quickly developing industrial
companies were in great financing needs which could no longer be met by the small
private bankers (Hackethal 2004: 75). Subsequently, a big number of banks organized
as joint stock companies were founded. Among those, Deutsche Bank was founded in
1870 in Berlin, Commerz- und Disconto-Bank (later only “Commerzbank”) was
established in 1870 in Hamburg, and Dresdner Bank was founded in 1872 in Dresden
(Pohl 1976: 24/25). Other universal private banks had emerged as well, but up until
the mid-1990s, these three big banks continued to dominate the group of private
commercial banks in Germany, largely also due to various consolidation waves. After
the Second World War, however, the three big banks were broken up into various
smaller partial institutions with no legal structures. In the early 1950s, those partial
institutions were then reorganized and consolidated into three successor institutions
each for Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank (Pohl 1976). The
reorganization was based on the demands of the Allied Forces to ensure a decentralized
banking sector in Germany, thus preventing any misuse of banks for political and
power purposes as had happened during the times of Nazi Germany (Pohl 1976).
The biggest German banks (big banks) were Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank (until
November 2009), Commerzbank, and Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (HVB),
which became a member of the UniCredit group in 2005, and from December 2004 on
Deutsche Postbank, all of them being universal banks meaning that their retail and
corporate banking businesses were complemented by growing investment banking
activities (Hackethal 2004, Deutsche Bundesbank 2014a).
The group of private commercial banks furthermore encloses the private bankers.
Private bankers, such as B. Metzler Seel. Sohn & Co. KGaA, Joh. Berenberg, Gossler
& Co., or Bankhaus Max Flessa KG, only play a minor role in today’s banking sector.
Private bankers still operating in Germany today usually belong to the oldest existing
banks (see beginning of this section), and used to normally be run as family business.
Now, they are typically owned by owner-managers who are personally liable for the
financial obligations of their banks (Hackethal 2004: 77). However, particularly during
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the times of the industrialization, both World Wars, and the German banking crisis of
1931, many private bankers disappeared. Many private bankers were taken over by big
commercial banks or merged with other private bankers to form bigger units in order
to satisfy the demands that came with the industrialization process (Pohl 1976). Also,
during the Aryanization process in Nazi German times, many private bankers were
forcefully liquidated as they were of Jewish decent, or they lost their banks to Aryans.
Many of the remaining private bankers today only survived as they changed their
business model from universal banking to specialized banking, i.e. conducting private
asset and wealth management for wealthy customers.
Regional banks and other commercial banks, as categorized by Deutsche Bundesbank,
too, are considered part of the group of the German commercial banks. This group
comprises all privately organized universal banks with the legal form of AGs and
GmbHs that traditionally had their business operations limited to a specific region in
Germany. However, their business activities are no longer restricted to that defined
region. On the contrary, their business activities now also include international
activities. Last but not least, German branches of foreign banks are also part of the
group of commercial banks.
Generally, the group of commercial banks is very diverse. They comprise both small
and big banks, banks that operate on a global level and those that have a regional focus
and customer base, as well as universal banks or specialist banks.
Private commercial banks, as the name indicates, are privately organized corporations,
who are owned by private investors. The German private commercial banks are
represented by the Association of German Banks (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken,
BdB), which “coordinates, shapes and represents the interests of the private banking
industry and acts as a mediator between the private banks, policymakers,
administrators, consumers and the business sector” (Bundesverband deutscher Banken
2013: 10). There are eleven regional banking associations that are also members of the
Association of German Banks.
Savings Banks Group
The savings banks group consists of various independent institutions, most notably the
numerous savings banks and Landesbanken, but also shared settlement units and joint
ventures (e.g. the leasing company Deutsche Leasing and DekaBank).
23
German savings banks primarily started to emerge during the late 18th century. The
first German savings banks emerged in North-West Germany: the Savings Bank of
Hamburg (1778), the Savings Bank of Oldenburg (1786), and the Savings Bank of
Kiel (1796) (e.g. Pohl 1976, Mura 1995a). Soon after that, savings banks quickly
emerged and spread in almost all German communities, mostly carried by their
respective municipalities (e.g. Pohl 1976, Mura 1987 and 1995a 1995b).
In 1838, all Prussian savings banks were put under the regime of the respective local
governments, due to the Prussian Savings Bank Act of that year, which eliminated
savings banks’ legal independent status. Similar developments occurred in all other
German regions, which resulted in a total of 2,700 public institutions at the beginning
of the 20th century (Hackethal 2004). Although later on, in 1931, savings banks
received their autonomous legal status back, the link to the public sector remained.
With the autonomous legal status, the so-called “guarantor’s liability”
(Gewährträgerhaftung) and “maintenance obligation” (Anstaltslast) were introduced
as well (Hackethal 2004). Guarantor’s liability made the public founding entity
unrestrictedly liable in case its savings bank defaulted, thus acting as a guarantor for
third party lenders, while maintenance obligation required the same public founding
entity to ensure its savings bank’s solvency, e.g. by providing capital or liquidity in
case of need (Hackethal 2004).
Savings banks are – with the exception of a few independent savings banks –
“institutions incorporated under public law”, meaning that the responsible public body
of a savings bank is a German municipality, i.e. a city, town, district, or the like
(Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2012: 5), which, however, does not own the
savings bank.
Besides the general federal legislation for banks (e.g. the German Banking Act),
savings banks are subject to the savings banks acts of the German Lander (federal
states). Though the savings banks acts vary among the different Lander, they share
important elements regarding the savings banks group’s public legal structure, the
municipal trusteeship, their public mandate, and their business model and regional
principal. They usually also include general terms on the collaboration with the
respective Landesbank.
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Savings banks have an extensive branch network and a huge local presence, also in
rural areas. Savings banks are generally obliged to follow the so-called “regional
principle” meaning that savings banks “are only authorised to operate branches within
their home region and that their loan activities should focus on that region” (Deutscher
Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2012: 6). The savings banks acts of the respective
Lander explicitly state the obligation to follow this regional principle (see, for
example, § 3 of the Savings Banks Act of Northrhine-Westfalia). This is to avoid
competition among any local savings banks (Hackethal 2004). The regional principle
has the advantage that savings banks are generally very committed to their home
region, to the development of the local economy, and generally have very good
knowledge of their customers.
Savings banks were founded with the intention to give the poorer population the
opportunity to help themselves, to act independently by providing them with a safe
institution to deposit their money in return for interest (e.g. Mura 1987 and 1995a).
Incentives for saving were also considered educational measures for the population,
and were provided by the different savings banks through various incentive
mechanisms, such as the domestic coin banks (Heimspardosen), which would even be
picked up from home and emptied into the respective savings banks accounts by
savings banks employees (e.g. Mura 1995a). Despite the two World Wars, inflation
and the subsequent devaluation of monetary savings, bank runs, and the like, saving
remained popular with the German population and was upheld by both the savings
banks and the German population (e.g. Mura 1995b). The savings banks’ philosophy
builds on the idea of self-provision. Savings banks used to provide people with the
opportunity to save their money for times of need, especially for the poorer population,
such as servants, day laborers, agricultural workers, etc. In addition to the various
forms of saving, the so-called “investment saving” was then also introduced as a means
of saving. In 1956, the first investment fund company belonging to the savings banks
organization was founded in Dusseldorf, i.e. the Deutsche Kapitalanlagegesellschaft
mbh/DEKA (Mura 1995b).
Generally, savings banks provide financial services to the local households,
companies, and the public sector. Different from private commercial banks, for
example, savings banks are restricted with regard to profit maximization. For example,
the Savings Banks Act of Northrhine-Westphalia under § 2 section 3 states that “profit
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maximization is not the primary purpose of the business operation” (Savings Banks
Act of North Rhine-Westphalia 2014, own translation). Similar statements can be
found in other savings banks acts. Due to their restricted profit maximization rule, most
savings banks usually engage in community services. In fact, the German Savings
Banks Association states that the savings banks finance group has sponsored a variety
of “charitable causes and cultural and sports activities, as well as research and
scientific, environmental, and business development projects” in Germany (Deutscher
Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2012: 4-5).
Landesbanken are also part of the savings banks group. They were established in the
mid-19th century and developed into central banks for the German savings banks of a
given region and soon became an important provider of local government finance.
Their predecessors are the so-called provincial aid budget offices
(Provinzialhilfskassen), the first one being the Provinzial-Hülfskasse Westfalen,
which started operating in 1832. Landesbanken played a particularly important role
after the Second World War in helping their respective Lander to finance their
economic and infrastructure projects.
Landesbanken are owned by their respective German Land, by other Landesbanken
and by the regional savings associations, which mainly serve to provide administrative
services to their members, i.e. to their regional savings banks. Landesbanken serve as
the respective Hausbank to their Land providing cash management services and
granting loans, which are primarily refinanced through public mortgage bonds and
public sector bonds (Hackethal 2004: 80). In line with their respective bylaws, they
are allowed to conduct any legal banking business, and hence have been operating as
regular universal banks for years.
In general, Landesbanken and savings banks share certain tasks and also collaborate
on a number of issues. Whereas savings banks focus on doing business with small and
medium-sized enterprises and retail banking, Landesbanken primarily focus their
efforts on doing business with big companies, wealthy private customers and
institutional customers (Klein 2003). The savings banks finance group has a joint
liability scheme, which consists of regional funds of the respective regional savings
associations, supra-regional funds, and funds from the Landesbanken and regional
building societies, and operates along a strict liability cascade (Deutscher Sparkassen-
und Giroverband 2012).
26
Until 2005, both Landesbanken and savings banks enjoyed the so-called guarantor’s
liability and maintenance obligation (see section 4.1.3). A decision by the EU
Commission in 2001 effectively abolished maintenance obligation and guarantor’s
liability from 2005 on, which will play an important role when analyzing the change
process for Landesbanken in chapter 4.
The savings banks finance group is represented on matters concerning banking policy,
regulatory issues, and other banking industry issues by the umbrella organization
German Savings Banks Association (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband,
DSGV), which is funded by the regional savings banks associations and the
Landesbanken. In addition, Landesbanken are also exclusively represented by the
Association of German Public Banks (Bundesverband Öffentlicher Banken
Deutschlands, VÖB).
Cooperative Banks Group
Cooperative banks are typically rather small. They are member-owned and their main
function is to support the businesses of their own members. The abolition of serfdom
and freedom of trade and the ongoing industrialization at the beginning of the 19th
century increasingly threatened the existence of small agricultural businesses as well
as craftsmanships in the cities (Pohl 1976: 33). Craft and trade guilts during the middle
ages had forced craftsmen and tradesmen into a firmly established system. When this
system crumbled and freedom of trade, the development of modern monetary
transactions, and the development of the railroad industry came about, farmers and
craftsmen were left on their own and forced to deal with an entirely new situation.
They were no longer able to solely work for and supply their regional markets and take
orders in exchange for a downpayment, but they then had to produce their products in
advance for the general market and for storage (Pohl 1976). That also implied a gap
between production and sales, which could only be bridged with loans. However, the
existing credit institutions at that time were not suited to fulfill that purpose, because
savings banks, for example, requested collateral in exchange for credit, which small
craftsmen were unable to give, or because private banks were tied up in financing the
manufacturing and transportation industries (Pohl 1976: 35). As a consequence,
cooperative thinking took root. The early forms of credit cooperatives were founded
on the basis of self-reliance, self-aid, and self-responsibility (see Pohl 1976 and
Hackethal 2004). The most famous founders of credit cooperatives were Hermann
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Schulze-Delitzsch and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen. They had both founded the first
credit cooperatives independently from each other. Although Schulze-Delitzsch’s and
Raiffeisen’s cooperatives had differed (the controversy between those two mainly
evolving around the differing opinions on the valuation of company shares, subsumed
as “system quarrel” (Systemstreit)), they both laid an important basis for the existing
cooperative institutions. Savings from depositors were transferred to members with
financing needs and profits were distributed among its members once a year
(Hackethal 2004: 83). This principle remained the same until today, except that non-
members are now also allowed to receive loans (Hackethal 2004: 83).
In 1972, all German credit cooperatives were united to form the Federal Association
of German Cooperative Banks (Bundesverband der Deutschen Volks- und
Raiffeisenbanken, BVR), and are politically represented by that association in Berlin
(Hackethal 2004). The Association of German Cooperative Banks consists of the
primary credit cooperatives that provide mainly retail banking services to their local
markets. In addition, the two central institutions of the cooperative banking group –
the WGZ Bank and the DZ Bank – act as clearing institutions to the primary
institutions, provide them with access to national and international financial markets,
provide them with asset liability management, and support and offer centralized back-
office functions (Hackethal 2004: 83).
Cooperatives are restricted to raising equity from the cooperative members only.
Because of this legal restriction, in addition to the small sizes of the institutions, loans
are hardly ever given out to bigger companies, which hinders the growth of the
cooperatives banking group. The essence and basic idea of cooperative banks is to
support the “purchasing power or trade of its members or their social and cultural
interests through cooperative business operations”, as stated in § 1 of the Cooperative
Societies Act (“Genossenschaftsgesetz”, own translation).
Cooperative banks are typically organized in the legal form of registered cooperatives.
The regional cooperative institutions are usually owned by their respective members
(corporate entity or natural person), sometimes also by non-members, which is
regulated in the respective cooperative bank’s bylaws. The regional cooperative
institutions, in turn, hold the majority of shares of the cooperative central banks – the
DZ Bank and the WGZ Bank DZ Bank and WGZ Bank fulfil certain service functions
for the other regional cooperative institutions, such as liquidity settlement or the
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provision of refinancing funds, and are also active as regular universal banks both
nationally and internationally. In case of bank insolvencies, the members are liable
with their shares in the bank and possibly an additional guaranteed amount defined in
the bylaws (Nachschusspflicht, reserve liability). Different from commercial banks,
each cooperative member has only one vote, irregardless of his or her number of shares
in the cooperative institution. Similar to the savings banks, cooperative banks usually
act locally, have deep roots with the local households and smaller companies, and
operate according to the regional principle to avoid creating competition within the
cooperative banks group.
Other banks
In addition to the primary three pillars of private commercial banks, the savings banks
group and the cooperative banks group, a few other bank groups exist, including the
group of special purpose banks, mortgage banks, and building and loan associations,
which only make up a minor percentage of the number of all credit institutions in
Germany.13 They will not play any particular role in this thesis due to their small
number, but are mentioned here for the sake of completeness.
The group of special purpose banks consists of banks with special functions, i.e. banks
that grant loans to individuals, enterprises, and projects that are deemed eligible for
promotion by the German government. Among them are, for example, the
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) or the Industriekreditbank (IKB).
The group of mortgage banks consists of both privately and publicly organized
mortgage banks that serve the purpose of financing long-term investments of the public
sector (communities, the federal state, or the German Lander) or corporations and
private individuals. They refinance themselves through giving out mortgage bonds or
public mortgage bonds (German Pfandbriefe). Hence, long-term lending is coupled
with long-term refinancing. Those banks are generally restricted by the “special banks
principle”, i.e. their business activities are restricted to a certain set of business
activities, such as giving out mortgage loans.
13 The grouping of German banks according to Deutsche Bundesbank varied over time. For example,
until 2007, investment companies were also considered credit institutions, but have been counted
separately since the coming into effect of the German Investment Act (“Investmentgesetz”) on 28
December 2007.
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Building and loan associations are also both privately and publicly organized
associations that vary in their legal arrangements. Privately organized building and
loan associations are AGs that are majority-owned or influenced by large banks or
insurance companies. According to the Building and Loan Associations Act, building
and loan associations have to be independent institutions, hence banks wanting to
engage in the building and loan savings activities have to act through subsidiaries. The
publicly owned group of building and loans associations are owned by one or more
German Lander and/or its respective regional savings banks association. There are a
few others that are either dependent business areas of Landesbanken or savings banks,
or are public institutions. Public building and loan associations do not compete against
each other, as they are regionally segmented, whereas private building and loan
associations do, as they operate nation-wide.
Demand Side
Aside from the supply side of financial services and products being bank-dominated,
the demand side for the financial products and services, i.e. private households and
firms, also has traditionally met its financing needs primarily through bank loans or
internal financing. Households have held a great portion of their assets in bank savings
accounts at their local banks, have relied on bank loans in case of financing needs, and
firms have primarily relied on bank loans for funding their investments. Hence, the
interconnectedness between banks and households and firms has been very great.
Stock markets, on the other hand, used to be rather small and less liquid, whereas bank
loans accounted for a great portion of companies’ liabilities (Vitols 2005: 386).
The common term used to describe this kind of connectedness between the supply and
demand side in Germany is the so-called “Hausbank principle”, indicating that both
firms and households had their one or two banks they turned to for all kinds of
business, ranging from depositing their assets with them to financing their investments,
or arranging IPOs through them, receiving assistance and advice when getting engaged
on the capital market, and the like. Generally speaking, the German population has
traditionally been rather risk-averse, meaning that it would deposit its assets in bank
accounts to earn interest as a means of a relatively risk-free form of investment instead
of investing it on capital markets, for example. This kind of behavior has traditionally
been supported by the government, e.g. through laws such as the Savings Premium
30
Act (“Sparprämiengesetz”) of 1959, or the Capital Accumulation Act
(“Vermögensbildungsgesetz”) of 1961 (see section on savings banks).
According to Schmidt and Tyrell (2004), the intermediation ratios in Germany, i.e.
ratios that measure the level of involvement of the banking sector in channeling funds
between surplus units (usually households) and deficit units (usually firms), have been
continuously high.14
Those close long-term financing commitments between banks and firms was
furthermore supported by the banks’ role in the firms’ corporate governance structure.
This means that in addition to the banks’ role as primary external funder for German
companies, the bank-firm relationship was further strengthened by the banks’ direct
shareholdings and proxy voting rights, as well as by the banks’ representation on the
supervisory boards of those firms (e.g. Vitols 2005, Elsas and Krahnen 2004). In
addition, other elements of the financial system, such as the legal system or the
accounting system, were tailored in such way that it benefited this Hausbank principle
and bank-dominated financial system. For example, the German accounting system
primarily resolved its information asymmetries between investors and firms via private
information channels, such as information of board members and German audit reports
(e.g. Leuz and Wüstemann 2004). German banks would “gain a considerable amount
of inside information about the track record and projects of a firm” via large
shareholdings in industrial firms (private big banks) and via private information
channels (Hall and Soskice 2001: 23). In addition, the legal system was tailored
towards creditor protection rather than investor protection (see, for example, Levine
1997).
Overall, the German financial system was thus a very coherent system with the
different parts and elements of the German financial system being complementary to
each other.
Characterization of the German Financial System
Over the years, the German financial system has continuously been characterized and
criticized as being “overbanked” and unprofitable compared with other financial
systems (see, for example, Koetter et al. 2006, Decressin et al. 2004, or Hempell 2002).
14 For more information on intermediation ratios, see, for example, Schmidt et al. 1999, or Schmidt
and Tyrell 2004.
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Though the number of bank institutions and branches in Germany has been steadily
declining15, the number remained fairly high. Particularly during the first decade of
this century, a great number of consolidations took place, especially in the cooperative
banks group and the savings banks group. However, Germany’s number of banks and
bank branches in relation to the population continued to be rather great compared to
other countries’ banking sectors (Table 2).
Table 2 – Number of reporting German bank institutions
In comparison, Germany also had a much higher bank branch density than other
industrial nations. For example, according to the Bank of International Settlement,
Germany had the fifth highest branch density among 16 industrial nations, not
including the Postbank branches. According to that data, the number of German bank
branches amounted to 46 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2003, which was much higher
than the average of 35 (Sachverständigenrat 2004: 371, BIS 2004: 131). Including the
Postbank branches, the number would even have increased to 62, which would have
been the second highest bank branch density among those 16 nations
(Sachverständigenrat 2004).
Moreover, in terms of asset concentration, Germany showed the lowest numbers
among those 16 selected nations. The assets of the five largest institutions as a share
of all banks’ assets only amounted to 17% in 1995 and 22% in 2003, compared with
an average of 52% and 59%, respectively (Sachverständigenrat 2004). This, too,
15 Between 1985 and 1990, the number of bank institutions jumped up, which was due to the
reunification between East and West Germany. Before 1990, only institutions in former West
Germany were counted. The general trend, however, clearly was a steady decline in institutions.
Private commercial banks Landesbanken Savings banks Cooperative banking group
1950 281 15 882 2310
1955 337 13 858 2203
1960 336 14 866 2259
1965 343 14 864 2221
1970 314 12 832 2180
1975 293 12 675 2421
1980 243 12 599 2289
1985 236 12 590 3664
1990 365 12 772 3416
1995 335 13 626 2595
2000 294 13 562 1796
2005 252 12 463 1296
2010 280 10 429 1140
Source: own representation based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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indicates a largely fragmented banking market.16. Own calculations on the basis of the
Deutsche Bundesbank data base show similar results. The big banks’ aggregated
assets17 as a share of all banks’ aggregated assets amounted to less than 10% during
the 1990s and only slightly increased in the 2000s, not even reaching 20% (Deutsche
Bundesbank 2014b).18 Hackethal (2004), too, noted that the asset bank concentration
among German banks has been rather low compared to the European average, at least
when treating all banks as single entities and not counting the savings banks group and
cooperative banks group as one large entity, respectively.
Similarly, the Boone indicator, a classic indicator for the concentration and
competition in industry sectors, shows that Germany (red line) has had a more
competitive market than most other European countries, certainly more competitive
than the euro zone average (purple line).
Figure 1 - Boone indicator development for various European countries
Over the years, the 3 pillar structure of the German financial sector has remained intact.
In fact, the numbers for the respective market shares show remarkable consistency.
For example, in terms of savings deposits from domestic households, savings banks
16 It should be noted, however, that the number leaves aside the fact that savings banks and
cooperative banks are counted individually, thus implying that they are all competitors to each other,
which, in fact, they are not (see “regional principle” of cooperative and savings banks).
17 The group of big banks includes Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, UniCredit Bank (formerly
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank), Postbank since 1995, and Dresdner Bank until 2008.
18 Other statistics, such as the World Bank’s/Bankscope’s bank concentration ratio show much higher
numbers for Germany (between 65 and 73% between 1998 and 2008). This is due to the fact that they
calculated the assets of the three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial (!) banks. In
Germany’s case, this completely distorts the validity of the data as savings banks and cooperative
banks have a big market share. Even taking this into account, big banks’ aggregated assets as a share
of the aggregated assets of commercial banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks, still only amount
to 35% at the most (own calculations on the basis of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s data base).
Source: own representation based on the World Bank financial development indicators data base.
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alone have held a constant market share of over 50%, another 25-30 % being occupied
by credit cooperatives (see Table 3). Furthermore, the market shares in terms of
lending to non-banks has remained fairly constant, some increases being attributed to
the group of “others”, which includes German mortgage banks, which have gained
market shares in the lending business.
Table 3 - German banks’ market shares
Though somewhat less dominant than with savings deposits from domestic
households, the savings banks group has also occupied the largest share in the German
banking market in terms of deposits and borrowing from non-banks in general,
including firms (also Table 3).
Other indicators for the quality of the financial sector include its size, measured, for
example, in terms of stock market capitalization. To that regard, Germany has been
average within the Eurozone (Sachverständigenrat 2008: 21), but has been seriously
lacking behind the leading financial centers, such as the US and the UK, but also the
Netherlands, Ireland, or Luxembourg (Sachverständigenrat 2008). In terms of market
capitalization of listed domestic companies, Germany has even continuously been on
the lower end of the spectrum (see Table 4), also giving evidence to the fact that
German companies’ presence on the stock market has been comparatively lower than
in other countries.
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005
Commercial banks group 29,76 25,15 26,43 26,55 22,98 20,84 26,18 29,02 14,34 13,39 15,66 16,66
Savings banks group 34,05 37,43 34,69 33,59 39,83 41,15 39,04 37,80 52,68 51,42 52,16 50,78
Cooperative banks group 14,16 14,85 12,46 12,19 20,13 20,99 18,07 17,65 25,81 27,51 29,62 29,67
Others 22,03 22,57 26,42 27,67 17,06 17,02 16,70 15,53 7,16 7,67 2,55 2,89
Market share in terms of deposits
and borrowing from non-banks in
%
Market share in terms of lending
to non-banks in %
Market share in terms of saving
deposits from domestic
households in %*
Source: own calculations and representation based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
*Saving deposits from domestic households: “commercial banks” includes big banks and regional banks,
“savings banks group” includes only savings banks, and “cooperative banks group” includes only credit
cooperatives
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Table 4 - Market capitalization indicators for selected countries
The delivery of financial and insurance services in Germany as percentage of gross
value added made up between 3.8% and 5.5% during the years 1990 to 2012 (Eurostat
2014). With that, Germany has constantly been below the European Union (28
countries) average and euro area (18 countries) average19. Here, too, it becomes
apparent that Germany has been particularly lacking behind other financial centers,
such as Luxembourg (between 19.1% and 29.4%), Ireland (between 6.6% and 11.3%),
UK (between 5.9% and 10.7%), or Switzerland (between 7.2% and 13.1%) during the
same time period (Eurostat 2014). In the US, for example, the contribution of the
financial and insurance sector to gross value added varied between 6.2% and 7.7% in
the years between 1997 and 201220 (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014).
In addition to being criticized for its sheer number of institutions and branches, the
German financial sector has also continuously been criticized for its low profitability.
Some of the major indicators give evidence to that.
19 Numbers for European Union and euro area are available from 2000 on (Eurostat 2014).
20 Numbers only available from 1997 onwards (own calculations).
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005
Australia 39,28 65,76 97,14 117,83 6381,45 6518,37 6944,08 8055,98 35,00 66,60 89,78 115,92
Austria 11,57 14,12 15,23 34,60 1263,38 1371,37 1210,75 1118,16 6,98 13,63 15,59 40,79
Belgium 37,96 35,35 73,82 75,07 1825,96 1410,70 1697,35 2118,60 32,24 36,89 78,43 76,46
Canada 46,47 57,87 113,29 121,64 4116,44 4074,40 4608,43 11515,85 40,88 60,85 113,78 127,20
Finland 20,91 34,51 246,05 100,75 1463,97 1429,19 2975,15 2554,28 16,34 33,74 241,09 107,01
France 30,03 32,62 102,82 77,87 989,57 755,79 1326,52 1400,84 25,24 33,21 109,07 82,32
Germany - 22,05 66,35 43,65 519,93 830,09 1243,14 785,75 20,71 22,89 67,34 44,15
Ireland - - 72,39 56,56 - 2216,78 1997,28 1274,07 - 38,05 84,13 56,34
Italy 15,23 17,22 63,23 44,55 387,88 439,80 511,05 469,23 13,09 18,51 69,60 44,68
Japan 115,22 72,26 84,11 91,25 1676,42 1804,06 2018,60 2566,27 94,08 68,75 66,73 103,60
Netherlands 51,73 81,24 161,85 89,45 1738,96 1403,71 1469,34 1452,22 40,70 85,09 166,32 92,86
Norway 23,16 28,78 36,19 55,72 2640,59 3463,95 4252,98 4131,26 22,19 29,94 38,64 62,80
Spain 24,62 30,69 75,51 84,01 1099,09 919,08 2530,85 7604,01 21,33 33,17 86,88 84,90
Sweden 48,02 63,35 134,27 104,38 3014,43 2526,36 3291,21 2790,83 39,41 70,19 132,79 109,00
Switzerland 74,31 118,46 275,72 229,04 2710,14 3309,34 3507,67 3536,32 65,57 133,85 309,45 243,95
UK 86,86 113,72 179,59 128,02 2971,30 3581,58 3233,01 4581,21 83,29 119,23 172,53 131,74
USA 57,61 81,50 161,46 133,51 2643,59 2880,82 2666,55 1740,34 51,17 89,48 146,79 129,59
No. of publicly listed companies
per 10K population
Market capitalization of listed
domestic companies as % of GDP
Stock market capitalization
as % of GDP
Source: own representation based on the World Bank financial development indicators data base.
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Table 5 - Bank profitability indicators of selected countries
For example, Table 5 shows the ROE (return on equity) of various big European
countries compared with the ROE of German banks. Between, 2000 and 2008, the
ROE of German banks had almost always been lower than that of banks in any other
country. Whereas many other countries’ banks’ ROE lay around or above 10%,
Germany’s bank’s ROE greatly fluctuated and was continuously much lower than that
of other countries, particularly in comparison to the leading financial centers in the UK
and the US or Switzerland. In the first years of the new century, the ROE of German
banks was even negative, thus pointing to a very unprofitable banking business. The
same accounted for the ROA. The ROA of German banks was continuously below 0
between 2002 and 2008.
At the same time, the cost income ratio furthermore indicates that German banks had
been rather inefficient compared to the euro zone average and other European
countries. While Germany’s banks’ cost income ratio continuously lay at over 70%
between 2000 and 2004, in 2001 and 2003 even reaching over 80% (82.8% in 2001,
and 81.81% in 2003), all other countries’ banks’ cost-income-ratio were much lower.
2.2. Changes in the German Financial System
Despite its relative stability and coherence, the German financial system has
undergone gradual but constant changes since the 1980s. Enderlein (2013) made a
clear distinction between the changes in the German financial system that had started
in the 1980s and ended with the break-up of the Deutschland AG and those changes
between the late 1990s and the 2008 financial crisis, which he distinguished as
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Australia 0,09 0,44 0,49 2,26 0,86 1,32 7,61 10,32 34,81 13,75 62,85 50,96 29,10 46,22 45,58
Austria 0,28 0,35 0,52 0,60 -0,51 5,83 7,44 9,48 9,51 -6,03 58,20 60,02 59,60 63,19 64,25
Belgium 0,40 0,74 0,41 0,76 -1,81 11,93 14,78 11,14 25,65 -45,17 66,12 67,39 62,91 56,94 56,20
Canada -0,14 0,50 0,99 0,88 0,57 -1,62 6,13 13,14 10,05 10,43 63,99 75,55 63,47 54,43 50,92
Finland 0,86 0,28 1,37 0,92 0,58 17,93 6,17 15,73 9,68 10,10 50,00 57,01 47,10 37,56 43,43
France 0,43 0,41 0,51 0,67 -0,31 10,35 10,38 13,22 20,94 -11,96 70,90 67,65 65,27 65,61 74,85
Germany 0,28 -0,08 -0,08 0,29 -0,30 7,15 -2,22 -2,66 10,19 -11,56 76,29 71,45 77,90 68,74 94,28
Ireland 0,33 0,18 1,67 0,93 0,18 8,44 4,88 17,97 24,70 4,89 14,93 20,85 16,81 35,78 -
Italy 0,89 -0,03 2,34 1,04 0,52 14,81 -0,35 17,10 12,26 5,56 61,46 70,72 82,45 59,12 65,40
Japan -0,07 -0,76 0,06 0,44 -0,13 -0,89 -20,76 1,12 8,28 -3,28 58,20 53,91 52,64 55,23 62,08
Netherlands 1,30 0,10 0,69 0,88 -1,55 14,30 1,11 11,07 17,08 -32,73 52,18 60,73 63,74 50,90 56,29
Norway 0,91 0,43 0,56 1,44 0,50 13,65 6,80 9,06 28,13 10,02 60,84 63,91 59,48 48,40 49,72
Spain 0,32 0,34 0,77 0,96 0,80 5,47 4,06 10,51 14,60 12,13 64,59 70,84 54,45 47,11 48,97
Sweden 0,68 0,42 1,22 0,70 0,53 19,70 11,99 31,16 18,55 15,53 68,19 71,79 67,13 62,17 65,86
Switzerland 0,91 0,63 0,79 0,57 -1,61 20,76 13,74 17,04 13,73 -42,66 62,48 70,04 65,70 68,84 226,32
UK 1,19 0,91 2,31 0,65 0,05 16,74 9,76 36,36 17,05 1,40 51,94 72,75 55,27 53,72 54,70
USA 1,16 1,29 1,30 1,27 0,10 13,71 13,84 13,30 12,49 1,45 60,74 56,15 58,57 58,50 64,23
Cost Income RatioROEROA
Source: own representation based on the World Bank financial development indicators data base.
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“corporate financialization” process and “banking financialization” process,
respectively. Whereas the “corporate financialization” process captures the changes in
the relationships between the financial sector (e.g. banks) and non-financial
corporations (e.g. industrial companies), which Deeg described as “the growing
influence of financial actors (whether direct or mediated via markets) over the real
economy (i.e. control financialisation) and the growing portion of corporate revenue
and profits deriving from financial transactions (i.e. profit financialisation)” (Deeg
2011: 121), the “banking financialization” phase refers to the changes in the banking
system and focuses on the “increased trading of, and exposure to, risk” (Hardie and
Howarth 2009: 1018). Though the thesis focuses on the “banking financialization”
process, the changes of the first process are briefly elaborated upon below as they
nevertheless constitute an important piece of background information without which
the banking financialization process cannot be well understood.
Changes in the German Financial System in the 1980s and 1990s
Compared with other financial systems, particularly the leading financial centers in
Great Britain and the United States, which – different from Germany – were much
more capital market-oriented, Germany had started to fall behind in the 1970s and
1980s.
The post-World War II world saw general liberalization tendencies, which included
policies that facilitated the liberalization of monetary and financial flows, but also in
other areas of society. Having dealt with a period of stagflation and economic recession
in the 1970s and early 1980s, the United States eventually rallied to turn the economy
around by fostering and implementing various measures supportive of the free market
principle. During the Ronald Reagan era, various financial sector reforms were
introduced, such as the “Depository Institutions and Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act” of 1980, phasing out interest rate ceilings on deposits, or the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, and various new financial instruments
developed during that time (e.g. credit default swaps, securitization, etc.). The
deregulatory and free market spirit was greatly influenced by the “Chicago School” of
thought: “‘Chicago’” stands for the belief in the efficiency of the free market as a
means of organizing resources, for skepticism about government intervention into
economic affairs, and for emphasis on the quantity theory of money as a key factor in
producing inflation” (van Overtveldt 2007). Reagan himself promised to get „the
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government off the backs of the American people“ by cutting taxes, slashing spending,
and deregulating the economy (Karaagac 2001: 142). Regardless of whether it had
been Reagan’s reforms that contributed to the US’ subsequent economic growth and
well-being, or whether it had been a consequence of preceding deregulatory reforms,
the American economy did recover quickly and flourished in the 1980s.
The UK followed suit. Also borne from the fear of falling behind economically,
particularly with regards to the developments in the US financial sector, Margaret
Thatcher pushed through a set of financial reforms that became known as the “Big
Bang” on 27 October 1986. The British “Financial Services Act” of 1986 was mainly
concerned with the liberalization and deregulation of financial markets, most notably
the stock markets. In fact, the reforms of the “Financial Services Act” opened the
London Stock Exchange to direct foreign investments, also allowed proprietary
transactions by abolishing the separation between brokers and market makers, opened
the ownership of Stock Exchange members to outsiders, abolished fixed broking
commissions, and removed barriers on derivatives business (The Guardian 2011). The
reforms “brought an end to the dominance of the London Stock Exchange and heralded
the rise of electronic trading, while the removal of entry barriers invited European and
US banks to flock to London” (Financial News 2013). In the following years, the City
of London flourished, foreign banks and trading companies came in, the trading
volume greatly expanded, the London Stock Exchange changed from an open outcry
system to an automated electronic exchange, securities markets were deregulated, and
London City generally became the leading financial center in the world. The City’s
contribution to GDP as much as doubled from 15.5 % in 1986 to 29.2 % in 2008
(Financial News 2013). Essentially almost one third of the nation’s GDP stemmed
from banking, finance, business, and leasing activities.
Compared with the developments in those leading financial centers of New York and
London, Germany’s financial system was lacking behind, and raised the question in
Germany how to keep up with the other countries. In its annual report of 1987,
Deutsche Bundesbank wrote:
“In spite of a number of favorable trends, the reform of the stock exchange system made little
headway last year in the organisational, legislative and tax fields. At the same time, the need
to take action with a view to promoting the international competitiveness of German stock
market centres seems to have increased if anything. Of late there have repeatedly been calls for
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the creation in Germany of a viable financial futures and option stock exchange modelled on
exchanges of this kind abroad” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1988: 47).
“The world-wide trend toward securitised financial assets and liabilities, the deregulation of
the markets and the increasing internationalisation of securities transactions enabled the share
and bond markets in the industrial countries to expand relatively strongly for a long period
during the eighties” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1988: 46).
Consequently, Germany was looking to catch up with the general trend towards
liberalization of financial and capital markets in order to remain competitive.
Based on these premises, the German financial system had started the attempt to adapt
to the new and increasingly global environment in the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas the
“old”, traditional bank-based financial system had been characterized and known for
its particularly strong ties between banks and corporations, as well as the bonds
between banks and private households (“Hausbank principle”, see, for example,
Ziegler 2000, Elsas 2001, Elsas and Krahnen 2004, or Hackethal 2004), these ties
started to loosen during those two decades. Particularly during the 1990s, a number of
legislative changes were implemented that were supposed to be conducive in making
the financial sector more competitive in the global context and to making the capital
market more accessible. Most notable to that regard are the four legal acts for the
promotion of the German financial market, passed in 1990, 1994, 1998, and in 2002,
respectively. Moreover, legislative changes were introduced that changed the practices
at the Frankfurt Stock exchange, including, for example, the introduction of an
electronic trading platform for stocks, futures, and options. In addition, in 1997, a New
Economy platform, the “Neuer Markt”, modeled after the American NASDAQ, was
established as a segment of the German Stock Exchange, which was supposed to
support young and innovative sectors (particularly information technology,
multimedia and telecommunication companies) help raise equity via the capital
market.
At the same time, the German population, traditionally not very active on the capital
markets at all, were encouraged to get engaged in the capital market segment and to
become shareholders. The most prominent example was the privatization of the
German Telekom, which had its first IPO in 1996 and was advertised heavily across
the mainstream German media channels. In fact, shares of the company were
particularly pitched to be “people’s shares” (Volksaktien). In 1996, only 6% of the
39
German population over 14 years were shareholders (Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2014).
The number increased to almost 10% until 2000, but quickly fell back to even below
6% after the bursting of the dotcom bubble in the late 2000s.
At the same time, the corporate connections between banks and corporations in terms
of occupying seats in each other’s supervisory boards, banks being the sole financier
of non-financial corporate companies, etc., started to dissolve. New financial
regulation, such as the Control and Transparency in Large Companies Act (“Gesetz
zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich”), implemented in 1998,
aimed at improving corporate governance and transparency in German corporations
and as such, incorporated elements into the German system that had traditionally been
common for more market-oriented systems. The peak of that development was
eventually reached with the implementation of a law that made the sale of long-term
equity stakes held by firms and banks in other firms and banks tax-free from 1 January
2002 on (Deeg 2010, Enderlein 2013). This law would effectively break-up the
traditional Deutschland AG. As a consequence, many big banks sold their shares in
large German corporations, which were replaced by other institutional investors, such
as German and British insurance companies or mutual and hedge funds (Deeg 2005,
also see section 3.1.3 on this matter and further statistics). Instead, the big banks shifted
their focus from the simple loan business and deriving income from maturity mismatch
transformations to being active in the M&A advisory business to companies, raising
equity for companies (Enderlein 2013), and generally attempted to derive more income
through commissions. For example, Deutsche Bank, through its investment subsidiary
Morgan Grenfell, prepared the take-over attempt of Thyssen by Krupp (Höpner and
Jackson 2001), a rather big and important M&A transaction. Overall, however, M&A
business was still dominated by the American and British investment banks, who had
occupied a greater market share and have had much more experience with that kind of
business.
Changes of the German Financial System in the 2000s – Development of the Hybrid
However, though these changes in the 1980s and 1990s were significant, they are not
considered having been the decisive factor for Germany’s outcome during the 2008
crisis (Enderlein 2013). Instead, the hybrid that developed during the 2000s was
essentially characterized by an ever-growing exposure to foreign customers and risks
on the asset sides of predominantly big banks and Landesbanken while the structural
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set-up of the banking system and the financing patterns of non-financial institutions
(i.e. households and firms) showed a rather strong continuity. Different from those
changes in the 1990s, banks’ business behavior, particularly of Landesbanken and
private big banks, started to significantly change in the 2000s after the dotcom bubble
burst. First of all, the sheer size of banks in terms of their balance sheets in relation to
GDP grew significantly. In 2008, the aggregated balance sheet of all German banks
exceeded German GDP more than three times (321.6% of GDP)21. Whereas the
German GDP had increased by 23.7% between 1999 and 2008, the balance sheet total
of big banks, for example, had increased by roughly 78% over the same period of time,
those of Landesbanken had increased by 52.3%. In comparison, the balance sheet total
of savings banks, for example, had only increased by 21.8% during the same
timeframe, which was much more in line with GDP growth.
Figure 2 - Aggregated German banks’ balance sheet total compared to German GDP
Also, the speed with which individual balance sheets grew in the mid-2000s, was
enormous. For example, in 2005, Deutsche Bank’s balance sheet total was close to 1
trillion euros. One year later, it had already reached 1.5 trillion euros, only to surpass
the 2 trillion euros mark in 2007, i.e. the balance sheet of Deutsche Bank had doubled
within two years (Karsch 2007 and 2008).
21 Number calculated on the basis of Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
Source: own calculations and representation based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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Figure 3 - Major income items for all German banking groups as percentage of operating income
The above figure clearly shows while net interest received as the major source of
income in the mid-1990s significantly declined from making up approximately 80%
of operating income to under 70% in 2000, the percentage of net commissions received
increased from contributing 16.3% in 1995 to almost 25% in 2000. This is in line with
the described changes during the 1990s. Starting in the late 1990s, however, the net
result from the banks’ trading portfolios, especially big banks’ trading portfolios,
started to make up a significantly larger portion of operating income, thus pointing to
an increased engagement in proprietary trading (see chapter 3). Furthermore, the asset
side of German banks further indicates significant changes.
Figure 4 - Distribution of major asset categories of German big banks and Landesbanken between 1981 and
2010
Clearly visible is that particularly between the late 1990s and the crisis, lending to non-
banks decreased while especially lending to banks increased (Figure 4). In comparison,
lending to non-banks by savings banks and credit cooperatives remained constantly
high, and even increased (Figure 5).
Source: own calculations and representation based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
Source: own calculations (average time values within time interval) and representation based on Deutsche
Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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Figure 5 - Distribution of major asset categories of German savings banks and credit cooperatives between
1981 and 2010
Also, the asset side shows an increased foreign exposure, indicating the German banks’
involvement in international bank activities. For example, the exposure from loans to
foreign banks and non-banks increased by 184.5% across all banking groups between
December 1999 and December 2007. In comparison, exposure to foreign liabilities
(deposits and borrowing by foreign banks and non-banks) only increased by 35.7%
during the same timeframe.
Moreover, the following table illustrates the main bank group’s foreign exposure.
Table 6 - German banks’ foreign exposure
While the exposure to foreign banks and non-banks on the asset side was considerably
high for private big banks and Landesbanken, lending to foreign banks and non-banks
in 2005 even reaching close to 52% and 31%, respectively, the exposure of savings
banks and cooperative banks remained comparatively small (Table 6). The liability
sides show a similar picture. Deposits and borrowing from foreign banks and non-
banks as share of the big banks’ overall deposits and borrowing made up 55.31% in
2000 (48.42% in 2005), and those of Landesbanken 30.16% in 2000 (29.42% in 2005).
In comparison, savings banks’ and credit cooperatives’ deposits and borrowing from
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Big banks 23.69 33.64 51.9 18.61 21.54 33.16
Landesbanken 15.03 21.83 30.87 11.28 12.22 21.01
Savings banks 1.68 2.61 4.07 0.69 0.79 1.73
Credit cooperatives 1.47 2.42 5.06 0.49 0.97 2.62
Bank group's lending to foreign banks and
non-banks as share of the bank group's
overall lending to banks and non-banks (%)
Bank group's lending to foreign banks as
share of the bank group's overall lending to
banks and non-banks (%)
Source: own calculations (average time values within time interval) and representation based on Deutsche
Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
Source: own calculations and representation based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data
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foreign banks and non-banks only made up 1.7% and 2.83% of all their deposits and
borrowing in 2000, respectively (1.56% and 2.18%, respectively, in 2005).22
German Landesbanken and private big banks got increasingly engaged in asset
trading.23 In fact, Germany’s banking system was among the most heavily exposed to
“shadow banking” (Arteta et al. 2012, Acharya and Schnabel 2010, Enderlein 2013).
Furthermore, securitization markets in Germany indeed gained in importance. In
particular private big banks and Landesbanken were responsible for the growth of the
German securitization market (e.g. Ricken 2008).
According to SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 2015),
securitization outstanding (including, for example, CDOs, ABS’, CMBS’, etc.) in
Germany rose from 3.43 billion USD in 1998 to 213.3 billion USD in 2008, which is
an increase of over 6100%! Also, the volume of securitization issuance in Germany
rose from 4.2 billion USD in 1998 to 151.3 billion USD in 2007, an increase of over
3500 %.24 Acharya and Schnabel (2010), too, show Germany’s banking sector’s
exposure to the “shadow banking” sector via asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
conduits, such as Sachsen LB’s Ormond Quay.
Figure 6 - European and German securitization market
According to Ricken (2008), German banks even were the 2002 market leader in
Europe in conducting synthesized transactions (Ricken 2008: 79).
At the same time, as mentioned earlier, other elements remained strongly bank-based,
not just in the 1980s and 1990s, but also throughout the 2000s. For example, private
22 Own calculations based on data derived from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s macroeconomic time
series (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b).
23 Hardie and Howarth (2009: 1024) show that the asset side of German banks was much more
vulnerable to market price movements and indicated increased trading activity.
24 Numbers derived from Europe Structured Finance Issuance and Outstanding Statistics provided by
SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 2015).
Source: own representation based on SIFMA data (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 2015).
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households and firms (particularly SMEs) continued to prefer bank financing, and still
heavily rely on bank financing to this day. Hence, people’s and corporate behavior,
had not changed very much, largely due to Germany’s large sector of small and
medium-sized companies. Also, the strong ties between small and medium-sized firms
and their banks – mostly savings banks, cooperative banks, or regional commercial
banks – by and large stayed intact. Furthermore, aside from a number of
consolidations, the institutional set-up, however, remained largely unaltered. The
prominent 3 pillar structure of the German banking sector – made up of the savings
banks group, the cooperative banking group, and the group of private commercial
banks – stayed the same. Also, the legal structure of the banks, organized as private,
cooperative, and public-law entities, remained unchanged.
Hence, this resulting hybrid structure then greatly incentivized behavior of “moral
hazard”, as it had preserved important elements of the bank-based system, such as a
strong reliance on bank financing both of households and firms (to this day), a
subsequent strong focus on creditor protection, and a high number of banks under
public law, while also having introduced investor protection schemes and encouraged
global involvement in the securitization and trading markets (Enderlein 2013).
2.3. State of Research and Research Gaps
The content of this thesis is embedded in the comparative political economy literature,
more specifically, in the context of literature on comparative contemporary financial
systems as discussed in political science.
Modern financial systems have typically been categorized as being either
predominantly bank-based or predominantly market-based financial systems (see, for
example, Zysman 1983, Rybczinsky 1984, Deeg 1999, Schmidt, Hackethal and Tyrell
2002, Allen and Gale 1995 and 2000). The German financial system in its post-World
War II set-up has typically been considered a model case for bank-based financial
systems, as opposed to the United States and Great Britain, which have typically been
categorized as market-based financial systems (e.g. Krahnen and Schmidt 2004,
Zysman 1983, and Deeg 2005).25 As illustrated at the beginning of this section, it
25 On arguments in favor or against either type of financial system, see, among many others, Diamond
1984, Allen and Gale 2000, Rajan and Zingales 1998, Stiglitz 1985, Levine 2002, Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine 2001, and Zysman 1983. Similar to criticism of the Varieties of Capitalism literature, criticism
of this bipolar categorization of financial systems includes that the categorization was too static and
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exhibited the typical traits associated with bank-based financial systems, such as a
greater portion of household assets being held as bank deposits, stock markets being
rather small and less liquid, and bank loans accounting for a rather great proportion of
company liabilities (Vitols 2005). German banks were and continue to be the primary
suppliers of financial services. At the same time, the demand side for those financial
services, i.e. households and firms, met their financing needs through bank loans or
internal financing. As Vitols (2002) pointed out, bank-based systems also rest on the
institutions and the behavior of households, corporations and public sector as savers
and investors. As described in section 2.1, households held a great portion of their
assets in bank savings accounts at their local banks, relied on bank loans in case of
financing needs, and firms primarily relied on bank loans for funding their
investments.
Bank-based financial systems, i.e. financial systems in which banks play the dominant
role as financial intermediaries, are typically said to be found in coordinated market
economies (CMEs), i.e. economies that are characterized by strong relationship-based
coordination among firms and other actors. Coordinated market economies are the one
end of an essentially bipolar categorization of political capitalist economies on the
basis of institutional similarities and differences, as particularly brought forth by Hall
and Soskice (2001). 26
However, despite the strong complementary elements the so-called Varieties of
Capitalism literature (VoC) emphasized, changes have been observed in many
economies and economic sub-sectors. Indeed, one of the major criticisms of the
Varieties of Capitalism literature was that it did not account for, or said very little
about, how and why countries or their economies might change, e.g. from a more
liberal economic system to a more coordinated market system, or vice versa (e.g. Deeg
2010, Jackson and Deeg 2006, Streeck 2010). These changes have particularly been
observed as reactions of political economies to the globalization process since the
insufficiently captured changes among financial systems. Moreover, financial systems did not always
exclusively fit one or the other polar type. Nevertheless, though most authors acknowledge the
shortcomings of this typology, it is used most frequently, and – for the sake of simplicity – shall
suffice to explain the differences in financial systems as such and the changes the German financial
system underwent.
26 The categorization of coordinated market economies and liberal market economies refers to the
Varieties of Capitalism literature. For detailed discussions, see Hall and Soskice 2001, but also
Iversen et al. 2000, or Kitschelt et al. 1999.
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1980s, as, for example, in Germany (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 2003). As Deeg (2005)
pointed out, the emphasis of the Varieties of Capitalism theory on complementarity as
the force organizing institutional configurations essentially limited the possibility of
institutional change. In fact, the various elements of the “old” and traditional German
financial system, such as the role of banks as primary financial intermediaries and the
corresponding financing pattern of corporations and households, the corporate
governance structures of big corporations, the legal system, or the accounting system
(“insider system”, see, for example, Leuz and Wüstemann 2004), were said to be
consistent and complementary to each other, meaning that “the positive effects of the
values taken on by the elements mutually reinforce each other in terms of relevant
evaluation function, and the negative effects and their values ‘fit together’” (Schmidt
and Tyrell 2004: 28; for details on complementarity, see, for example, Milgrom and
Roberts 1990a, Aoki 2001, Deeg 2007, and for an application of the concept of
complementarity to financial systems, see Aoki and Patrick 1994, Schmidt et al. 2002,
Hackethal and Schmidt 2000). Hence, the “old” system perfectly fit the categorization
of a complementary bank-based financial system in a coordinated market economy.
This, however, became more complicated once various elements within the system
started to change. Changes in the German financial system, such as the mentioned
technological changes, growing investment banking activities of German private big
banks, increased merger and acquisition activities by large corporations (see, for
example, Schmid and Wahrenburg 2004, or Höpner and Jackson 2001), and changes
in the regulatory environment (for a discussion on those changes, see, for example,
Lütz 2000 and 2002, Vitols 2004 and 2005), also left questions as to what implications
they had on the overall set-up of the bank-based system. In response to the criticisms
directed at the insufficient consideration of the observed obvious institutional changes
(e.g. Streeck 2010), especially change in the direction of liberalization (e.g. Vitols
2002), theoretical discussions on institutional change emerged.
Nevertheless, though changes were observed, the conclusions drawn from that were
very different. Some considered the changes so minor that they were not
acknowledged as “real” changes, or the changes were explained as just another version
of the old, which then left Germany’s financial system still being categorized as bank-
based (e.g. Vitols 2004). Even recent publications found Germany to still be a stable
coordinated market economy (Jackson and Deeg 2012: 1112). During the 1990s, there
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was an ongoing discussion whether, in fact, a process of “disintermediation” was
taking place, i.e. a process that had been defined by Deutsche Bundesbank as one of
“increased lending activity via the capital market while bypassing the universal banks
as hitherto most important financial intermediaries” (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014d,
own translation). Though some researchers argued that the banks’ classic role as the
primary financial intermediary kept declining (for example, Gorton and Rosen 1995),
others opposed the view and asserted that there was no evidence to support this
argument and that banks, especially in Germany, continued to play a very strong role
(e.g. Boyd and Gertler 1995, Hackethal 2004, Schmidt et al. 1999). In fact, Hackethal
found the “the immense stability in intermediation ratios and financing patters of firms
between 1970 and 2000 as strong evidence for [their] view that the way in which and
the extent to which German banks [fulfilled] central functions for the financial system
[were] still consistent with the overall logic of the financial system” (Hackethal 2004:
100/101). This is taking into account that the income derived from lending business
(interest income) did decline, but was partially compensated by income derived from
fee-based income, such as asset management, investment banking, wealth
management, etc. Either way, banks continued to play a strong role in the German
financial system. Hence, determining whether disintermediation had taken place or not
also contributed to the discussion whether Germany’s banking system was still bank-
based or had moved towards a capital market-oriented financial system. It comes to no
surprise that those researchers supporting the continued complementarities in the
German system also used these as arguments in favor of the differences in national
economies, respectively financial systems (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001), rather than
supporting theories on converging economic systems (e.g. Kester 1996, or Streeck and
Thelen 2005 in terms of liberalization towards market-oriented institutions). Others,
of course, considered the observed changes evidence in support of convergence
theories that claim that a general trend towards the Anglo-Saxon liberal market-
oriented economic systems was observable (convergence towards the superior model,
i.e. the “best practice model”, e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Furthermore, a
third strand of discussion evolved that argued that the German financial system had
taken on a new path altogether, namely developing into a hybrid that combined
elements of both bank-based and market-based financial systems.
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In fact, the majority of authors seem to have come to agree that the observed changes
in the German case pointed to the emergence of a “hybrid model”, which appeared
most suitable to account for both the changes and, at the same time, the ongoing
continuity in the financial system. For example, Höpner, though admitting that a clear
dividing line between the concepts of “hybridization” and “convergence” may be
difficult to draw, concluded that “whether or not one [liked] the self-imposed semantic
problem of convergence versus hybridization, a realistic description of trends
nevertheless [indicated] that coordinated market economies [were] undergoing an
unambiguous process of expanding market mechanisms” (Höpner 2001: 38). Deeg
(2005) found that “the German financial system [had] initiated a new path or trajectory
by bifurcating in two heterogeneous subsystems or subregimes. One subregime
[encompassed] banks and firms continuing to operate in the traditional regime, while
the other [encompassed] banks and firms who are now operating under a new regime.
In both subregimes [he saw] a hybridization process in which many of the institutions
of the old path [continued] as before, some old institutions [were] transformed to new
purposes […], and new institutions [were] introduced […].” (Deeg 2005: 169/170).
Lütz (2000) argued that while institutional restructuring was taking place within
Germany that reflected characteristics of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, “convergence of the
models throughout the entire system has been prevented until now by institutional
‘brakes’” (Lütz 2000: 7). Deeg and Lütz (1998), while analyzing the changes in
financial regulation and market structures in Germany and the United States, too,
found that convergence was and would likely remain of limited nature. Similarly,
Jackson and Deeg (2012) asserted that “no overall convergence has taken place toward
a single variety of capitalism” in the German case (Jackson and Deeg 2012: 1112).
Also, Jackson and Sorge found that “the institutions of the German political economy
[displayed] both remarkable continuity and dramatic change over the last thirty years”
(Jackson and Sorge 2012: 1146, emphasis by the authors). Interestingly, for some time
in the 2000s, the German hybrid model had actually been considered rather successful
in that it had seemingly managed to effectively combine both elements of the two poles
(e.g. what Krahnen and Schmidt 2004 had termed the “banks-and-markets” view), and
that other previously bank-based countries, too, had moved to combine bank-based
and market-based elements, such as France or Sweden (e.g. Jackson and Deeg 2012).
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Similar discussions to the ones that were led about the changes in the German financial
system were being led elsewhere with other economic systems and sub-systems, for
example, with regard to corporate governance, labor markets, or welfare states (see,
for example, Culpepper 2005, Jackson and Deeg 2012). The discussions on the
German financial system, however, are rather exemplary for the disagreements in the
literature on the question of institutional change. Culpepper (2005), for example,
pointed out that the major problem was that the operational criteria and evidence as to
what could be regarded as fundamental change or not greatly varied. Furthermore,
Jackson and Deeg also criticized that “the CC [comparative capitalism] literature
[lacked] agreement on the number of distinct types of capitalisms, the key institutional
domains that constitute distinct types, and the conceptual dimensions used to compare
institutions within these domains” (Jackson and Deeg 2012: 1110). However, what
most authors seem to have agreed on is that convergence towards a single mode of
capitalism was unlikely and that the Varieties of Capitalism economies continued to
exist (Streeck and Thelen 2005).
Similarly to the disagreement on the types of capitalisms in the literature, the literature
on the sources of institutional changes is equally vast and ambiguous. However, the
question of where change comes from and why and how systems change is essential
to this thesis. I will therefore attempt to summarize some of the major debates relevant
to the German hybrid case.
Generally, institutional change can be distinguished with regards to the “speediness”
with which it occurs. It can take place very suddenly and constitute some kind of
“shock” to the system, e.g. through the advent of a war or natural catastrophe, which
may overhaul the entire system. On the other hand, change may also come about very
gradually and incrementally.
Another distinction, which often coincides with the previously mentioned one, can be
made whether change in a system and its institutions is a deliberate process, i.e.
something Kingston and Caballero (2005) called “design-based” approaches to
institutional change, or an unintentional process. Design-based theories view change
as a deliberate choice process by either individuals or collective group of individuals
“in which they lobby, bargain, vote, or otherwise compete to try to implement
institutional changes which they perceive as beneficial to themselves, or to block those
they view as undesirable” (Kingston and Caballero 2005: 153). These theories,
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however, all focus on the change of formal institutions, i.e. mostly laws, which, in turn,
are assumed to entail behavioral changes of the actors.
Consequently, as Kingston and Caballero also noted, these approaches insufficiently
capture change processes that cannot be unambiguously traced to deliberate policy and
legal changes but that instead evolve gradually. Hence, they categorized a second
major group of institutional change theories they labeled “evolutionary theories on
institutional change”, in which new institutional forms emerge as a “spontaneous”
result of “uncoordinated choices of many agents, rather than in a centralized and
coordinated manner” (Kingston and Caballero 2005: 153). Nevertheless, even
deliberately designed policy changes may not lead to a sudden change but come about
gradually. Similarly, changes in formal rules may not necessarily lead to a change in
actors’ behavior at all (e.g. Culpepper 2005). Generally, drawing definite lines is rather
difficult and often depends on the specific case in question.
Aside from the distinction whether institutional change occurs deliberately or
unintentionally, gradually or suddenly, a subsequent question then also arises whether
those kinds of changes are endogenously or exogenously induced. The debate and also
disagreement on the importance of exogenous or endogenous sources of change can
be demonstrated rather well with the discussions on the German case. The German
financial system has for a long time been studied with regards to path dependence.
Path dependency essentially rests on the notion that “once in place, newly designed
institutions influence future outcomes as actors begin to make ‘investments’ in the new
institutional order which in turn provides increasing returns for all those playing by
the new rules. Over time, this process raises the costs of changing the rules, even if a
different set of rules might be more beneficial to all concerned” (McFaul 1999: 32).
Studying the Italian and German financial systems, Deeg (2005) advanced the claim
that contrary to the heretofore prevailing concept of path dependence that asserted that
only exogenous factors – i.e., “shocks”, such as natural disasters, wars, crises (see
above) – were able to move actors off a current path, endogenous factors could also
account for change. He, too, considered the changes that had been observed in the
German financial system, i.e. the incorporation of market-based elements into the
hitherto bank-based system, as a “gradual” and “evolutionary” rather than deliberately
designed process. As Deeg (2001) pointed out, this meant that though new elements
had been introduced, the system did not experience a complete and radical change
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from its previous “bank-based” nature. Many of the old institutions remained, e.g. the
financing patterns of firms and households or the strong legal focus on consumer
protection. Deeg claimed that “actions undertaken by actors within an institution or
institutional system” could account for change (Deeg 2005: 173). Though path
dependence had been considered more supportive for institutional inertia and ensuring
consistency and stability (e.g. Streeck and Thelen 2005), Deeg took path dependence
one step further to argue that it should be viewed as a means to actually explain
institutional change: though “positive feedback or self-reinforcing mechanisms are
usually viewed as mechanisms of institutional reproduction or stability […], increasing
returns to a new institutional path may gradually displace the old path. As self-
reinforcing effects become stronger for a new path, they weaken the self-reinforcing
effects of the old and may, eventually, tip the balance in favor of the new” (Deeg 2005:
173).
However, once again, drawing the lines of what can be termed endogenous sources for
change is debatable. Deeg argued that “key actors came to see their interests as
diverging from the existing path because of decreasing returns to them within it” (Deeg
2005: 174), which ultimately caused these key actors to diverge from their original
path. Hence, while changes in behavior of actors and their actions (e.g. big banks and
Landesbanken getting engaged in proprietary trading activities on the securitization
market), and national regulatory and legal reforms supporting this process, may
ultimately constitute endogenous factors, it leaves out considerations as to where these
changed preferences came from. In fact, those “diverging interests” may be traced to
exogenous factors, e.g. the global liberalization tendencies, that brought about new
economic challenges to the actors (i.e. German banks and political actors), which, in
turn, caused their interests to change and forced them to react and adapt to the
economic pressures. Hence, endogenous changes could merely be considered a
consequence of the external forces. In his paper “The second image reversed”,
Gourevitch (1978) argued that “the international system is not only a consequence of
domestic politics and structures but a cause of them” (Gourevitch 1978: 911). At the
same time, he asserted that though international systems and “external” challenges
greatly influenced domestic politics, they were not fully deterministic, i.e. there was
generally still room for different possible responses by national politics to those
challenges (Gourevitch 1978). This ties in with institutionalist approaches that assert
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that international developments can have a big influence on national/domestic politics,
but are still constrained by the national context and its structures (“history” matters
and path dependence, see, for example, Guinnane et al. 2003, Mahoney 2000, Pierson
2000a, Mayntz 2002).
Generally, the influence of such external market forces like the globalization and
Europeanization processes are considered to be greater in those societal sub-systems
that are characterized by a great extent of “dynamic”. Those are systems that are
heavily influenced by economic market forces, such as the financial system. In fact,
financial markets have been identified as one of the extreme cases where domestic
regulation and governmental or societal influence are only of limited nature (Mayntz
and Scharpf 1995, Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996, Strange 1998, Lütz 2002), even more
so in the context of globalization and technological progress that renders the national
borders increasingly void.
Despite the assumed lack of governmental or societal influential scope in financial
systems, the “domestic leeway of response to pressure” (Gourevitch 1976: 911) proved
to be existent in the German case. In fact, that kind of “leeway or response” could even
be observed within the same sector, i.e. through the varying responses to globalization
and Europeanization in the different banking groups (e.g. Deeg 2011), which
ultimately resulted in the hybrid model.
Another problem regarding the inconsistency in the institutional change literature
arises from the inconsistent uses of the term “institutions”. Whereas some authors use
“institutions” in a narrow way, i.e. formal legal governance rules that are sanctioned
by the legal system and the state apparatus (see, for example, Ostram et al. 1994, or
Bates et al. 1998), others also include those societal norms whose non-compliance by
actors would be sanctioned by loss of reputation for that actor, social outcry,
deprivation of cooperation, and the like (Scharpf 1997). Organizational-sociological
institutionalism even goes one step further by associating “institutions in one way or
another with ‘culture’, that is, with normative effects, ideas, conceptions,
‘preconscious understandings’, myths, ritual, ideology, theories, or accounts”
(Jepperson 1991: 150). This, of course, makes the discussion of what change is then
even more complicated. For example, much of the institutional change literature
focuses on formal changes, i.e. policy changes and changes of specific rules and laws.
However, just as Culpepper argued (2005) that behavior of actors did not necessarily
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have to follow from a change in formal rules but that this behavioral change was
dependent on a “joint belief shift” (Culpepper 2005: 176), the same can be true the
other way around. Behavioral change of actors without any legal or formal changes of
laws can still also alter the nature of an economic (sub-) system. Interestingly, both
assertions seem to account for the German hybrid. The behavioral changes in
Landesbanken and big banks in the 2000s were a consequence of the globalization
effect and the then diverging economic premises for them. The shifts in their strategic
business orientations nevertheless were done within the realms of the already existing
legal framework. On the other hand, savings banks and cooperative banks did not
experience the same necessity for change, and continued their businesses largely
unchanged despite a general liberal spirit in Europe and the world.
One of the prevailing assertions when it comes to the development of the hybridization
process of the German financial system is the notion that a great number of
deregulatory policy changes had been decisive for the behavioral changes of
particularly Landesbanken and big banks and the incorporation of liberal market
elements into the hitherto bank-based system. This would fit the theories of
institutional change that claim that institutional change was the result of a deliberate
collective choice process, in which liberalization policies were introduced that allowed
for or incentivized specific behavior. Furthermore, these policy changes were
considered the reaction of policymakers to the influence and pressure of the general
globalization process in the global financial markets in an attempt to make the German
market more competitive.
An alternative explanation for the alleged policy changes could have been that the
changes in policies had been the source of a change in the ruling government parties
to a coalition of parties that were more inclined to liberal policy views (power
constellation point of view). However, the 2000s, for example, saw governments
formed both of a conservative-liberal coalition as well as a social democratic-green
coalition. In fact, the red-green coalition in the late 1990s and in the 2000s, which had
traditionally not been known to be free-market friendly, was the one who was very
active in supporting liberal market statements.
Though admittedly, the 1980s and 1990s did see a few regulatory changes in laws that
could be labeled “deregulative” measures, such as the Financial Market Promotion
Acts or the law that would make the sale of long-term equity stakes held by firms and
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banks in other firms and banks tax-free and effectively break up the Deutschland AG,
a number of legal acts were introduced that were rather (re-)regulative measures, such
as the introduction of Basel I and II or the Markets of Financial Instruments Directive
(also see annex 2). Moreover, the 2000s saw more of a general “vocal” support of the
government parties and possibly the negligence to regulate emerging new financial
products and services.
Hence, deregulative measures or at least vocal support of the government to that regard
may be part of the reason for behavioral change, but does not suffice as explanatory
variable. The change in the business strategies of particularly Landesbanken and big
banks in the 2000s were less a consequence of legal changes or deregulatory incentives
rather than borne out of the underlying economic issues that were pressing on the
respective banking groups and the entire economic system as a whole at the turn of the
century and the early to mid-2000s. Whereas the existing institutions for savings banks
and cooperative banks were sufficient for them to deal with these growing economic
pressures, the existing institutions for Landesbanken and big banks were not.
This thesis does not want to dispute the existing notions of path dependence in the
context of historical institutionalism and other institutional change perspectives with
regards to the German case. However, what seems to be missing in the existing
literature is a more comprehensive and detailed view on the considerations and
processes the respective actors had gone through in light of the changing economic
environment. Hence, what is important and this is the main aim of the following
chapters, is to illustrate exactly that actors’ point of view as an essential explanatory
variable to the hybridization process, and thereby enrich the existing literature by that
perspective. As explained in section 1.3, the chosen mixture of the actor-centered
institutionalism and historical institutionalism approach seemed suitable to fulfil that
aim.
If approaching the changes in the German financial system from a problem-oriented
policy research standpoint, i.e. research that is concerned with “the causes of policy
problems, with the potential policy solutions, and with their likely effects on the initial
problems and on the wider policy environment” (Scharpf 1997: 11), the focus would
be almost exclusively on macro-economic analyses to identify globalization as the
major cause for the economic pressure on the German financial intermediaries to adapt
to the new economic environment, and liberalization and privatization policy attempts
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as the (presumed) best possible political solution to the competitive weakness problem
of the German banking sector. However, this approach would only capture the policy
side of the problem, thus not taking into account banks’ actions and motivations. It
would not adequately answer the question why many institutional structures in the
banking system remained unchanged, and why some banking groups switched to a
business approach that entailed an increased international market and risk exposure
while others did not. It would also only insufficiently capture the complex interactions
among the involved actors and the factors that influence their decisions. Instead,
transaction-oriented policy research seems to offer more suitable approaches, as it
explains certain phenomena (such as the transformation of the German banking
system) as the product of the interactions between various intentionally acting and
intrinsically motivated actors, whose actions, however, are constrained by certain
institutional and situational contexts (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, Scharpf 1997). This
differentiation from problem-oriented policy research is based on the assertion that
though there may be a best solution to an identified problem, it will hardly ever be a
feasible one. This is the case, because policy decisions are generally not just made and
influenced by one sole actor who has all the means to act as he or she pleases and to
implement the necessary measures to arrive at the desired outcome. Even then, his or
her motivations would still be influenced by his or her own personal interests that may
or may not deviate from the “best solution”, by the certain situation he or she is
currently in, and the institutional context he or she is constrained by, e.g. legal
constraints, and the like. Naturally, the more actors are involved in the decision-
making process, the more comprehensive and manifold the influencing factors
become, and the more complex the interactions turn out to be. In turn, the end result
of the decision may be a far stretch from the “best solution”. To fill that gap, Mayntz
and Scharpf developed what they called an actor-centered institutionalism approach.
Actor-centered institutionalism seeks to overcome the old dispute between agency
(rational choice) and structure (historical institutionalism or sociological
institutionalism). Though acknowledging that institutions27 are relevant inasmuch as
27 Actor-centered institutionalism generally builds on the concept of “institutions” used in neo-
institutionalism, which argues that institutions not only matter but constitute action constraints and
action possibilities (Keck 1991). Actor-centered institutionalism, however, does not just look at
political institutions, but asserts that institutional factors have a “stimulating, enabling, or even
restricting” action context rather than just having a “determining impact” (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995:
43). The concept of institutions hence is used to “describe the most important influences on those
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they influence actors’ decision-making processes and structure their interactions,
actors themselves characterized by “specific capabilities, specific perceptions, and
specific preferences” (Scharpf 1997: 43) are given particular attention.28 The actor-
centered institutionalism approach tries to also include the intentions and motivations
as explanatory variables for policy outcomes. Generally, motives for actions are rather
subjective: “[…] actions are motivated not by actors’ objective interests but by their
subjective preferences” (Scharpf 1997: 60), which makes it harder to identify those
motives. To a great extent, those preferences are shaped by the institutional context,
e.g. by the tasks and competences an actor is being assigned through its legal
formation, but also by the actors’ position within the actor constellation.29 At the same
time, preferences are shaped by the actors’ characteristics independent of the context,
for example, his or her personal experiences with similar situations in the past (Mayntz
and Scharpf 1995). The actors’ preferences and perceptions – regardless whether they
are shaped by the historical development, by the institutional context, by personal
experience, or something else – are activated and stimulated by a certain problem or
issue (Scharpf 1997). Those preferences and perceptions then refer to the evaluation
of a status quo, the possible cause for the problem, the effectiveness and preferences
of possible actions, and the corresponding results (Scharpf 2000). In a nutshell: actors
always act in a specific situation. They are never isolated in their decisions: “[…]
actors respond differently to external threats, constraints, and opportunities because
they may differ in their intrinsic perceptions and preferences but also because their
factors that in fact drive […] actors’ orientations and capabilities, actor constellations, and modes of
interaction” (Scharpf 1997: 39). They furthermore “define how the outcomes achieved through such
choices will be evaluated by the actors involved – and they will thus determine the preferences of
these actors with regard to the feasible options” (Scharpf 1997: 39).
28 Scharpf (1997) distinguished between individual actors and composite actors, whereas the latter
ones can be further subclassified as aggregate, collective, and corporate actors. Aggregate actors are
basically a group of individual actors who act aligned because they have the same or at least similar
interests, however without being formally organized (Scharpf 1997). Corporate actors, on the other
hand, are formally organized bodies, usually organized top-down, with formalized decision structures
and independent of their members, such as firms (Coleman 1974, Mayntz 1986, Scharpf 1997).
Lastly, collective actors, are dependent on their individual members and are also controlled by them,
but do not have to be legally defined bodies (Scharpf 1997). Scharpf divided them into coalitions,
clubs, social movements, and associations. For most analyses, collective and corporate actors will
suffice, also in order to reduce complexities that arise from taking into account all individual actors.
29 Actors always interact with each other in certain constellations. The solving of a problem or taking
up of an opportunity is not – in most cases – the work of just one single actor, but the product of
interactions of multiple actors with independent action orientations: “Solutions […] to a given policy
problem must be produced by the interdependent choices of a plurality of policy actors with specific
capabilities and with specific perceptions and preferences regarding the outcomes that could be
obtained” (Scharpf 1997: 69).
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perceptions and preferences are very much shaped by the specific institutional setting
within which they act” (Scharpf 1997: 36/37).
As Pancaldi (2012) pointed out, actor-centered institutionalism “does not represent a
variant from the four institutionalisms in political science (rational choice, historical,
sociological, and discursive)”, but instead puts a greater focus “on actor related factors
as possible explanatory variables in their own right to political phenomena” (Pancaldi
2012: 2).
Nevertheless, actor-centered institutionalism, too, focuses on the establishment of
certain policies, which only constitutes one factor. Hence, this approach alone would
probably explain the turn towards liberalization policies and the political actors’
support of securitization markets and such, but not be suitable for explaining the entire
evolvement of the hybrid system. It is commonly used to display and reconstruct
particular instances in great detail, as Seikel (2011), for example, did with the
abolishment of maintenance obligation and guarantor liability in the case of German
Landesbanken and savings banks. The case study at hand, however, is broader than
just covering one particular instance or policy outcome, and as such, cannot suffice to
meet the criteria for a case study applying the actor-centered institutionalism approach.
However, it still aims at using facets of the approach in terms of presenting the reader
with a more comprehensive situational and motivational context of each relevant
banking group and discusses the resulting options and motivations of the relevant
collective or aggregate actors.
Therefore, the thesis puts its focus on the possible actions and choices the different
groups of actors had given their individual situational contexts and situations. Of
course, that incorporates formal and informal institutional settings, such their legal set-
ups, historical contexts, but essentially discusses the options within a given
framework.
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3. The Change Process of German Big Banks
As outlined in section 2.2, the German big banks30 were among the banks that had
undergone some of the biggest changes in terms of business strategies. Though the big
banks only constituted part of the private commercial banks group, their business
volume made up about two thirds of the entire group’s business volume. Their
aggregated balance sheets, on average, constituted between 55 to 65% of the
aggregated private commercial banks group balance sheet size during the 2000s (see
Table 7). In addition, the big banks were the globally operating and systemically
relevant German private banks. Hence, this chapter focuses on them only.
Table 7 - Private big banks’ balance sheets as share of the private commercial banks’ balance sheets
Not only did the private big banks change their business models towards the more
capital market-oriented investment banking business (deriving more income from net
provisions), but they also became some of the biggest players in the securitization
markets (see Acharya and Schnable 2010, Arteta et al. 2012, Enderlein 2013).
Furthermore, as described in section 2.2, the asset side of the big banks’ balance sheets
showed significant changes: in particular loans to non-banks increasingly made up a
significantly smaller portion of the asset side starting in the late 1990s (see Figure 4).
From having composed close to 70% of the asset side in the early 1990s, the percentage
fell below 40% at the end of 2008. At the same time, lending to banks as percentage
of the balance sheet asset side more than doubled from just above 20% in the early
1990s to roughly 45% in 2008.
Two reinforcing strands were responsible for these developments: On the one hand,
private big banks themselves pushed for those strategic changes, and on the other hand,
the political sector contributed to this development by promoting greater capital
market orientation, securitized products, financial product innovation, and general
30 Included Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank AG, HypoVereinsbank AG (UniCredit
Bank), and – from December 2004 on – Deutsche Postbank (see section 2.1).
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Commercial banks (in
billion euros)
2551,318 1447,078 1704,413 1789,761 1829,672 1803,84 1878,756 1933,216 2046,592 2257,783
Private big banks
(in billion euros)
1106,963 825,069 969,783 1026,819 1056,182 1044,735 1217,452 1226,94 1296,889 1403,914
Private big banks in %
of commercial banks
43,39 57,02 56,90 57,37 57,73 57,92 64,80 63,47 63,37 62,18
Aggregated balance sheet sizes
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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growth of the financial sector. For example, a motion of the CDU/CSU parliamentary
group of the German Bundestag dated 1 April 2003 formulated a request to the German
government to support the competitiveness of the German financial center in
agreement with the German Lander in suitable areas by strengthening Frankfurt as the
financial center, to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy, etc. (Deutscher Bundestag 2003a).
Similarly, in a motion dated 7 May 2003, the Social Democrats asked the German
government to avoid unnecessary strains for the financial industry, to establish the
“Finanzplatz Deutschland” as some kind of trademark to accommodate for the
increasing importance of the capital market in Germany, and to consider the financial
industry’s interests when implementing or changing new tax measures or laws.
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003b). Corresponding public hearings on that topic in the
finance committee of the German Bundestag, such as the one on 4 June 2003, also
demonstrated the broad political consensus among the expert community and the main
political parties on the importance of financial industry growth and the necessity to
implement measures to make Germany more competitive in that area. Moreover, the
initiative “Finanzstandort Deutschland” (financial center Germany), a conglomeration
of various actors of the financial industry in Germany between May 2003 and March
2011 that had the task of lobbying and marketing for the German finance industry both
nationally and internationally, not only consisted of banks and bank associations of all
major banking groups in Germany and insurance firms31, but also the German
Bundesbank and the Federal Ministry of Finance. Already in 1998, the coalition
agreement between the governing parties SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens contained
a clear commitment to “improving the framework for the creation of new jobs and
sustainable economic development” including the “continuance of financial market
legislation” and the “international competitiveness of the German financial center”
(SPD 1998: 5, own translation). Even more distinctly, the coalition agreement of 2005
between the CDU/CSU and SPD stated that they wanted “to reduce financial market
regulation to the necessary extent in order to facilitate lending through banks”
(CDU/CSU 2005: 22, own translation). Generally, the statements regarding financial
market policy in the latter coalition agreement show a clear commitment to the
31 Members included Allianz group, Bayern LB, Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und
Raiffeisenbanken, Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, Commerzbank, DekaBank, Deutsche Bank,
Deutsche Börse Group, Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (until 2010), Munich
Re (until 2010), Postbank, Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband, DZ-Bank, HypoVereinsbank,
KfW, Morgan Stanley.
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competitiveness, to using national leeway as a competitive advantage, to fostering
product innovation and the securitization market, reducing redundant financial market
regulation, and the like (CDU/CSU 2005: 86-87).
The following section explains the situational context most relevant to the big banks
during the 2000s. Considering that context, I proceed by discussing the economically
feasible options left to choose from under the given social, historical and political
background, and explain why the option of shifting the business focus to investment
banking and proprietary trading from the private big banks’ side was chosen. At the
same time, the chapter demonstrates why it was sound for political actors to support
this choice. The chapter closes with a brief summary of the action possibilities and the
eventually chosen path of the big banks.
3.1. Situational Context of German Big Banks
3.1.1. General Economic Situation of Germany
As emphasized by Scharpf, actors always act in specific contexts and situations
(Scharpf 1997). Correspondingly, much of the behavior and decisions of both political
actors and the German big banks can be comprehended by looking at the economic
situation Germany had faced in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the surrounding
international developments.
As the world had started to grow together due to the globalization process, the level of
interconnectedness among the countries rose, too. Hence, not only did the globally
interacting countries reap the economic and social benefits from this kind of
interconnectedness, but they were also much more affected by each other’s economic
cycles. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Germany was faced with many economic
challenges, most notably the challenges resulting from the impact of German
reunification, the integration of the German economy with those of its EU partners,
the economic pressure resulting from the recession after the dotcom bubble burst in
2000, and the global economic aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001.
With the exception of the year 2000, which had been the best year in terms of economic
growth since the early 1990s due to the then booming “new economy” sector32 (real
32 The term „new economy“ refers to the rise of a multitude of young and innovative firms in the then
promising business sectors such as bio technology, information technology, e-commerce, nano
technology, etc. during the mid-1990s. In 1997, a new segment of the Deutsche Börse was founded
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GDP had grown by 3.1 % (Eurostat 2014), compared to 1.9 % the previous two years),
the German economy was generally struggling. Though by the late 1990s, Germany
had slowly recovered from the economic and social challenges that had come with the
reunification of the early 1990s, the economy remained rather stagnant. Between 1996
and 2005, the German GDP had continuously grown much less than the EU average.
For example, German GDP in 1996 was at 0.8 %, while the EU-15 average was at 1.9
% (Eurostat 2014). In the following years, Germany, on average, grew 1 % less than
the EU-15 average (Eurostat 2014).
The little economic improvement towards the end of the century was soon countered
by the burst of the dotcom bubble in 2000 and the global economic recession following
the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Consequently, economically slow years for Germany
followed. At the beginning of 2002, CNN Money reported that the “German economy
turned in its worst performance in almost a decade in 2001, as the global slowdown
hurt exports and hampered investment” (CNN Money 2002). Hence, after the
comparatively good year 2000, GDP growth fell back to 1.5 % in 2001 and even 0 %
in 2002 (Eurostat 2014). Corporate insolvencies in 2001 and 2002, for example,
reached negative record highs at 32,278 and 37,579, respectively, and continued to
climb up in the years following, only slowly decreasing again after 2004 (Figure 7).
Figure 7 - Corporate insolvencies development in Germany
In addition, Germany’s economic problems were also partially rooted internally. In his
government declaration for the “Agenda 2010” in front of the German Bundestag on
entitled “Neuer Markt” (new market), which was modeled after the U.S. NASDAQ, to provide the
young start-up firms in the aforementioned business sectors ways and means to raise capital through
the capital market. The “Neuer Markt” segment of Deutsche Börse, however, eventually failed and
closed down in 2003.
Source: own representation based on German Federal Statistical Office data.
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14 March 2003, former chancellor Schröder pointed to Germany’s weak economic
growth in light of a difficult international setting, but also emphasized the general
structural causes for weak growth in Germany. In particular, he named high ancillary
wage costs as particularly problematic, as they were hardly bearable for employees,
and – at the same time – hindered employers from hiring more people and creating
new jobs (Schröder 2003). Overall, he urged for profound and extensive reforms in
Germany, which the Agenda 2010 eventually aimed at accomplishing.
In sum, the deteriorating global economic environment in the early 2000s and the
Euro’s depreciation coupled with economic problems at home led to a continuing
sluggish overall setting (Sachverständigenrat 2003). This put Germany’s political
decision-makers, as well as the German public, in a position of demand for change and
structural reforms. Any economic growth opportunities, thriving market opportunities,
and investment potential to help get the economy back on its feet were welcome.
3.1.2. Influences of the EU
As mentioned in the previous section, the level of interconnectedness grew steadily.
That also meant that trends and developments in other countries also caught on much
more quickly and influenced the domestic political decision-making process. This was
particularly the case for a political union such as the EU. In the late 1990s, Germany
found itself in a dynamic European setting that was characterized by an eagerness to
grow and exploit its potential and improve its economic competitiveness. The EU had
then been preparing for its hitherto biggest enlargement, adding eight Central and
Eastern European countries in 2004. It had furthermore just established the European
Central Bank on 1 June 1998, and introduced the common currency of the Euro on 1
January 1999 (cash changeover from 1 January 2002), thus largely completing the EU
Internal Market.33 Overall, the EU was ready to position itself as a big economic
competitor in the world. While having a monetary union, a common currency, and an
internal market, were considered beneficial as such, it also presented the Member
States with the opportunity to strengthen their unified (economic) position against the
U.S. and other big economic players. With the process of enlargement and negotiations
on the Agenda 2000 proposals on policy reform and the future refinancing of the EU
33 The EU Internal Market (sometimes also referred to as the „common market“ or „single market“) is
a “single market in which free movement of goods, services, capital and person is ensured and in
which European citizens are free to live, work, study and do business.” (Europa Portal 2014a)
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under way, the European Council met in Cardiff on 15 and 16 June 1998 to develop
economic guidelines “to promote employment through increased competitiveness and
economic and social cohesion within a framework of macroeconomic stability”
(European Council 1998: 3). The EU Council considered this strategy to be the key to
reap the “full benefits of EMU and the European single market for all Europe’s
citizens” (European Council 1998: 3). Also, when the European Council came together
in Lisbon on 23 and 24 March 2000 for a special session to agree upon a new strategic
goal for the EU in order to deal with the “quantum shift” challenges resulting “from
the globalization and the challenges of a knowledge-driven economy” (European
Council 2002), the targeted strategic goal for the following decade was “to become the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”
(European Council 2002).34 As was repeatedly stated, competitiveness was considered
the overarching factor to succeed in the international context. Consequently, any
strategy that would help improve the economic competitiveness was pursued and
welcomed. Two factors that were presumed key to positively influence the EU’s
competitiveness were a functioning capital market and a fertile environment for
business start-ups and innovation (European Council 2002). To further make progress
in this area and to fully exploit the EU’s economic potential, the EU Council thus
invited and urged the EU Commission to quickly draw up a plan on how to “improve
the single market in financial services, in particular examining the effectiveness of
implementation of current legislation and identifying weaknesses which may require
amending legislation” (European Council 2002: 9), thus identifying ways and
measures to effectively integrate the financial markets in Europe.
“The working schedule of the European Commission resulted from an assignment of the heads
of state and government who, around the time of the Euro introduction, argued: ‘We may now
very well have a common currency, but that is only half the battle, if the actors on the European
34 Several talks with financial experts and political representatives outlined this kind of “knowledge-
drive” as a contributing factor to the changes in the financial sector because it led people to be overly
confident about and reliant upon statistical models, and the like. One interviewee described it as
follows: “We have a unique social phenomenon, which is the pseudo-academization of our lives. This
phenomenon has entered all aspects of our lives. In the banking industry, this led to an over-
interpretation of the meaningfulness of theoretic models and probability calculations. Particularly
around the year 2000, basically all graduates of theoretical physics went straight from the universities
into banks, because as highly educated mathematicians, they could draft and develop those risk
models. I do not know if this made the banking business necessarily any better, but it definitely made
it more documentable.” (Interview XV, own translation)
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financial market do not also start coordinating with each other.’” (Interview VII, own
translation)
“In order to have a common EU internal market, you also need a common banking market. For
that we needed common rules and preferably also a European supervisory agency. […]. The
Euro had enhanced the entire development to that effect. It became clear then that there were
no more isolated markets with different laws and regulations. Let us take the example of
reporting procedures of a big bank, which had to deal with roundabout 40 supervisors in
Europe. There were already two in Germany - BaKred, later BaFin, and Deutsche Bundesbank.
The situations were similar in other countries. Doing the reporting for all those supervisors was
rather tedious, especially if there were different reporting standards and different procedures
of how to report to BaFin, how to report to the Bank of England, and so on. Those are economic
costs that can easily be saved when harmonizing the rules.” (Interview XXVI, own translation)
The European Commission followed suit with its communication of 28 October 1998
entitled “Financial services: building a framework for action” (Financial Services
Action Plan), in which it again stressed the necessity of being competitive and strong.
The communication then was presented at the European Council meeting in Vienna in
December 1998. Eventually, the Financial Services Action Plan was issued by the
European Commission on 11 May 1999. The action plan put forward “indicative
priorities and a timetable for specific measures to achieve three strategic objectives,
namely establishing a single market in wholesale financial services, making retail
markets open and secure and strengthening the rules on prudential supervision”
(Europa Portal 2014b). The Lisbon Agenda of 2000 furthermore stressed the necessity
of maintaining a quick pace and having the measures of the Financial Services Action
Plan implemented by 2005 (European Council 2002). One significant step towards
managing such a tight schedule certainly presented the expansion of the so-called
Lamfalussy process to all financial services sector legislative processes. While
legislative processes in the EU, particularly comprehensive and technical ones, which
are common in the financial services sector, used to take very long to be passed and
implemented, the EU Council decided to not only apply the process for legislative
processes in the investment and securities sector, but to all legislative processes
concerning financial market regulation in late 2002.35
35 The Lamfalussy process is a four-level legislative approach used in the EU to speed up lengthy and
complex legislative processes. When applying this approach, the EU institutions only adopt the
framework legislation (directives, regulations) while the technical details and further guidelines on
regulatory practices are specified in level II and III measures by the EU Commission in corporation
with the European supervisory authorities (level IV then is the checking for compliance and
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“The basic driver was the establishment of the European location in order to give room to the
European financial market. In order to raise Europe’s potential in the areas of employment and
work, we have to dig deeper and that means: no national particularities! The road that was
presented was the world of the directives. In the world of European directives, the general
direction was determined by the directive, but a few national elements could be incorporated
via national discretions when implementing the directive in the home country.” (Interview VII,
own translation)
The Financial Services Action Plan’s policies then were based on the principles of
mutual recognition and “passporting”, which essentially allowed banks and other
financial service providers of one EU Member State to provide and distribute its
products and services in all other EU Member States without needing to get further
authorization from the respective other states (European Commission 2014). Of
course, these policies made the distribution of products and services across the entire
EU much easier, and, above all, cheaper for financial service providers as bureaucratic
costs for approval and licensing procedures and additional branch offices were
eliminated or at least reduced. In turn, this meant increased competition on the
domestic markets, something the EU had wanted and intended to achieve.
Though these external pressures that were a result of the general Europeanization and
internationalization process in the financial services sector generally affected the entire
banking sector, it particularly affected the private big banks. Different from the other
two major pillars in the German banking sector, i.e. the cooperative banks group and
the savings banks group, whose legal structures de facto shielded them from being
fully exposed to those market dynamics (see chapter 5 for elaborations on this issue),
especially the globally operating banks experienced the effects of globalization,
technological progress, and economic slowdowns full force. Due to their legal
structure as privately organized banks, they were fully exposed to the global capital
market forces, which were dominated and driven by the two dominant Anglo-Saxon
financial centers London and New York.
implementation in the Member States by the Commission). For details on the process, see, for
example, the European Commission’s website (European Commission 2014a). The Lamfalussy
process has been particularly criticized for its lack of democratic legitimization. As one interviewee
put it: “We were not really happy with the expansion of the Lamfalussy process beyond the
investment and securities area. It was the attempt to reach decisions more quickly within the EU, but
this kind of quickness came at the loss of democratic legitimization while the EU institutions were
being strengthened at the same time. […].” (Interview X, own translation)
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3.1.3. Economic Situation of German Big Banks
Despite the progress and incorporation of some more capital market elements in the
1990s, the German banking system was still rather repressive and “old fashioned” in
the late 1990s. Compared with the leading financial centers in the world, German
banks were still lagging behind. Repeatedly, the Bundesaufsichtsamt für Kreditwesen
and later the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht described and critically
mentioned the weak profit situation of German banks and addressed the palpable „gap
towards successful international competitors“ (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das
Kreditwesen 2000: 39/40).
The weak profitability was the result of both a weak income situation as well as
comparatively high costs. The Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht named
high staff costs, climbing administrative expenses with large fixed costs, as well as
increasingly high expenditures on risk provisions and write-downs to market value on
participating interests and securities holdings as the major cost drivers (various annual
reports of the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht). High expenses also
resulted from the transition to electronic banking, new information and communication
devices and platforms, which involved costly restructuring and reorganization
measures within the institutions. In addition, the rising regulatory requirements put
further pressure on the cost side.
Though sometimes disputed (e.g. Sachverständigenrat 2004/2005), the weak income
situation of German banks was mainly attributed to the intense competition on the
German market. As mentioned in section 2.1, the financial sector had always been very
competitive and overbanked. The number of banks and branch offices had traditionally
been comparatively high.36
“One important factor was the bank branches. Germany had not just been overbanked but also
overbranched. I have nothing against competition, but Germany was so covered with branches
that some branches could not possibly generate the revenues that were necessary to be
profitable.” (Interview XIX, own translation)
In fact, banks’ net interest margins – i.e. the main source of income for German banks
- had been continuously lower than in many other countries (Table 8).
36 Though high competition is very beneficial for bank customers as prices for bank products and
services will be low, it constitutes an income problem for banks.
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Table 8 - Bank net interest margins development for selected countries
“You need a certain size as some kind of protective shield. But what is more important, if you
do not want to run the risk of being taken over, you need a high share value, and that is only
possible when your profitability is high. The Spanish banks, on average, had an interest margin
of 4.6 when we had one of 1.3. So, you can imagine what those banks earn more just because
of those margins. If you are wondering why some countries were not caught up in the subprime
crisis, such as Italy and Spain - well, those who have lucrative margins at home to live off do
not need to look for business elsewhere. That is certainly no excuse for us [German banks], but
it is an explanation.” (Interview XIII, own translation)
Furthermore, the financial sector as part of the German economy was naturally
affected by the strained and difficult economic conditions both at home and abroad as
explained in section 3.1.1. Particularly with the financial sector being very globally
interconnected, the weak global economy after the bursting of the dotcom bubble and
the 9/11 attacks, as well as the economic and financial crises in Asia (1997/1998),
Russia (1998/1999) and Argentina (1998-2002) had a significant impact on the
German big banks’ income situation (see, for example, Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2003). In consequence of the strained economic
conditions, demand for credit both in the private and public sector declined, which
furthered the continuous decline of net interest income. In addition, net commission
income and net income from the trading book, which had increasingly made up a larger
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 1,63 2,54 1,81 1,48 1,15 0,59 2,78 4,30 2,26 2,02
Austria 1,22 0,82 1,68 1,72 1,76 1,75 1,48 1,70 1,90 2,19
Belgium 1,01 1,36 1,34 2,16 1,74 1,24 0,93 1,15 0,93 0,96
Canada 1,44 2,02 1,76 2,21 2,38 2,14 1,65 1,92 2,21 1,96
Finland 1,73 1,84 0,28 1,15 1,25 1,92 0,90 1,02 1,16 1,10
France 1,11 0,95 0,89 1,16 1,12 1,00 0,83 0,73 0,63 0,90
Germany 1,22 1,16 1,07 1,19 0,98 1,04 0,95 1,04 1,00 0,94
Ireland 0,38 0,25 0,27 0,18 0,29 0,60 0,95 1,02 0,86 0,12
Italy 1,89 2,06 2,19 1,37 1,68 2,47 3,70 2,20 2,27 1,88
Japan 1,49 1,23 1,27 1,45 1,39 1,23 1,14 1,20 1,25 1,13
Netherlands 1,06 1,20 1,22 1,35 1,05 1,74 0,83 0,27 0,85 0,57
Norway 2,02 2,19 2,25 2,49 2,13 1,32 1,70 2,08 1,49 1,28
Spain 1,67 0,87 2,45 2,50 2,32 2,40 2,58 1,73 1,57 1,37
Sweden 1,72 1,32 1,28 1,53 1,70 1,07 0,90 1,05 1,40 1,07
Switzerland 0,91 1,27 1,20 1,33 1,35 1,26 0,72 0,64 0,52 0,51
UK 1,16 1,18 1,09 1,61 2,03 2,28 2,50 1,54 2,04 1,42
USA 4,32 3,83 3,83 3,95 3,71 3,50 3,47 3,21 3,14 3,10
Net interest margins
Source: own representation based on the World Bank financial development indicators data base.
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portion of the big banks’ profits37, also declined, since revenues from investment
services, such as those related to mergers, acquisitions, IPOs, or from trading, had
significantly dropped in light of the problems and collapses on the global financial
markets in the early 2000s. Both the ECB and the Federal Reserve Bank lowered the
interest rates to (hitherto) historically low levels (the Federal Funds Rate fell from as
high as 6.5% in the US in mid-2000 to as low as 1% in mid-2003, and the ECB key
interest rate fell from 4.75% in the Fall of 2000 to 2% in mid-2003), the revenue from
long-term government bonds was very low, and the yield curve had also flattened
during the first years of the new millennium, thus lowering the income potential
deriving from maturity transformation.
In addition, the existing trend of sinking margins in the major income area of net
interest income, an increase in competitive institutions, and alternative financial
products to bank financing further threatened to take away business from the big banks.
For example, alternative forms of corporate financing, such as issuing corporate bonds,
could substitute for the traditional loan. Moreover, other financial intermediaries and
financial service providers, such as market funds, gained in popularity. For example,
between January 1990 and December 2008, the number of public and special
investors’ funds in Germany rose from 1,765 to 6,050 with a net asset value of close
to 910 billion euros (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b) that year. Insurance companies,
too, increasingly provided their customers with financial products and services that
substituted for bank products. In addition, new competitors entered the market and
took up the niches and fulfilled the needs of corporate firms and private households
private big banks could not fulfill. Particularly in initiating mergers and acquisitions
of big companies, but also in providing other investment banking services, the big
American investment banks such as Morgan Stanley (office in Frankfurt established
in 1987) or Goldman Sachs (office in Frankfurt established in 1990) were dominating
the market. The Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen even described their
dominance as “overwhelmingly dominant” (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen
2000: 39). For example, the privatization of Deutsche Telekom AG in 1996, the largest
37 The percentage of net interest income of the German big banks declined from roughly 68% in 1996
to just below 50% in 2005, whereas the percentage of net income from the trading book increased
from 4.2% to 27.3% during the same timeframe (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b).
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communications provider in Europe at that time and the largest issued volume of 13
billion USD, had been globally coordinated by Goldman Sachs.
“To our dismay, we realized that especially prestigious transactions, such as the privatization
of federal ownership, were coordinated in the lead by Goldman Sachs or other Anglo-Saxon
competitors, and that the German institutions were only lagging behind […].” (Interview IV,
own translation)
With the advent and commercialization of the internet, another group of competitors
entered the already competitive German market – the direct/internet banks. Without
having to operate bank branches like “traditional” banks did, internet and direct banks
had a considerable cost advantage.
3.2. Motivation of Relevant Actors
The immediate questions that come to mind when analyzing the changes on the big
banks’ side are what motivated these banks to adjust their business models that way
and why did the political side support those developments? The motivations of the
actors are usually closely linked to the institutional and situational context, but also
include individual preferences.
3.2.1. Motivation of German Big Banks
First and foremost, private big banks were privately organized companies that had to
strike the balance between satisfying their owners, i.e. their shareholders, and
satisfying their customers while, of course, being compliant with the regulatory and
legal requirements. The shareholders of the big banks’ shares were interested in the
growth of the banks’ net revenue and increases in the earnings per share and dividend
payments. These factors were coupled to the banks’ overall profitability, which could
be measured in a number of key indicators, such as return on equity, return on assets,
or the cost-income-ratio – all of which were closely monitored by the investors. Low
profitability, in turn, had a negative effect on the value of the shares of the globally
operating large banks, as they became less attractive to global investors.
The general low profitability became a particular problem for the German big banks
as competitiveness in the financial market increased (see section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3) and
the long-standing relationships with their corporate investors started to loosen with the
break-up of the so-called Deutschland AG in the early 2000s. Wanted both from the
political side and the banks’ and corporations’ side, the decisive step for breaking up
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the Deutschland AG was a law introduced in 2001 that allowed for tax exemption for
capital gains for the sale of corporate participations from 2002 on. Since German big
banks holding major shares in many big German corporations (for example, Deutsche
Bank’s corporate participations in 2000 included 11.9% in DaimlerChrysler, 10% in
Linde, and 9.6% in Münchener Rück (Handelsblatt 2000)) was rather unattractive to
other (global) investors, this tax reform had been considered necessary. From a
political standpoint as well as from the firms’ side, global investors were desired to
make the German market and the German economy more attractive.
“If you are opening up capital markets, then these also have to follow and apply internationally
acclaimed governance rules. This had not been the case in Germany with its cross-
entanglements and cross-holding of supervisory board seats. Hence, there had been pressure
from foreign investors to this regard. [...]. The companies themselves also had come to the
conclusion that, in the long run, holding participations of 10-15% in other companies - be it
banks, insurance companies, or others - could not be conducive to being internationally
successful and to being able to invest.” (Interview XIV, own translation)
“When Gerhard Schröder became chancellor in 1998, he had ‘promised’ the insurance firms
and big banks in advance that he would dissolve the Deutschland AG. The instrument for doing
so was the tax-free sale of participations by insurance firms and banks. The beneficiaries of
such policy were essentially only Allianz, Deutsche Bank, and – to a lesser extent -
Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank, but particularly Deutsche Bank. From my point of view,
this was the first big boost towards capital market-orientation, since the participations of banks
and insurance firms were tightly connected with business relationships and lending (in the case
of banks). With the implementation of the policy change, a lot of equity capital flooded the
market that then awaited its utilization. If I am not mistaken, the volume of Deutsche Bank
equaled about 10-12 billion euros that, of course, were used to establish new business models.
Disadvantaged were of course those who never even had any participations to begin with, such
as savings banks and cooperative banks.” (Interview X, own translation)
The share of foreign investors in free floating stocks of big German banks increased
considerably during the 2000s. For example, Deutsche Bank’s share of foreign
investors increased from 46% to 53% between 2001 and 2008, the share of foreign
investors at Commerzbank increased from 37% to 72.5% during the same timeframe,
and at Deutsche Börse even from 32% to 84% (Bundeszentrale für politische
Aufklärung 2010). In comparison, the average percentage of foreign investors holding
shares in German DAX corporations was at 52.6 % in 2008. Many of the foreign
investors were institutional investors from Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US or
the UK. Consequently, their interests were much more short-term driven and much
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more market-oriented than those of the strategically involved investors of the previous
years.
In the eyes of the institutional investors, German private big banks were largely
“overcapitalized”. The minimum capital requirements of 4% for the core capital ratio
and 8% of the BIS equity ratio was easily surpassed by the German big banks. For
example, the core capital ratios (BIS equity ratios) for Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank,
Commerzbank and HypoVereinsbank in 1999 lay at 5.9% (12%), 6.4% (12.4%), 6.3%
(9.7%), and 5.8% (10.4%), respectively (Martin Faust 2002: 56). This, too, added
pressure to not “bind” that much capital but to rather invest.
Accordingly, the pressure to maximize profits became much greater as the percentage
of foreign investors increased. But it was also a general trend: With a general opening
of the capital markets to the world, investors both nationally and abroad had a much
larger pool of financial products and services to choose from, and naturally searched
for the best investments, i.e. those that promised the greatest shareholder returns.
“Imagine you are a joint-stock bank. You see that all your competitors, not just in Germany
but also around you, earn really good money with certain activities and financial instruments.
Maybe they even have a ROE of 30%. And you go ahead and say: ‘No, if my ROE turns out
12 or 15%, I am ok with that.’ What do you think your stockholders will tell you? Your owners?
Why should they keep on giving you capital?” (Interview XIX, own translation)
“Have a look at what institutional investors asked for their returns on their portfolios in the
mid-1990s. [...] The shares belonged to life insurers, property insurers, pension funds and
mutual funds. [...] Their shareholder return expectations are the profit goals banks had to be
measured against. [...]” (Interview II, own translation)
“A German big bank will be visited about 50 times a year by institutional investors. In return,
we pay about 300 to 400 visits to them. Those are the actual owners. And they will tell you:
‘What are you doing? You are overcapitalized!’ […]. ‘You have [too much] capital. […]. Buy
back shares!’ Then I said: ‘I think that would be the wrong move. What happens if I do not do
that?’ ‘Then we are going to sell your shares.’ So, the pressure of the capital markets with their
short-term 3-month-period thinking has proved to be negative here. That does not just account
for banks but for everyone who is well-advised to think in medium to long-term ranges when
it comes to strategic decisions. This [short-term thinking] certainly led to decisions back then
that one would not necessarily make today.” (Interview XIII, own translation)
Along with the pressure to improve profits came the threat of (hostile) takeovers by
foreign banks or other companies. The lower the value of the banks’ shares, the greater
the threat.
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In a nutshell, the bad economic situation, both nationally and internationally, had a
direct influence on the German big banks. Both income and cost side restrained the
big banks’ profitability. Still in 2003, the Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht pointed out that it was “primarily the continuing low
profitability of German banks that caused their business results to suffer in
international comparison” (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2004: 17).
When the percentage of foreign investors from Anglo-Saxon countries and the overall
competitiveness in the market increased, the pressure to either improve profitability,
thereby satisfying the shareholders and improving the share prices, or otherwise
running the risk of being taken over by other companies, was rather great, and
consequently, necessitated action. In turn, the banks’ management boards aimed to
satisfy those demands, but also had an intrinsic motivation to perform well as their
success and earnings were also linked to the company’s success.
The motivations and goals could be traced in various press statements and annual
reports. For example, in its 2003 annual report, the former Deutsche Bank CEO, Dr.
Josef Ackermann, wrote in his letter to the shareholders: “We improved the most
important target figure, the underlying pre-tax return on equity, from 4% in 2002 to
13% last year. The goal we want to achieve in the next two years is 25%” (Deutsche
Bank 2004: 4). This goal was reiterated in the subsequent annual reports of 2004 (“In
2005, we aim to achieve 25% before restructuring expense” ((Deutsche Bank 2005:
3)) and 2005 (“Our target is to achieve, over the cycle, a sustainable profitability of
25% pre-tax return on equity as well as a double-digit growth rate of earnings per
share” (Deutsche Bank 2006: 5)), eventually reaching that goal in 2005 and 2006 (pre-
tax return on average active equity over 25%). Also, HypoVereinsbank determined the
key factors for future success “sharply boosting our profitability, elaborating our
growth options, and reinforcing our strategic room for maneuver” (Bayerische Hypo-
und Vereinsbank 2004: 15). Dresdner Bank also named an increase in profitability and
growth as its primary goals, and targeted a return on equity of 12% after taxes
(Dresdner Bank 2006: 4).
At the same time, the banks’ business, particularly in Germany with its long-standing
tradition in relationship banking, greatly relied on the relationship with and trust of
their clients and customers. Satisfying those and thereby generating business through
them was the other key target, which was also addressed by various big banks’ CEO
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letters to the shareholders. For example, Dresdner Bank stated: “We are focusing all
our efforts on our customers, and hence systematically leveraging our growth chances”
(Dresdner Bank 2005: 3), “[…] increasing key ratios in the short term is not enough”
and ensuring that the bank was “always acting in our customers’ best interest”
(Dresdner Bank 2006: 3/4). Similarly, Commerzbank stated that “in all our measures
it was important for us not to overly burden or place undue strain upon our
relationships with customers – in other words, the very basis of our business – but, on
the contrary, to build upon these” (Commerzbank 2003: 3, own translation). After all,
income from net interest, though considerably less than for the other banking groups,
continued to be the largest source of income as percentage of the overall operating
income. Net interest received still constituted between 50 and 60 % of the operative
income for private big banks in the 2000s (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014c).
Figure 8 - Major income items for German big banks as percentage of operating income
Overall, the big banks’ motivations were pretty unequivocal. The primary goal was to
increase profitability. All other motivations, i.e. being efficient, providing high quality
goods and services, gaining market share, outperforming competitors, improving key
ratios, diversifying risk portfolios, etc., were subordinate goals that were linked to the
basic intrinsic motivation of generating revenue and making profit, i.e. the basic
capitalist approach of any firm operating in a free market environment. This became
even more important in the course of the internationalization of the entire financial
services industry. The more interesting question for that matter may be why politics
supported and urged for the growth of the financial market in Germany, including the
development of securitization markets.
Source: own calculations and representation based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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3.2.2. Motivation of German Politics
It should be noted that the political support in fostering the German financial sector
was rather unanimous. There was large political consensus among the governing
parties and the opposition parties (see, for example, the political initiatives of different
parties all aiming for the same goal, as well as the public hearing on this subject on 4
June 2003).
In light of the situational context as illustrated in 3.1, three major motivational factors
were decisive for the general fostering of the German financial market. First, the
immediate motivational factor in light of the strained and difficult economic situation
was to find ways and means to spur economic growth38 again, to stimulate job growth
and employment. Economic growth in neoclassical economic theory is generally
considered to derive from an increase in human and capital stock, advances in
technology, and improvement in the quality and level of literacy (Solow 1956). This
means that aside from technological progress and access to high quality education
across all social classes, politics should be primarily concerned with job creation,
raising employment levels, and generally empowering the firms to be innovative and
productive. Though consistent economic growth has generally been one of the main
goals in German economic policy (see, for example, § 1 of the “Gesetz zur Förderung
Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft” of 1967), it was particularly necessary
in light of the aforementioned dire economic conditions and a record-high
unemployment rate of over 11% in 1997 and 1998 and over or close to 10% in the
subsequent years (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2014). For example, a look at probably
the best known and most comprehensive German reform agenda, the “Agenda 2010”,
provided useful information on the intentions of the political actors at that time. The
“Agenda 2010” introduced in 2003 was a concept to reform the German social system
and job market. It included concepts on extensive reforms in the areas of education,
employment, health and pension insurance, finances, taxation, etc., which were
38 Economic growth is defined as “an increase in the capacity of an economy to produce goods and
services, compared from one period of time to another” (Investopia 2014), and measured in an
increase in real GDP, or, even more importantly, an increase in per capita income.
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intended to also remove structural barriers that were considered hindering economic
growth (e.g. Schröder 2003).39
The follow-up question then is why the financial sector as a whole and financial
product innovations in particular were considered necessary supporting. For one
reason, Germany’s financial sector had been falling behind comparative nations’
financial sectors (see section 3.1). Though this was a primary concern for the banking
sector itself, it also very much concerned politics. Other countries’ financial sectors
were contributing more to their respective countries’ GDP than Germany did, the
primary examples of successful countries at that time being, in particular, the United
States and also Great Britain. Both countries had an innovative and large financial
sector. Hence, the motivation for German politics to exploit the potential for growth
in the German financial sector was big.
“Back then even more than today, one believed that economic growth would be the result of
more efficient capital markets.” (Interview XVII, own translation)
“Naturally, one did the math: ‘How high is the contribution of the financial market to the GDP
in Great Britain? In the US?’ And then we saw that countries like France, Germany, and other
continental European financial markets were lagging far, far, far behind - and had been lagging
behind right from the start. So we wanted to keep up. We wanted to be competitive. Both
politics and the market actors wanted that.” (Interview XIX, own translation)
Furthermore, Germany has always been an export nation which has greatly relied on
other nations to import its products. Hence, it also relied on its banks to accompany
and support firms who wanted to establish subsidiaries abroad and who wanted to sell
their products to foreign countries. This accounted particularly for Germany’s big
banks and Landesbanken who were the primary bank groups to accompany firms
abroad. Hence, Germany simply could not afford to have their big banks and
Landesbanken fall behind and to not keep up with international trends.
“I believe it was common consensus that the German economy, which was strongly export-
oriented, needed the accompanying support of well-functioning and strong financial markets.
I think it was viewed rather positively that the fungibility of stocks in Germany increased, that
the Deutschland AG was dissolved, and that the balance of German investors investing abroad
and foreign investors investing in Germany was improved. So the international
39 These reforms were considered rather liberal and surprising for a coalition consisting of the Social
Democrats and the Alliance 90/The Greens. The reforms were also supported by the Christian
Democrats, but heavily criticized by the far left wings of the center-left parties.
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interconnectedness was considered a value in itself. And that way, Germany could catch up
with the big capital markets, such as the US or Great Britain.” (Interview XI, own translation)
“[...]. As an export nation, you just could not be standing last in line here. Also, this was the
time when the German state started to have increasing financing needs. For that, you needed a
functioning capital market. [...] You needed a banking market that could take on the
government bonds, which is difficult in an isolated and inaccessible market. [...] But again,
from a German point of view, as an export nation, you just could not let that train leave the
station without you.” (Interview XIV, own translation)
Germany’s economic “backbone” has always been its Mittelstand, i.e. small and
medium-sized companies with an annual turnover of less than 50 million euros
(Günterberg/Walter 2003). In 2000, for example, the German Mittelstand made up
99.7% of all German companies and generated 43.2% of the overall revenue generated
by all German companies (Günterberg/Walter 2003: 14). It contributed almost 49% to
the gross value added by German companies that same year (Günterberg/Walter 2003:
14). Those companies, especially the small-sized companies, still heavily relied on
bank loans for external financing.40 With the introduction of the capital requirements
of Basel I and later also Basel II, loans, however, became much costlier to banks and
therefore also less attractive for profit-oriented banks. The Basel standards required
banks to back the loans they were giving out with a certain minimum amount of capital.
Generally speaking, the riskier a company or the more likely a private household or
company was to default on a loan, the more capital was required for that loan. With
Basel I, the categories specified by the regulatory framework for the classification of
borrowers were pretty broad and not much differentiated. For example, there was no
differentiation between small and big private companies, thus leading to an
underestimation or overestimation of the risk with which the companies defaulted.
This later changed with Basel II, which differentiated much more to this regard.
Though Basel II was fully implemented only in 2007, banks made the necessary
changes and started adjusting and preparing much sooner (e.g. Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2004, 2005, and 2006). From a regulatory standpoint
then, smaller companies were considered more likely to default on loans than bigger
companies, and in consequence, it was costlier for banks to give out loans to the
40 The preferred means of financing has always been internal financing, own capital, etc., but if
external financing became necessary, then bank financing, e.g. through bank loans, was the preferred
form.
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smaller companies or private households. Then, as well as today, banks consequently
threatened regulators and politicians with “credit crunches” due to these new capital
requirements. Nevertheless, since these requirements were also politically wanted,
internationally agreed upon, and desired for reasons of financial stability and safety,
non-compliance with these regulatory standards were not an option. Whether or not
the threat of a “credit crunch” was indeed real, can be debated. Regardless, it is still a
valid explanation why politics supported the securitization market as they did not want
to hinder banks from providing necessary loans to Germany’s Mittelstand. Because
securitization allowed for credit risks to become tradable, which, in turn, took the
credits or their risks off the balance sheets, capital got “freed”, which then would
provide more room for possible further loan allocation (e.g. Ricken 2008).
Though the external financing focus of SMEs in Germany was (and still is) largely
loan-oriented, the aim was not only to increase the banks’ lending potential through
securitization, but to also broaden the financing options for smaller firms, e.g. through
equity or venture capital financing, mezzanine capital financing, or through securitized
products (Weber 2004). The coalition agreement of 2005 clearly committed to product
innovations and mezzanine capital as alternative financing means for SMEs
(CDU/CSU 2005).
“The German Mittelstand has received about 40 billion euros in financing means through the
ABS market, the largest portion of that deriving from securitization of bank loans to the
Mittelstand. By doing so, the securitization market has made a significant contribution to
German banks being able to maintain their lending business with the German Mittelstand
despite the changes in their refinancing conditions through Basel II and the discontinuation of
state guarantees; that, in fact, they could even extend the lending business in 2006 and that we
never experienced the alleged credit crunch supposed in 2003.” (Asmussen 2006: 11, own
translation).
Hence, securitization was first and foremost considered beneficial in diversifying
banks’ risk portfolios, as well as diversifying companies’ external financing options.
In fact, a distinction should be made between banks getting involved in trading
securitized products for the sole sake of making profits from that, or engaging in the
securitization of products themselves for the purpose of risk diversification, provision
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of useful alternatives to traditional financing products, etc.41 The Ministry of Finance,
based on the findings of a study that had been conducted by the Boston Consulting
Group by order of the Ministry of Finance to evaluate the potential of the German
securitization market, had been primarily emphasizing the latter one.
Second, Germany as the largest net contributor to the EU wanted a leading role in the
EU, which could only be achieved if it was economically stable and competitive,
particularly in an area that had grown so immensely important. Germany had always
been very supportive of the European idea and its intentions and goals. In fact, it has
been one of the greatest supporters of European integration. Hence, it was only natural
that Germany would be supportive of one of the EU’s primary goals, namely “to create
a single deep and liquid financial market to serve as a motor for growth, job creation
and improved competitiveness in the European economy” (European Commission
2005: 5-6). Also, since Germany, like other economies in Europe, was in dire need to
find growth potential, the benefits of the EU single market, i.e. the aforementioned
economic growth and rise in employment, were very appealing. Since the EU was
striving to harmonize the single market for financial services, it was only natural to
support that move. Besides, compliance with EU regulation was indisputable.
“There was indeed a public policy discussion in Europe and in Germany along the lines of:
‘The German Sonderweg is trouble. It hampers competition, and it hampers the capabilities
and capacities of German private banks. The capital market is the determining element of the
global economy and the biggest economy in Europe does not play by the rules of the capital
market.’” (Interview VII, own translation)
And third, there was the general demand of the population for taking part in the general
trend towards greater market orientation and following the “Zeitgeist” of the time. For
one, the interest rates were so low that “low-risk” investments such as savings
accounts, savings plans, etc., were not very attractive to investors. Hence, they were
looking for greater returns, and it was the government’s responsibility to provide
access to that.
Also, though not a primary motivating factor that could explain the developments in
the later years, but a contributing factor for the government’s support of a more liberal
41 The losses incurred from proprietary trading activities of German banks were mostly losses from
US subprime portfolios, and not so much losses from German securitized products (True Sale
International 2014).
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and market-oriented approach in the financial sector, certainly was the goal to find a
solution to the demographic challenges that came with a growing portion of elderly
people and the subsequent strain on the traditional pay-as-you-go pension insurance
scheme. The system had been built on the premise of an even number of young
working people being able to pay into the pension scheme, while retired people
received the benefits. With an increasing number of older people and a declining
number of younger people, the balance was distorted and the system would only have
been sustainable under rising contribution rates and smaller benefits on the receiving
end. Both factors would not have contributed to the general wealth and satisfaction of
Germany’s citizens. Consequently, the government kept encouraging its population to
also take private provisions for the future in addition to the traditional pay-as-you-go
pension insurance scheme. For that purpose, it was also in the government’s interest
to have people look for alternative ways of investments that were suitable for old age
provisions, including certain investment funds, life insurances, etc. Examples include
the Riester pension (introduced in 2002) and the Rürüp pension (introduced in 2005),
both privately financed pensions that were supported by the government by being tax
deductible or state-funded.
3.3. Action Possibilities of Relevant Actors
3.3.1. Action Possibilities of German Politics
Once the decision to support the financial sector as a means to foster economic growth
in Germany and to support its competitiveness was made by the political decision-
makers, the possibilities to do so were rather straightforward. Essentially, two main
courses of action were feasible. On the one hand, the political side could have decided
to provide state aid in terms of financial subsidies to the financial industry sector or its
companies by creating jobs in the public financial sector as a means to initiate growth,
or nationalize private banks to “protect” them from hostile takeovers. However, this
option would have been disadvantageous for a number of reasons. First, the costs for
the state would have risen as any state subsidies or enlargement of the public sector
would be accompanied by an increase in monetary spending. In turn, this would have
had to be financed through tax increases and/or a greater level of public indebtedness,
both options undesired by the public and the state officials. Also, the level of
indebtedness in Germany, i.e. the government gross debt, had already steadily been
rising since the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany (for instance, from
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41.3% in 1990 to 55.6% in 1995 to 60.2% in 2000 to over 64% in 2003 (Eurostat
2014)). Considering that the overall gross debt level according to the convergence
criteria agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty was set at a maximum of 60% of GDP
and the level of new indebtedness was set a maximum 3% increase annually, further
public expenditures measures would have been unreasonable and irresponsible.
Second, Germany’s chosen economic system was the social market economy, as
agreed upon by the Federal Republic of Germany and the former GDR after the
reunification.42 This meant that the basis was still a free and competitive economy that
was characterized by private ownership, assuming free price setting, pursuit of profit,
performance, etc. The state was to provide a general regulatory policy framework and
only assume a “corrective” role if it became necessary and was economically justified.
Hence, rather than nationalizing corporations and creating public sector jobs,
privatization of firms and state enterprises were striven for, such as, for example, the
privatization of the former state enterprises Deutsche Bundespost into Deutsche Post,
Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Postbank, or the privatization of Deutsche
Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn into Deutsche Bahn. Hence, any move towards
state aid and nationalization attempts would have completely countered the German
market model and the advances made in previous years towards that model.
Third, besides countering one’s own principles and advances, it would also have
constituted a serious breach with EU principles and regulations. Not only would
subsidies have meant risking falling short of meeting the Maastricht criteria (which
Germany and other EU Member States eventually did anyway), but it would have also
meant threatening to come into conflict with EU state aid law, which was rather critical
and strict towards any kind of state intervention to the benefit of selected companies
or industry sectors (European Commission 2014b).
Fourth, state subsidies or nationalization attempts would not have solved the
underlying profitability issue of the German big banks, nor would it have made the
German financial sector as a whole more competitive.
42 See the “Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion zwischen der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” of 18 May 1990. In
addition, though not explicitly stated in the German Basic Law, the basic elements of that economic
system were ensured by the various central elements of the German legal system while extreme
economic model cases such as the central planned economy or the liberal laissez-faire were generally
ruled out.
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Last but not least, this form of state intervention would not have been in line with the
general “Zeitgeist” of that time, which was characterized by an increasingly capitalist
environment, a greater capital market orientation, general liberalization tendencies,
and the global interconnectedness made possible and vivid by the immense
technological progress. Hence, this option would not have worked under the given
circumstances. Consequently, economic growth had to come from and through the
market itself, through jobs and growth in the private sector.
Thus, if subsidies and the like were no feasible options, the government was then well
advised to introduce measures and/or laws that would generally make it easier for
companies to be innovative, to operate efficiently, and to not burden them with too
much bureaucracy or taxes that make it more difficult for them to be nationally or
internationally competitive.
Given the fact that the EU had set out to harmonize the financial market regulatory
framework across its Member States, the national leeway was rather small. Certainly,
national measures were undertaken to improve the competitiveness of the German
financial market and to catch up with the leading financial centers by encouraging
product innovations and the use of derivative instruments, for example, through the
implementation of the four legal acts to foster the German financial sector
(“Finanzmarktfördergesetze”), the last one having been implemented in mid-2002.
Moreover, a few legislative measures were introduced that were conducive to the
securitization of credit risks or bank credits, such as the
“Kleinunternehmerförderungsgesetz” of 2003, which extended the trade tax privileges
of banks to special purpose vehicles that securitized credits or credit risks from bank
business (Ricken 2008). In spring 2003, the then finance minister Hans Eichel
introduced his “Finanzmarktförderplan 2006”. With that plan, he announced tax
improvements and simplifications for investment funds and the admission of hedge
funds in Germany.
However, the vast majority of laws passed in Germany then were implementations of
EU directives aiming to complete the EU single market in financial services. Many of
those measures aimed at fostering the financial market both in the EU and the home
market through facilitating the cross-border activities of investment funds, making
alternative forms of financing for firms (on the capital market) more accessible, or
making Germany as a place for financial market activities more attractive for
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investment funds. This was attempted, for example, with the introduction of the
Investment Modernization Act (“Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz”), which
implemented the amended European UCITS Directive, or the law to implement the
EU Prospectus Directive (“Prospektrichtilinie-Umsetzungsgesetz”), which introduced
a new German Securities Prospectus Act that necessitated the issuance, approval, and
publishing of a securities prospectus when publicly offering securities or when
admitting them for public sale on organized markets.
Nevertheless, at the same time, most of these measures were also directed at improving
investor relations and transparency, and at generally improving the institutions’ risk
management capacities. For example, the “Bilanzkontrollgesetz”, implemented at the
end of 2004, seeked to prevent balance sheet manipulation, the
“Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz” (also end-2004) implemented certain EU accounting
standards, or the “Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (mid-2005) necessitated
the public disclosure of individual management board compensations. Also, the
aforementioned Eichel plan provided for improvements for investors with regards to
transparency, and disclosure (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2003). Furthermore,
the “Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz” implemented the European Market Abuse
Directive and aimed at strengthening private investors’ liability claims rights, among
other things. Also, the “Gesetz zur Umsetzung aufsichtsrechtlicher Bestimmungen zur
Sanierung und Liquidation von Versicherungsunternehmen und Kreditrisiken” (end-
2003) also implemented various EU directives to improve consumer and investor
protection. Most notably, however, at the end of 2006, the EU Directive on the
implementation of the Basel II requirements was implemented in Germany, and the
EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in mid-2007. Both measures
aimed at improving risk management in the institutions, at tightening capital
requirements, increasing transparency, improving corporate conduct rules, and the
like.43
There was also no doubt that new risks were associated with the global
interconnectedness and the products. For example, in its 2003 annual report, the
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht had cautioned that the credit risk
transfer market was also coupled with new risks, aside from providing great new
43 A comprehensive list of the financial and capital market regulatory laws implemented in Germany
since the 14th electoral period can be found in annex 2.
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potentials: “One of the current main concerns is that it is very difficult to identify the
amount of risk transfer actually taking place and the party ultimately responsible for
assuming that risk. In addition, concentrated exposures could play a larger role than
on other derivative markets. Various initiatives at international levels, most notably
the Joint Forum and the network of European supervisory authorities, are currently
dealing with the effects this market could have on the stability of the financial system”
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsich 2004: 21). Similarly, it later wrote
that “the new instruments also result in new risks” (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005: 31) and that “supervision will pay attention to
encouraging institutions that are active in this market [i.e. derivative market] adapt and
strengthen their risk management accordingly” (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht: 31). Moreover, the German Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht and other supervisory authorities paid particular
attention on cross-country cooperation, particularly with regard to those institutions
that were working internationally and were globally connected. Hence, the risks
associated with globalization and technological progress but also the new product
developments and innovations that kept emerging rapidly in fast pace were being
addressed, and had to be taken seriously by the political actors.
Hence, aside from (de-)regulatory measures, which were mostly driven by the
European agenda and complemented by (re-)regulatory measures, politics had the
possibility to generally voice their support and encouragements of financial market
activity, product innovation, and seeking the exchange with the industry on those
matters.44 As already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this option was
exploited by all mainstream parties.
To political actors, it was also clear that the banking sector’s profitability would have
to be primarily strengthened via the income side, as reductions on the cost side were
generally limited. Furthermore, as savings banks and cooperative banks were generally
too small to conduct large business transactions, it was also evident that it had to be
44 Generally, the EU directives in the 2000s gave more room for national discretions and the
interpretation and practice of the measures than is the case today. Future research could, for example,
focus on the question if and to what extent Germany had used those discretions to foster the German
financial market, also in comparison to other EU Member States.
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Landesbanken and private big banks, or the central institutions of cooperative and
savings banks that would be suitable for the capital market and investment business.
3.3.2. Action Possibilities of German Big Banks
As the particular situation of the German big banks and the overall economic situation
conveyed, big banks had to necessarily implement changes in order to improve their
profitability, to remain competitive, and to improve their global standings and market
values.
In the short term, the money “freed” from the sale of the corporate participations in
light of the dissolution of the Deutschland AG could be used to initiate share buyback
programs in order to improve the respective bank’s share value. For example, Deutsche
Bank initiated its first share buyback program on 1 July 2002, i.e. right after the tax
reform law had been passed.
„Deutsche Bank had 10-12 billion euros. With that money, it started financing a big share
buyback program. By buying back own shares, the ROE ratio was dramatically increased.
Reaching the anticipated 25% before tax ROE became much easier that way. […].” (Interview
X, own translation)
“The dissolution of the Deutschland AG basically financed the restructuring of the banks.”
(Interview VIII, own translation)
However, those were no long-term solution to the actual underlying profitability issue.
Hence, all feasible options left for private big banks involved options that would tackle
the overarching issue of competitiveness and profitability. Generally, there were
essentially two key control variables to effectively manage a bank’s profitability and
to improve its cost-income ratio. This included cutting costs on the one side, and
increasing income on the other side, preferably both.
Cost-Cutting
Germany’s banking sector has had an extensive branch network and had traditionally
been “characterized by overcapacities” (Bundesaufsichtsamt für Kreditwesen 1999:
41), which was expensive to maintain as it involved not only the maintenance and
administrative costs of those numerous branches, but also personnel, IT networks, and
the like. Hence, one option to save money certainly involved closing or downsizing
branches and personnel. The commercialization of the internet and the advent of
internet banking certainly helped implement cost-cutting measures that were helpful
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in streamlining the branch network. Not only did the use of internet banking constitute
an addition to the classic branch network but could substitute for entire branch offices,
thus reducing costs on that end (see, for example, the 1998, 1999, and 2000 annual
reports of the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen). However, larger-scale
downsizing activities would always meet the resistance of politics and unions (see part
on mergers and acquisitions later in this section).
Another option to cut costs were to generally streamline business through outsourcing
activities, such as outsourcing bank sections to external companies or centralizing
various business units at the headquarters. For example, the 2003 annual report of the
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht stated: “Deutsche Bank AG intends to
begin processing a range of back office functions including payment transactions for
other banks and savings banks. […]. Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank have both
announced plans to outsource payment transactions to Postbank in 2004.”
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2004: 88). Also, staff and material
expenses were attempted to be cut, and workflows were attempted to be made more
efficient, etc. Streamlining measures also included deciding on strategically important
segments and potentially getting rid of those that were not. For example, in 2003,
HypoVereinsbank AG spinned off Hypo Real Estate Group, which, according to its
management “no longer fit [its] strategic business objectives” (Bayerische Hypo- und
Vereinsbank 2004: 14). Hence, many private banks did exactly that.
“The major banks have been concentrating on strategically important lines of business. Other
areas which do not qualify as core activities are either experiencing sharp cutbacks or being
discontinued altogether” (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2003: 61).
To that regard, the classic retail business, in which savings banks and cooperative
banks had the dominant market position, also had to be called into question. It was low
margin business, and consequently, unattractive business if the goal was to increase
profitability. It had only been worth economically when being able to cross-sell other
products. At the same time, loans to private households and small and medium-sized
companies bound a lot of regulatory capital as set forth by the Basel I (later Basel II)
regulatory requirements. Even considering the option of securitizing credits and credit
risks to “free” capital as an option to cut costs and to make room for more investment
(Ricken 2008, Boston Consulting Group 2004) still left the question of where to invest
that money meaningfully and not solve the underlying low margin problem. On the
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other hand, keeping the long-standing relationships with customers and receiving their
deposits was still considered important. Thus, while some banks focused more on other
business segments, the retail business was still kept as the “anchor” business (various
interviews).
Furthermore, the cost-cutting efforts were counteracted by a few opposing
developments, such as the necessary reorganization and restructuring and
implementation of the IT systems due to the increased importance of internet banking,
investment banking, and e-commerce activities (e.g. Bundesaufsichtsamt für das
Kreditwesen 2001: 58).
Moreover, the increasing demands on institutions regarding supervisory standards,
particularly those of Basel II, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, or the
new accounting standards, significantly increased costs in IT and personnel. For
example, risk management and control units had to be set up, reporting channels
between the banks and the supervisory authorities needed to be updated and expanded,
reporting requirements increased, external auditors and supervisory audits
commissioned, and so on.
“Reducing costs is difficult, because even reasonable regulation comes with costs. Just look at
all the compliance regulation costs, […].” (Interview XIX, own translation)
Aside from internal restructuring efforts to consolidate, external reorganizational
means through possible mergers and acquisitions were conceivable. Mergers and
acquisitions on the domestic market, however, were problematic and options scarce.
For one, the German market did not provide many opportunities. 85 % of the number
of banks in Germany in 1998 and 1999 were savings banks, Landesbanken, or banks
from the cooperative banks group (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b). They, by virtue of
their legal status (see section 2.1), could not be merged with or bought, and were
politically unwanted.
“We were never able to conduct bank consolidations across the different pillars in Germany.
One example is Italy, where public-law savings institutions were converted. The charitable
parts of the Italian savings banks’ business activities were transferred to a foundation and this
foundation then held the shares of the savings banks. That way, mergers between big and
influential savings banks and private banks could take place there, which made a lot of sense.
I also could have envisioned creating a nice regional institution out of a private bank and one
or two savings bank in the Düsseldorf-Köln-Bonn area in Germany with good market power.
However, all of that did not exist in Germany back then, neither does it today. Of course, if
87
options that were available in other countries were no options for us, we were competitively
weakened.” (Interview XIX, own translation)
“It is no secret that growth through M&A as well as organic growth had certainly been
constrained by the 3 pillar structure. Regarding growth through M&A, it is rather obvious: It
was simply impossible to buy certain market competitors. And by the way, it was evidently
impossible that those competitors would exit the market despite proven insufficient
profitability. Hence, market adjustments were barred from both sides, exit and consolidation.
And the 3 pillar structure also hampered organic growth inasmuch as the conditions on the
home market were very difficult and unprofitable in many market segments and not covering
costs because of those competitors operating under non-strictly-profit-maximizing conditions.”
(Interview XVIII, own translation)
“In Germany, you cannot buy anything. You cannot buy savings banks, as otherwise you would
be turning against politics. [...] Cooperatives are untouchable in their cooperative structure.
Hence, there is nothing to consolidate. One tried to consolidate the little bit that was left for
consolidation. But those were all political deals.” (Interview II, own translation)
Mergers and acquisition opportunities among private banks were scarce. Synergies
from big banks with regional private banks were rather limited and did not provide for
the necessary business opportunities that were needed for big banks to become more
profitable in any way. As smaller private banks were also mostly regionally rooted
with locally established business connections, there were no significant additional
earnings to be gained from such mergers. Similarly, those kinds of deals also did not
bring any major cost advantages, as the smaller institutions were simply too small to
be beneficial as outsourcing partners, providers of centralized business functions, or
the like.
The only reasonable and feasible option that would have provided the desired size and
business power to be successful on an international level were mergers between any
of the big banks. Mergers of that size would have allowed for reductions in the number
of employees, integrating or consolidating redundant business areas, adding new
lucrative business areas to the existing ones, and would have generally allowed for
greater market power. Among the German big banks, merger deals had been discussed
in pretty much all conceivable constellations, most prominently the merger attempt
between Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank. It eventually failed in 2000 because of
various reasons, most notably the strong opposition from the workforce in reaction to
the projected downsizing of initially 16,000 people if the deal were to go through. The
workforce and union members on the supervisory boards of the two banks, as well as
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then chancellor Gerhard Schröder had pushed for those projected downsizing
measures to be “socially compatible”, which, in turn, had angered the international
investors. They considered these kinds of “socially compatible” mergers undesirable
as they prevented necessary rationalization processes and synergies urgently needed
to make those banks attractive on the international arena (Manager Magazin 2000). In
reaction to these issues, stock prices of both banks fell by almost 30% (Manager
Magazin 2000).
“You immediately have a huge problem once you [as a firm] start cutting jobs and personnel
in Germany. The magic word is: ‘We have to do this in a socially compatible way.’ This
basically means you can only reduce personnel to the extent to which people leave your firm
for natural reasons. And that takes time.” (Interview XIX, own translation)
Also, further differences among both credit institutions arose from the question of how
to integrate Dresdner Bank’s investment bank Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, as
Deutsche Bank also had then just bought and integrated the American Banker’s Trust
in addition to the existing British investment bank Morgan Grenfell (bought in 1989).
Consequently, the merger talks between both banks failed, essentially leaving both
banks more vulnerable than before.
Merger talks between Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank later in 2000 also failed due
to unresolved questions about Dresdner Bank’s wealth management (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung 2008) and evaluation differences.
Eventually, in 2001, the biggest German insurance company, Allianz, took over
Dresdner Bank with the objective to create a “one-stop” finance solution by combining
an insurance and a bank institution in one big financial conglomerate. However, as
became known in the years to follow, the integration of Dresdner Bank failed, and both
institutions suffered severely from it. In the midst of the financial crisis of 2008,
Commerzbank eventually bought Dresdner Bank off the hands of Allianz for almost
10 billion euros, roughly 40% of what Allianz had paid in 2001 (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung 2008), and was fully merged into Commerzbank in 2009, thereby
losing its independent legal status.
Before the crisis and the decision to take over Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank had also
voiced interest in acquiring Deutsche Postbank, but eventually lost to Deutsche Bank,
who was financially stronger and took over Deutsche Postbank AG in 2010. Also, in
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1998, a merger took place between Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselban with
Bayerische Vereinsbank to Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank.
“Big mergers in Germany may not have had to be approved by the government, but it at least
needed to be tolerated as workplace consolidations naturally played a role when merging two
big institutions. [...] For example, when merging the two big Bavarian banks, the Land Bavaria
was fully behind the merger.” (Interview I, own translation)
Again, mergers – regardless whether they were to take place within the same bank
group or across bank groups – were generally eyed critically by politics with regards
to the social component of job cutting. When Deutsche Bank started to streamline its
institution by cutting many jobs (among other things), work unions as well as politics
greatly disapproved of that decision. For example, Franz Müntefering (then SPD party
chairman) openly criticized the Deutsche Bank CEO Joseph Ackermann for
announcing further job reductions despite having made substantial profits. He argued
that Ackermann’s business ethics were questionable “if he declared a return on equity
ratio of 25% as his target and at the same day announced further job reductions of
6,400 jobs despite growing profits” (Müntefering 2005, own translation). Heiko Maas
(then chairman of the SPD parliamentary group) also stated that further layoffs at
Deutsche Bank would prove that the bank’s only concern was “to maximize its own
operating results without showing any responsibility for Germany as a business center
and without consideration for the firm’s own employees” (Maas 2005, own
translation).
“Human resource policy in the banking and insurance sector has become antisocial and brutal
over the past years.” (Foullong 2007, own translation)
As the German market did not provide the private big banks with many merger and
acquisition options to choose from in the first place, and since some of the options had
been exploited but had failed, the only other option left had been to look for possible
merger or acquisition options outside of Germany. However, as the German banks
were financially weaker than most of the big international players and were lagging
behind the international competition, this option proved rather futile. With the
exception of Dresdner Bank’s acquisitions of the British investment bank Kleinwort
Benson in 1995 and the American investment bank Wasserstein Perella in 2001, as
well as Deutsche Bank’s acquisitions of the British investment bank Morgan Grenfell
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in 1989, the American Bankers Trust in 1998, and a few European banks in the 1980s,
not many acquisitions were left that constituted financially sound choices.
On the other hand, acquisitions of German banks by foreign banks were always a
possible threat. In fact, in 2005, the German HypoVereinsbank (HVB) was acquired
by the Italian financial institution Unicredit S.p.A, and has since then been a subsidiary
company of Unicredit S.p.A, also meaning that it was no longer listed as independent
stock company on the stock exchange. Naturally, the takeover of HVB by Uncredit
S.p.A. and further rumors fuelled the discussions on German banks being threatened
to being taken over by foreigners.
Overall, cost-cutting measures were limited and counteracted by the aforementioned
developments in the technological and regulatory areas. Generally, cost-cutting can
also only be done to a certain degree without offsetting positive effects, e.g. hindering
necessary business expansion projects, keeping one’s workforce motivated, etc.
Moreover, in 2004, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht also
acknowledged that cost reductions via job cuts were hardly possible anymore, and that
a strengthening of the equity ratio had to come from giving up certain business
segments or other means (Manager Magazin 2004). Aside from that, cost-cutting can
always only constitute one lever to effectively manage a bank. The other end has to
come from improved earnings.
Increase Income
One option to improve the earning’s side certainly was to simply raise the prices for
certain financial products and services in order to increase margins. However, in order
to do so, one would have needed a certain market dominance and a largely
concentrated market, which Germany certainly had not been. The market share of
German big banks in terms of savings deposits by private households only constituted
approximately 5% in the late 1990s/early 2000s (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b), which
was very little compared with other countries, such as France or Spain, where the
banking sectors were much more concentrated and the leading banks had a much
greater market share and market power.
“We have enormous competition in Germany, especially regarding the lending business. This
is because we have a banking structure that is particularly competitive: an overbanked market
with players from the public-law sector that do not have the same profit maximization pressure
than capital market-oriented banks – I do not want to say they have no profit pressure at all,
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but not the high profit maximization pressure that capital market-oriented firms have. The
cooperative banks, who are not public-law institutions, but whose philosophy also is to support
their own cooperative members rather than maximizing profit, also contribute to the intense
competitiveness. Hence, higher margins that actually should have been taken due to the
increased capital requirements of Basel II could not be sustained in the market. […].”
(Interview XXV, own translation)
Hence, simply raising the costs for loans in order to get bigger margins from those
transactions would have driven any competitor out of the market.
“The low profitability stems from the fact that private, profit-maximizing banks are in the same
market with savings banks and cooperative banks who do not have to maximize profits. Taking
all private banks together, [they] may make up 15-18 % of the retail business. That means,
whatever [they] agree upon or not does not matter as long as the other 80% agree on something
else. [...] And because the private banks kept earning less and less with their retail business and
because the pressure on their earnings kept mounting, they gladly turned to products that
promised 5-6% commission fees. The tragic thing is that it went well at the beginning. And
because it did, people got more and more reckless.” (Interview XIII, own translation)
“The German banking market was rather fragmented. This meant low market shares even for
the biggest players. If you look at the market shares of the 3 or 4 biggest German banks in the
retail business, which is around 20 or 25%, and compare that to the 3 or 4 biggest banks in
France, Italy, or Spain, which is far beyond 50%, oftentimes 60, 70, or 80%, there is a big
difference. With those market shares, of course, you are able to generate more satisfying
earnings. With the money you earn domestically, you are also better able to do business abroad.
Looking at the German banks, it becomes apparent that - with the exception of Deutsche Bank
- they did not fare so well with their foreign appearances. Internationally, this is being attributed
to the 3 pillar system. [...]” (Interview XI, own translation)
Naturally, the options of mergers and acquisitions mentioned earlier were not only a
cost-cutting endeavor, but also an option to gain more market share and to gain and
attract more business opportunities.
Takeovers and mergers on the national level was, as stated, limited due to the rigid 3
pillar structure of the German banking sector. Cooperative banks were untouchable in
their legal structure, which made it impossible for them to being taken over by stock
companies. Likewise, the regional savings banks acts, too, prevented a takeover of
savings banks by private banks. Consequently, the possibility to gain greater market
share through mergers or acquisitions was limited to other private banks, which, as
described earlier, was limited in numbers and synergy effects.
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Another option to gain market share and to win over new customers could have been
to apply aggressive pricing strategies when selling products or services, such as the
“loss leader” pricing strategy where a product is sold at a price lower than its market
costs. By doing so, the private big banks would have, for example, offered loans to
private or corporate customers at much more favorable conditions (lower interest rates,
for example) than savings banks or cooperative banks did, thereby having attracted
new customers, while having covered the losses incurred from selling the product
below market price by stimulating the sale of other products or services (“cross-
selling”). For example, if a corporation had wanted a loan, the bank would have agreed
but demanded to be in the lead for the firm’s next bond issuance or for all kinds of
derivative instruments needed by that firm (e.g. swaps, hedging for currency risks,
commodity risks, etc.). This strategy, too, was attempted by the private banks.
“Of course, we tried to go into investment banking services that - at that time - did not have to
be backed with that much capital. So we tried to push for the commissions business. For that,
we used the lending business as an anchor product and tried to convince the companies: ‘If you
want our assets, e.g. loans, you are going to have to include us when you are doing attractive
business, e.g. currency derivatives to hedge foreign currency transactions, be it the emission of
bonds, interest rate hedges, commodity price hedges, and so on.’ We really requested that from
the companies, based on the motto of: ‘Yes, we will provide you with credit if you make sure
that we are lead manager or co-lead-underwriter the next time you are issuing bonds.’”
(Interview XXV, own translation)
However, the cost-benefit-analysis in trying to gain market share in a business area
that was very difficult at that time (loan business) was too negative to be worth it.
Various factors played into that. (1) The market was dominated by savings banks and
cooperative banks that were both regionally rooted, had a long-lasting and strong trust-
relationship with their local customers, so that gaining market share by luring those
customers away from them was difficult to start with. (2) Savings banks and
cooperative banks had the competitive advantage of being able to pursue a business
model that was not aimed at profit maximization and had no shareholders that
“punished” unprofitable transactions, thereby allowing them to offer services and
products at more favorable terms to customers than private big banks were able to. (3)
Due to the savings banks’ public-law status, savings banks were able to refinance
themselves more cheaply than other (private) banks (see chapters 4 and 5 on
guarantor’s liability and maintenance obligation), thus also adding to the previously
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mentioned point on offering products and services more cheaply. Even after
maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability had been abolished, was there still an
implicit state guarantee that would guarantee savings banks and Landesbanken more
favorable refinancing opportunities. Hence, undercutting their prices was almost
impossible. (4) Margins in the loan business area had been steadily declining.
Repeatedly did the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen and later the
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht address the sunk margins issue (see,
for example, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2002: 23),
acknowledging that due to the sunk interest margins and flattening yield curve,
financial institutions were hardly able to earn money from maturity transformations
anymore. In addition, costs for loans had also continuously risen due to the capital
requirements that came with Basel I and Basel II. Furthermore, the loan business had,
in addition to the aforementioned issues, also become even more unattractive since the
risk provisions for banks had increased as the risks for defaults (corporate insolvencies,
private insolvencies, write-offs from unprofitable real estate business, etc.) had gone
up due to the strained economic conditions at that time.
Another option could have been to expand the “traditional” business on markets
overseas, which, for example, Deutsche Bank did (see Deutsche Bank’s activities in
the Asian market and North America, for example). However, those activities also
focused on “transaction” banking activities rather than “relationship” banking
activities, for pretty much the same reasons as stated above: the yield curve had
flattened, loan business had gotten more expensive due to increased capital
requirements and risk provisions, and the global markets had been contested. In
addition, foreign banks, just like any other business company, had a competitive
disadvantage compared to the local firms as the local firms usually have the trust and
knowledge of the region which foreigners can only acquire little by little. Hence, the
business area was not well-suited to improve earnings nor to gain market share for
private banks.
Consequently, additional earnings had to be found in other business areas that would
yield greater profits. One such area certainly constituted the investment banking
services that were done for clients, such as accompanying IPOs, mergers and
acquisitions for companies, bond issuing, etc., i.e. services that would yield income
from commissions for these services. One of the “state of the art” investment products
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certainly also constituted the securitized products. Getting engaged in the
securitization of credits (true sale securitization) and credit risks (synthetic
securitization) and their sale through platforms (e.g. the KfW platforms “Promise” and
“Provide”) or special purpose vehicles not only had the advantage of providing big
banks with the opportunity to improve their liquidity management, but it furthermore
gave them the opportunity to offer their clients alternative products that were presumed
less risky and generated considerable returns (e.g. Boston Consulting Group 2004).
“Since 2002, the investor behaviour of private investors has changed significantly. Following
the market losses on the stock markets at the start of the decade, investors demand, on the one
hand, increased security and risk limitation. At the same time, many investors are, however,
looking for above average returns in view of the low capital market interest rates. Innovative
products have therefore become significantly more attractive for private investors.”
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005: 27).
The big banks, particularly Deutsche Bank, had started to shift their focus on that
business area during the 1990s. The percentage from net commissions received for
private big banks went up from 28% in 1993 to over 35% in 2000, and then stabilizing
around roughly 30% in the subsequent years (see Figure 8). Acquiring the British
investment banks by Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank was a clear move in that
direction. German banks with their long-standing “repressive” business models had
very limited experience with investment banking. The “old” bank business model
traditionally focused on deposit-taking and loan business and had intentionally been
kept that way after the Second World War. This meant that German banks did not only
not have investment banking units or divisions, but also lacked the experience and the
expert knowledge in that business area. Hence, acquiring entire investment banks with
the corresponding experts and investment bankers in London and New York was the
logical way to proceed. The consequences from that, however, being that these
investment sections within the German banks would be almost entirely Anglo-Saxon-
coined.
“The only thing you could do in terms of growth was investment banking. It was the only
growth area. At the same time, Goldman Sachs and the other American, Anglo-Saxon banks
came to Europe in the course of the general liberalization phase. The large corporations in
Germany are not that loyal to us German banks. If Goldman Sachs has the better deal, then
they take that one instead of that of the German big bank. Loyalties to that regard had melted
down quickly. That meant that the German big banks - Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank,
Commerzbank - basically could only move forward to London and try to get established there
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on the international capital market. However, most of them did not have the critical size to be
successful.” (Interview II, own translation)
Last but not least, in addition to providing investment banking services to customers,
another option involved increased engagement in proprietary trading. As securitized
products were found to be good investment opportunities for the banks’ clients, they
were also considered good investments for the banks themselves. The biggest
advantage certainly was that securitized papers had had formidable ratings, thus were
presumed more or less risk-free investments, and generated rather satisfying returns.
At the same time, they were viewed positively by the political side.
3.4. Chapter 3 Summary
This chapter discussed the available action possibilities of both the German big banks
as well as the political side. By doing so, the focus was put on the actors as an
explanatory variable to the German hybridization process, more specifically, to the
strategic changes in the business activities of big banks towards greater market-
oriented activities.
The action possibilities were put in the context of the specific situation of the big banks
that was relevant to a) illustrating why there had been a need for action in the first
place, and b) what the institutional constraints were.
The context and motivations as well as the institutional background of the actors of
both big banks and politics were of importance to assess the action possibilities.
Starting in an already competitive domestic market, which had been dominated by
savings banks and cooperative banks in the retail sector, big banks had traditionally
had rather poor profitability ratios to begin with. Due to their private legal structure,
this became an acute problem once the corporate connections, cross entanglements and
cross shareholdings between German banks and corporations started to loosen with the
dissolution of the Deutschland AG, which would allow for other, more internationally
oriented investors, to come in. At the same time, the difficult global and domestic
economic conditions at that time and the sinking returns from the existing financial
products and services had generally led investors and banks to look for better returns
on their investments (decreasing returns). Consequently, various action possibilities
were considered and discussed that could have presented solutions to positively
influence the profitability issue. These possibilities, however, greatly varied with
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regard to their potential to have an impact on the big banks’ profitability, as the
following table summarizes:
Action possibilities Impact
potential
Comments
Cu
tt
in
g
co
st
s
Internal
restructuring efforts
Outsourcing of activities /
centralizing business functions
Medium Done, but countervailed by various
counter-developments, such as increased
regulatory compliance requirements and
IT restructuring due to IT innovations
Streamlining of business
activities (focusing on main
business areas, cutting
unprofitable business
activities, reducing RWAs, etc.)
High
Reducing number of branches
and cutting personnel
Medium
External
restructuring efforts
/ mergers and
acquisitions
Landesbanken - Legal barriers
Savings banks - Legal barriers
Cooperative banks - Legal barriers
Private big banks Low Partially political barriers (job losses due to
large mergers critically viewed by politics)
Small private commercial
banks
Low Too little synergies between small regional
private banks and large private banks
Foreign banks Low Too small in international context to be
acquiring big foreign banks
In
cr
ea
si
ng
in
co
m
e
Gain market share in
“traditional” retail
banking (maturity
transformation, etc.)
Natural growth, e.g. through
aggressive pricing strategies
Low German market too competitive in that
segment; too little margins; pricing
strategies too costly
Mergers / acquisitions Low Too little potential (see above)
Find alternative
income sources
Investment banking Medium Tough competition from other banks,
especially American investment banks; less
experience
Proprietary trading High High margins and high profitability; in line
with the “Zeitgeist” of the time
Table 9 - Summary of feasible action possibilities of German big banks
Most of the manageable cost-cutting options were exploited by the big banks. Cost-
cutting was one of the main options exploited by all banking groups including the
private big banks during the late 1990s and 2000s to improve their economic situations.
Where possible, branches and personnel were cut and business functions generally
streamlined, i.e. unprofitable business segments were let go, risk-weighted assets
reduced (largely in accordance with letting go of business segments), and so on. The
branches of big banks were reduced in numbers from 4,353 to 2,393 between 1998 and
2006 (not counting the branches of the Postbank AG, which was added to the group of
big banks in 2005).
However, many of the more cost-effective measures, such as cutting costs through
consolidations were, to a large part, barred. Savings banks and cooperative banks, as
well as Landesbanken, could not be acquired and/or merged with due to their legal
structure, synergies with other small private banks were very low, and the number of
other big banks very small and politically difficult. Also, cost-cutting endeavors were
generally countered by an increase in compliance costs and costs for necessary IT
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innovations, and also countered by political obstacles. Consequently, the boost to
improve profitability had to come from the income side.
Again, gaining market share in the traditional German banking segments, i.e. retail
banking, had almost no growth potential for the same reasons that were laid down as
options to cut costs (limited option of mergers and acquisitions, no room for more
aggressive pricing strategies). Hence, the only options left were finding alternative
sources of income, either in the investment banking area in terms of accompanying
companies with their IPOs, M&A projects, providing investment advisory services,
and so on. This was done by all big banks, especially Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank. However, competition here was very tough as well, as American investment
banks, who traditionally had more experience and expertise in that area, had entered
the European market as well. At last, proprietary trading seemed to offer the highest
yields, were presumed to be safe investments to their favorable ratings, and securitized
products were state of the art products at that time.
Looking at those options and the context, it becomes clear that the strategic changes
were indeed a result of the “decreasing returns” to big banks on the existing path (retail
banking), which had both internal and external causes. If one were to reduce the
argument to the claim that it had simply been the big banks’ own preference, i.e. their
“greed” and the “hunt for yield” that had caused them to shift their business focus to
the more profitable investment banking sector, one would disregard valuable
information on the reasons that influenced that motivation.
Deregulatory measures seem to not have been the decisive factor that had driven
private big banks to the capital markets. Though deregulatory measures had been
introduced (see section 3.3) and the general “drive” in the EU and Germany had been
capital market-oriented, the measures had also been accompanied by (re-)regulatory
measures. Also, those measures were helpful in opening up new business segments but
did not forbid or put any restraints on the existing business segments (retail banking).
Hence, the pure existence of new business opportunities does not qualify as an
explanation why they had been exploited. It also does not explain why some banking
groups (savings banks and cooperative banks) got much less engaged in them (see
chapter 5). Again, the entire context has to be considered to understand the reasons for
why big banks chose the investment banking sector over the other options. In general,
politics played a contributing role to this development in the big banks’ sector
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inasmuch as it had generally been supportive of the fostering of the German financial
market’s competitiveness. Though this had generally included all banks, the only
banking group that had the potential to fulfil this goal were the globally operating big
banks. Also, by barring certain action options or by making them more unattractive,
politics also indirectly supported that development.
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4. The Change Process of German Landesbanken
Aside from the private big banks’ increased involvement in investment banking and
proprietary trading activities, the German Landesbanken also stood out in terms of
changed business behavior and increased exposure to risk, eventually being the most
affected banking group in Germany. Of all the Landesbanken in existence before the
outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, almost all struggled during the crisis and received
some form of financial assistance through public guarantees on liabilities,
recapitalization measures, or assistance from the savings banks and Lander, the most
prominent examples of Landesbanken with the most public capital assistance being
former WestLB, LBBW including SachsenLB, BayernLB, and HSH Nordbank (see,
for example, Statista 2014).
Similarly to the private big banks, Landesbanken moved away from their traditional
role as Hausbanken to their respective Lander and communities towards engaging in
investment banking and proprietary trading. For example, it was the Landesbanken
that were especially engaged in organizing and promoting credit risk trading (Ricken
2008). This was particularly surprising as Landesbanken were public-law institutions
held by the respective Land, regional savings banks, or by a hybrid of regional
associations (Landschaftsverbände) and regional savings banks associations, thus
fulfilling important functions for those public entities.
At the end of 2008, the aggregated balance sheet total of Landesbanken had reached
over 1.5 billion euros, which was roughly 50% more than the aggregated balance sheet
total of all savings banks (ca. 1 billion euros), more than the aggregated balance sheet
total of the cooperative banks group45 (ca. 941 million euros), and it even surpassed
the business volume of the private big banks (ca. 1.47 billion euros).46 Altogether, the
Landesbanken’s business volume made up approximately 20% of all banks’ business
volume, thus constituting a significant part of the German banking sector.
The asset side of the aggregated Landesbanken’s balance sheet shows a similar
development to that of the private big banks. While lending to banks had always
constituted a big part of the Landesbanken’s asset side (lending to banks making up
between 40 to 45% of the asset side in the late 1980s and early to mid-1990s), it gained
45 Including both credit cooperatives and regional institutions of credit cooperatives.
46 All data is the December 2008 balance sheet data published by Deutsche Bundesbank (Deutsche
Bundesbank 2014b).
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even more in proportion during the 2000s and ended up constituting ca. 55% of the
Landesbanken’s asset side at the end of 2007. At the same time, lending to non-banks
experienced the opposite trend. Lending to non-banks kept steadily declining from
constituting between 50 to 60% of the asset side in the late 1980s and early to mid-
1990s to barely 40% at the end of 2007, having even fallen below that mark in the
previous years (own calculations based on balance sheet data retrieved from Deutsche
Bundesbank, also see Figure 4). Hence, business relations with banks clearly
outweighed business relations with non-banks, which was partially due to the lesser
importance of retail banking business and the central bank clearing functions
Landesbanken generally take on for savings banks, but also underlines the importance
of Landesbanken in the interbank market and interbank trading, and shows the banks’
susceptibility to interruptions on the banking market as such.
Even more strikingly, comparing the asset and liability side in terms of exposure to
foreign customers (banks and non-banks), a large discrepancy becomes apparent.
While lending to foreign banks and non-banks steadily increased and more than tripled
between 1999 and 2008 (e.g. from 168.3 billion euros in January 1999 to 663.8 billion
euros in December 2008, an almost 300% increase), deposits from foreign banks and
non-banks over the same period of time increased by far less (e.g. from 158.2 billion
euros in January 1999 to 220.2 billion euros in December 2008, an only 40% increase).
As Figure 9 illustrates, this gap started forming particularly during the 2000s.
Figure 9 - Landesbanken exposure to foreign banks and non-banks on the asset and liability side
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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Again, two strands were particularly vital for those developments in the Landesbanken
sector. One decisive step certainly was the EU decision to abolish maintenance
obligation and guarantor’s liability, thus leaving the Landesbanken in dire need to find
a new business model. In addition to this external factor, the general political support
of the EU internal market for financial services and an improved and more innovative
German financial market certainly attributed to the developments in the Landesbanken
sector. At the same time, Landesbanken themselves also pushed for the adjustments in
their business model in anticipation to find more profitable sources of income.
Following the pattern of the previous chapter, I proceed by outlining the situational
context of the late 1990s and early 2000s relevant to the Landesbanken sector and the
political decision-making process. Given that context, I then discuss the remaining
feasible options for Landesbanken in order to meet the presented challenges and the
chosen option of shifting the business focus to the more capital market-oriented
business. Furthermore, the chapter also includes the discussion of options for the
political side. Essentially, both processes mutually reinforced each other.
4.1. Situational Context of German Landesbanken
4.1.1. General Economic Context of German Landesbanken
Naturally, the general difficult economic situation of Germany around the turn of the
century, as elaborately described in section 3.1.1, and the EU’s influential policies on
matters regarding financial services and products (see section 3.1.2), played a very
important part in the developments in the Landesbanken sector, both for politics as
well as for the banks themselves, and thus also need to briefly be addressed here.
Landesbanken had to deal with the same issues deriving from the economic challenges
the entire German financial system had to face in light of the changes stemming from
globalization, technological progress, and the economic hardships of the early 2000s,
in addition to the high competitiveness factor on the German market.
Over three quarters of operating income generally still derived from interest income
(see Figure 10).
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Figure 10 - Major income and cost items for Landesbanken as percentage of operating income
As their traditional business model had been tailored towards the lending business and
accompanying big firms abroad, Landesbanken – in addition to savings banks and
cooperative banks – were among the banks most vulnerable and exposed to interest
rate risks and credit risks.
“International business in terms of accompanying [the savings banks’] clients to foreign
countries or to exporting there is important and necessary as it focused on the ‘real economy’.
Admittedly, [the savings banks] were handicapped to that regard by [the] regional principle.
This is why [they] tried to organize that kind of business through the Landesbanken.”
(Interview X, own translation)
As economic problems increased both nationally and internationally, credit risks also
greatly rose. With an even greater percentage of operating income deriving from
interest income than that of private big banks, Landesbanken’s profitability had greatly
suffered from increased risk provisions, corporate insolvencies, unpaid receivables,
and an ever-flattening yield curve. Particularly the Landesbanken’s engagement in
foreign markets (Asia and East Europe) had led to increases in credit risks deriving
from those engagements.
“Phases of low growth weakens the financial position of companies and private households
and result in higher credit default rates with a certain time lag. The ongoing period of economic
stagnation in Germany until mid-2003 noticeably increased the credit risk.” (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2006: 20).
Hence, Landesbanken and other banks engaged in the lending business had to deal
with the losses from the allowances on those loans in the early to mid-2000s.
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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Subsequently, the increased risk in the lending business due to the domestic and
international economic problems also meant an increase in the risk provisioning, thus
increasing the costs for Landesbanken even further. The volume of unpaid receivables
for German credit institutions had skyrocketed in 2002 to over 60 billion euros
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005: 20, Figure 7).
At the same time, the economic problems that affected the cost side also led to a
general decrease in demand for bank products and services, thus putting even more
pressure on the income side.
Moreover, with the EU’s endeavor to fulfill the EU single market in financial services
and with the introduction of the Financial Services Action Plan and the subsequent
implementation of various regulatory measures, the cost side was strained, too, as the
costs for being compliant with new regulatory standards rose. For example, though
Basel II was mandatory only from 1 January 2007 on, the implementation phase in the
institutions started much sooner (see, for example, Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2004: 35 and following). Many institutions started being
compliant with the new regulatory requirements already in 2004 and 2005.
Considering the technological changes, an increasing number of regular and special
audit visits of supervisory authorities to banks, the necessity to improve data and
restructure business units, changes in reporting lines (both internally and to the
external supervisors), and the like, enough time to adjust was essential. Basel II and
also MiFID - though certainly two of the most important and comprehensive ones -
were not the only new regulatory adjustments banks had to face that brought about
significant changes. In fact, there were a number of regulatory changes. The Financial
Services Action Plan of the European Commission alone provided for 42 regulatory
measures that had to be implemented by the Member States and consequently by the
banks. In addition to the various laws that were introduced or altered, changes in the
banks’ risk management systems were also necessitated through circulars of the
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, such as the minimum requirements
for the credit business of credit institutions (Mindestanforderungen an das
Kreditgeschäft der Kreditinstitute – MaK), the minimum requirements for risk
management (Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement – MaRisk), Principles
I and II, and the like. Those circulars generally concretized legal requirements that
could be rather detailed in terms of how supervisory authorities expected certain legal
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requirements to be implemented in practice. For example, the minimum requirements
for risk management of 2005 laid out in detail how the Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht expected the risk management systems in banks to
work.47
According to a study by Deloitte on compliance in banks in the 2000s, compliance
costs of American financial institutions that had taken part in the poll were quantified
of having increased by 159% between 2002 and 2006 (Peek/Rode 2010: 10). Though
Deloitte could not identify an exact number for German credit institutions due to a lack
of transparency in the cost units (i.e. costs for compliance being mostly “hidden” in
other cost units, such as IT costs, auditing costs, etc.), the costs were expected to be
similar, if not even higher, since the regulatory requirements in Europe had greatly
increased over that timeframe. For example, the number of special audits in German
banks in accordance with section 44 of the German Banking Act (KWG) ordered by
the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, increased from 201 in 1994 to 456
in 2000, even peaking at 623 in 1998 and 527 in 1999 (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005: 90). The audits were generally ordered “to gain a
better insight into the financial state of affairs of the individual institutions”, the focus
having been on the lending business, which had still constituted the biggest business
unit of German banks, and to check the adequacy of the banks’ risk management
systems (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005: 90). In addition to
“quantitative” banking supervision, i.e. the supervisory authorities making sure the
banks comply with the legal key indicators and requirements, “qualitative” supervision
had gained in importance, thereby strengthening the supervisory authorities’ roles, but
also intensifying the exchange among banks and supervisors, in turn binding more
resources and increasing the demands and consequently the costs for banks.
“The intensity of supervision had increased tremendously. As you know, with the
implementation of Basel II, we also had the chance to use bank-internal models to measure our
risk, which had to be approved by the supervisory authority. Hence, the supervisory authorities,
both Bundesbank and BaFin, expanded their personnel, recruited people with the relevant
know-how, who then cooperated with the people in the banks. When I started working,
qualitative supervision was frowned upon. [...] It had to be qualitative, meaning the supervisory
authority was supposed to look at the legally required ratios and numbers to see if they were
47 See, for example, the current circular as of October 2012 at
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Rundschreiben/dl_rs_1210_ba_marisk.html.
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ok - back then, it was still the German “Principle I” of § 10 and 10a German Banking Act and
large exposure regulations - but to interfere with the banks’ business models, to analyze and to
critically evaluate them was impossible. This has changed radically over the years. Now the
supervisory authority raises the claim to having to understand the business models, approve
them, [...] and so on. [...]” (Interview XI, own translation)
Though those were generally features that affected all banking groups, and not just
Landesbanken, they are nevertheless vital in understanding the initial situation of
Landesbanken, because they constituted important cost and income factors that
affected their profitability.
However, when addressing the situational context of German politics and the
Landesbanken, two issues particularly stand out and need to be addressed separately:
the particular connection between German politics and the Landesbanken, and the
competition-orientation of the EU Commission, which reached a specific turning point
for Landesbanken with the EU’s decision to abolish maintenance obligation and
guarantor’s liability in 2001.
4.1.2. Political Interconnectedness
When discussing Landesbanken in the German context, it is important to emphasize
that they were political institutions, i.e. they were the Hausbanken of their respective
Land, and as such fulfilled important tasks regarding regional infrastructure projects
and other projects to generally foster the regional economies (Seikel 2011).
Particularly after the Second World War, Landesbanken served an important purpose
helping set-up and re-establishing the Lander. To this regard, Landesbanken certainly
fulfilled important tasks. For instance, they were important to the Lander and
municipalities as providers of external lending (public sector financing, Figure 11).
Figure 11 - Lending of German banks to domestics public households
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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As becomes apparent from the above figure, Landesbanken were the primary lenders
to public households aside from the group of mortgage banks. Between the late 1990s
and 2008, approximately one fourth of all loans provided to the domestic public sector
by German banks were provided by Landesbanken. More specifically, during the mid
to late 1990s until 2003, the percentage of loans given to the Lander by Landesbanken
was continuously between 20 to 25% (Figure 12). This was more than twice what other
banking groups (with the exception of mortgage banks) had lent to the Lander.
Similarly, in terms of lending to municipalities, Landesbanken again played a
dominant role, being the second-ranked lender after the group of mortgage banks and
making up over 40% of all lending to municipalities between 1993 and 2000 and close
to 30% the following years (Figure 13).
Figure 12 - Lending of German banks to German Lander
Figure 13 - Lending of German banks to German municipalities
In addition, Landesbanken were important regarding the provision of finance to
regional firms. Regional firms who needed money for investment were able to get
financing options from the regional Landesbanken, usually at much more favorable
rates than private banks could offer due to the Landesbanken’s ability to refinance
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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relatively cheaply at the capital markets. Also, regional firms whose creditworthiness
prevented them from getting credit from private banks were usually able to get loans
from Landesbanken.
Though hardly playing a role in terms of lending to private households,48
Landesbanken were important to provide lending - in particular long-term lending - to
domestic enterprises. In fact, Landesbanken consistently contributed about one quarter
of all long-term loans to domestic enterprises (Figure 14).
Figure 14 - Long-term lending to domestic enterprises by banking group
This is not only important in the sense that Landesbanken had provided more long-
term loans to domestic firms than any other banking group, but also because the firms
they lent to were primarily small and medium-sized companies (German Mittelstand),
i.e. firms that were considered the “economic backbone” of the German economy and
which almost exclusively financed their external financing needs through bank loans
(see section 2.1).
Furthermore, Landesbanken had been set-up and were supported by German politics
in order to “directly compete against the dominant private universal banks and to
generally act as a counterbalance to the economic and political power of the big private
banks” (Seikel 2011: 9). As Smith (2005) pointed out, the “deep institutionalization”
of German public-law banks stems from a long history of “providing banking services
to Land and local governments and financing local and regional economic
development” and the “close relationship between public-law banks and their local and
48 Lending to private households was primarily done via savings banks and cooperative banks.
Between 1995 and 2000, only around 5% of all lending to private households came from
Landesbanken, even falling below 4% in the subsequent years (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b).
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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regional governments” (Smith 2005: 147-148). Hence, the support of German politics
in general was rather great.
Not only did politics generally support German Landesbanken, but both sides were
also rather interconnected with one another. The legal Lander acts on the respective
Landesbank and the Landesbanken bylaws specified the set-up of the supervisory
boards. The Landesbanken Act of BayernLB, for example, laid down that ten out of
eleven supervisory board members of the Landesbank had to be the “shareholders” of
the bank, i.e. the public trustees (Träger) of the bank. Other regional acts and bylaws
even specifically stated that a certain number of state representatives had to be part of
the supervisory boards (e.g. § 8 section 2 of the current regional act on the Bayern LB
(as of October 2014), or § 10 section 1 of the current NordLB bylaw (as of March
2015).
“What a savings bank was to a city or town, the Landesbank was to the Land. [...]. Regional
parliament members also sat on the committees and boards of the Landesbanken. This was
comparable to the savings banks - the mayor sat on the savings bank’s board and said, ‘we
want to foster our SMEs’ - it was similar here [in the Landesbanken’s case].” (Interview III,
own translation)
Naturally, Landesbanken also were prestige objects of the Lander. Though the
comparatively high number of Landesbanken – almost one for every Land – had
always been criticized, also in connection with the high number of savings banks and
the corresponding high share of public-law banks in the German banking sector,
mergers between Landesbanken of different Lander were unpopular as it would have
meant giving up power and prestige.
“The weaknesses in Germany’s banking system have long been a worry for the federal
government. In talks with the IMF last year both sides agreed that the country’s fragmented
banking system posed huge risks. Yet most of the government’s efforts to get Landesbanken
to merge have been stymied by the states, which have proved reluctant to lose control of their
wards.” (The Economist 2009a).
The privileged status of the public-law banks also became evident with the guarantor’s
liability and maintenance obligation for public-law banks. Those guarantees were
considered a major advantage as Landesbanken received very favorable long-term
ratings from the rating agencies. With such favorable ratings, they were then able to
refinance themselves cheaply on the capital market, which constituted a further
competitive advantage.
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“Over the years, we have always had distorted competition. [...]. I am talking about the state
guarantees, i.e. maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability for public-law institutions.
One had learned how to deal with it, but it was unfair competition. If I cannot go bankrupt in a
market economy, I clearly have an advantage. And that was not just the case in theory, but
there have repeatedly been cases of savings banks needing support. One of the more severe
cases was the one of the Mannheim savings bank, which cost the taxpayers millions. Hence,
when people say that maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability did not have any
application in real life, it is simply not true. Besides, refinancing options are also much cheaper
if I have a state guarantee to back me up - very strikingly so with the Landesbanken.” (Interview
XIX, own translation)
The close connection and mutual dependence between the regional governments and
their Landesbanken became rather apparent during the early 1990s, when various
Lander transferred their state-owned housing promotion assets
(Wohnungsbauförderanstalten) upon the Landesbanken, thus equipping the
Landesbanken with more equity capital that had become necessary as a consequence
from new regulatory and capital requirements49.
As the Landesbanken had been established to serve as clearing banks for the networks
of savings banks and to provide various financial services to their respective regional
governments, the connection had historically grown. Like the savings banks and
cooperative banks, they constituted a perfect example of the “path-dependent”
development in the German banking structure.
4.1.3. Influences of the EU – Abolishment of State Guarantees
Landesbanken faced one particular challenge that played a decisive role in the
alteration of their business models: the abolishment of guarantor’s liability
(Gewährträgerhaftung) and maintenance obligation (Anstaltslast) in 2001. Both forms
of state guarantees had been received by Landesbanken as well as the savings banks.
Guarantor’s liability is defined as a “direct liability, based on the state or by-laws, on
the part of a regional authority or an association under public law with respect to the
creditors of a public law credit institutions for all its obligations. Gewährträgerhaftung
therefore creates the obligation for the guarantor (Gewährträger) to step in in the case
of insolvency or liquidation of the credit institution” (European Commission 2001: 2-
3). The European Commission furthermore stated that guarantor’s liability “creates
49 More on this matter in the following section 4.1.3.
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direct claims of the creditors of the credit institution against the guarantor, who can,
however, only be called in if the assets of the credit institution are not sufficient to
satisfy the creditors” (European Commission 2001: 3). Maintenance obligation, on the
other hand, is the obligation of the federal, regional, or municipal entity (Träger) to
equip the respective public-law institution with the financial means necessary to
“maintain its functioning for the complete duration of its existence” and to compensate
for financial losses “through the use of subsidies or other appropriate means”, if it
becomes necessary (European Commission 2001: 2). Both guarantor’s liability and
maintenance obligation were consequences of the specific legal structure of a public-
law credit institution since those institutions were assigned to assume specific tasks
and mandates for the public sector that it could not adequately fulfil itself. Thus, in the
case of Landesbanken and savings banks, those mandates included important financing
tasks for the respective Land or municipality and its population. Nevertheless, public-
law institutions such as Landesbanken and savings banks were usually legally
independent entities that were subject to market competition on the German financial
market. Neither guarantor’s liability nor maintenance obligation were limited in time
nor amount. Also, Landesbanken and savings banks did “not pay a remuneration for
the guarantee” (European Commission 2001: 3).
As has been described at length in the previous chapter, Europe was in a phase of
integration, growth, and enlargement. Particularly with regards to the financial markets
in Europe, the European Commission aimed at the integration and harmonization of
the regulatory frameworks to advance the completion of the EU internal single market
and to be economically strong and competitive with the rest of the world. The EU
Commission at that time had a very strong take on antitrust laws and competition with
EU Commissioner for Competition, Mario Monti.50 As Commissioner for
Competition, Monti had become known for introducing radical reform legislation of
EU antitrust and merger controls and for being very tough on competition-related
issues, such as unwanted government subsidies or other forms of state aid.51 The
German 3 pillar system with a large part of the banking sector being publicly owned,
50 Monti was Commissioner for Competition between 1999 and 2004, and had been Commissioner for
the Internal Market, Services, Customs and Taxation between 1995 and 1999.
51 In fact, he was considered a “tough negotiator” (BBC News 2013) and to have “ruled the EU
antitrust world with an iron fist” (Dupuy 2004: 19).
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overbanked, and generally less profitable than other countries, thus presented a critical
“obstacle” for the European Commission in completing that task.
As has become evident from a number of cases, the European Commission also looked
for opportunities to extend its political influence beyond what had been agreed upon
by the Member States originally (Seikel 2011: 2, Story and Walter 1997, various
interviews), namely the national governments keeping control over their respective
financial markets while limiting the Commissions competences in that area (Seikel
2011: 2). In seeking more influence but also in attempting to create a homogenous
single European financial market (see section 3.1.2), the EU took particular issue with
any “national particularities” that would make the process of integration in the area
more difficult.
“Back then, when [the European Commission] advanced to a new working field, she made a
list of national particularities. Those national particularities have always been defined as anti-
competitive and had to be eliminated, because once they were all gone, there would be a
common European market place, from which bigger and more capable, more powerful, and
more productive entities could be drawn. The overriding competition has always been the
United States, i.e. the dollar area. So, the European Commission’s approach was to establish
the Euro next to the US-Dollar, to establish a European financial market next to the Anglo-
Saxon one - particularly the Wall Street dominated financial market - and to pursue the path of
eliminating national particularities so as to provide the optimal basis for a European solution.”
(Interview XIII, own translation)
Hence, any reason to tackle that system was welcomed.
On 21 December 1999, the European Banking Federation (EBF) filed a complaint
against guarantor’s liability and maintenance obligation, more specifically, against
WestLB, Stadtsparkasse Köln and the Westdeutsche Immobilienbank, which was
supplemented with more detailed information on 27 July 2000 and 15 November 2000.
In the 1990s, some German Lander had attempted to support their respective
Landesbanken in transferring Lander-owned housing promotion assets (such as the
Wohnungsbauförderanstalt, Wfa) upon them, thus equipping them with more equity
capital that had become necessary as a consequence of the new regulatory capital
requirements (Basel I introduced in 1988). In return, the Lander had only asked for
very minor interest payments (e.g. Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
2003: 63).
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“In the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, there was a housing promotion project that had
belonged to the Land, the WfA, and which had been transferred to WestLB by the regional
government. Politics made it possible that the equivalent amount had been fully acknowledged
as equity capital. WestLB only paid the Land an interest rate of 0.7%. If they had issued
completely risk-free bonds at the same time, that would have meant about 7% in interest
payment, i.e. ten times as much. To put it differently: WestLB would have had to pay so much
more for equity capital on the capital market than merely 0.7%. A complete distortion of
competition. [...]. And German politics could not be convinced to act otherwise. [...]. In the
end, the federal government was the agent of the Lander. [...].” (Interview XXVI, own
translation)
The EBF, the umbrella organization of private commercial banks in Europe, had
complained that those forms of support constituted an unfair advantage of public-law
credit institutions compared to private banks, and thus, was not in line with European
competition and state aid law. After private negotiations had failed, the private banks
filed complaint against specific cases. They argued that the integration of the Wfa as
equity into WestLB, for example, would have had to yield corresponding interest
adequate to market conditions, and that the interest for Wfa was much too low and
therefore constituted an impermissible form of state aid (Seikel 2010, Bundesanstalt
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2002: 27).
“In 1996, the Association of German Banks under the lead of Martin Kohlhaussen negotiated
with the public-law institutions under the lead of Friedel Neuber (WestLB). The issue was
interest-free loans that WestLB, but others as well, had received. The private banks made an
offer to WestLB that Friedel Neuber turned down without consulting anyone. [...]. The private
banks’ only intention at that time was to ensure that WestLB had to pay 6% in interest if private
banks had to pay 6% in interest. It had actually been a rather negligent offer by the private
banks, and would have meant a small concession by the Landesbanken, which would have
saved them all privileges - maintenance obligation would not have been touched, guarantor’s
liability would not have been touched. But Neuber turned it down.” (Interview XIII)
Even before the complaint by the EBF, the EU Commission had already started to
examine whether those two forms of state guarantees, i.e. guarantor’s liability and
maintenance obligation, constituted state aid under European law (former Articles 87
and 88 of the European Community Treaty), which had been subject of extensive talks
and exchanges of information between the European Commission and the German
government (European Commission 2001). The political opposition from the German
government and the Lander had been so great that the European Commission had
originally tried to solve the WfA case without an official procedure but in mutual
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understanding with Germany (Seikel 2011, European Commission 2001). However,
this attempt had failed as no such agreement could be reached (European Commission
2001).
The arguments of the private banks were generally based on the condition that the
unfair advantage of Landesbanken stemmed from cheaper refinancing costs due to
more favorable ratings from rating agencies, which, in turn, were a result of the state
guarantees. If a bank could not, de facto, go bankrupt, because the guarantor (i.e. the
public “trustee”) was obliged to step in to protect the creditors, the long-term ratings
would naturally be more favorable. To the private banks, it was considered proof that
- compared with the good long-term ratings of the highest or second-highest category
- most Landesbanken had much worse financial strength ratings, usually at C-level or
worse. Those ratings by the dominant rating agencies, i.e. the “Bank Financial Strength
Ratings” (Moody’s) or the “Bank Fundamental Strength Ratings” (Standard & Poor’s)
left guarantor’s liability and maintenance obligation unconsidered when assessing the
banks, thus pointing to the problem of the financial soundness of the Landesbanken.
For example, LBBW’s Bank Financial Strength Rating had been at C+ during the mid-
to late 1990s while its long-term deposit rating had been at Triple-A during the same
timeframe (Moody’s 2007). Another example shows that HSH Nordbank’s Bank
Financial Strength Rating had also been at C-level while its long-term rating had been
captured prime 1-level at AA1 by Moody’s in 2004 (Moody’s 2004). According to the
Directorate-General for Competition, the refinancing advantage of Landesbanken
amounted to 250 to 500 million Deutschmarks for every 100 billion Deutschmarks
(Fröhmel 2000). The German Savings Banks Association countered that Germany’s
big banks essentially also benefited from an implicit state guarantee as they were so
economically and systemically important that the state could be assumed to step in if
they were in trouble, which would count in favor of their ratings and consequently
their refinancing conditions. However, the EU Commission agreed with the private
banks that guarantor’s liability and maintenance obligation were “not compatible with
the common market” (European Commission: 2). Hence, the EU Commission decided
that the “aid scheme” had to be abolished. The European Court of Justice consequently
ruled that this “incompatible aid” from the Lander transfers of the housing promotion
assets and the resulting refinancing advantages for the Landesbanken had to be repaid
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(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2003: 62). Consequently, those
repayments, too, constituted an additional strain on the Landesbanken’s cost side.
The German authorities and the EU Commission reached an understanding on 17 July
2001, known as the Brussels Agreement, to implement the necessary legislation to
fulfil the agreed upon conclusions by the end of 2002, essentially replacing
maintenance obligation and abolishing guarantor’s liability.52
Most notably, a grandfathering rule was agreed upon, which essentially entailed that
liabilities agreed before 19 July 2001 and for those agreed between 18 July 2001 and
18 July 2005 with a maturity ending on or before 31 December 2015 would fully enjoy
guarantor’s liability as before.
“In my opinion, politics is not free of responsibility here, because they did not just tender the
long transition period for Landesbanken out of pure altruistic reasons, but, see, what purpose
did Landesbanken have for decades? […]. Many German Lander had used their Landesbanken
more or less as personal financiers.” (Interview XII, own translation)
Naturally, Germany followed suit and implemented the necessary legislation both on
the federal and the Lander level.
As politics was basically prevented of exerting any more influence of any kind on their
Landesbanken and thus indirectly on their ratings, they were on their own. That also
meant that Landesbanken needed to improve their key ratios just like the private banks
in order to stay competitive.
4.2. Motivation of Relevant Actors
In light of the situational context discussed in section 4.1, i.e. decreasing income and
increasing costs, most importantly with regards to the developments in the EU and
particularly the abolishment of the guarantor’s liability and maintenance obligation,
both the Landesbanken and German politics had a keen interest in keeping the
Landesbanken competitive.
4.2.1. Motivation of German Landesbanken
Though Landesbanken were publicly-held institutions by the Lander, municipalities,
regional savings banks associations, etc., and as such did not face the same pressure
from private investors to be profitable or otherwise facing the threat of being taken
52 Refer to European Commission (2001) for the details on the conclusion.
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over, they nevertheless partially financed themselves through the capital market (e.g.
through the issuance of bonds). Thus, good official ratings from rating agencies were
vital to attract investors.
Due to the EU Commission’s decision to abolish guarantor’s liability and maintenance
obligation, the Landesbanken feared that the discontinuation of those state guarantees
would negatively affect their ratings (see, for example, Moody’s 2005, Fröhmel 2000).
As mentioned in the previous section, with the state guarantee’s gone or soon to be
gone, it was feared that the rating agencies would downgrade the Landesbanken’s
long-term ratings as the financial strength ratings were usually much lower. A
downgrade, in turn, would increase their refinancing costs on the capital markets.
Hence, keeping the hitherto favorable long-term ratings was their major concern and
priority. This, in turn, meant becoming more profitable and finding ways and means
to improve the income and cost sides.
Moreover, they were also competing for customers with the private commercial banks
both nationally and internationally, particularly on the corporate side. Hence, being
competitive and profitable as a selling point and satisfying customers was vital, upon
which all Landesbanken agreed (see various business reports, e.g. BayernLB business
report 2003, HSH Nordbank business report 2003, WestLB business report 2003, etc.)
All in all, the Landesbanken’s motivation were also rather obvious: being profitable
and finding a new business model in light of the EU’s decision and the general difficult
economic conditions.
Here, too, the even more interesting question evolved around the political side’s
motivation to support the Landesbanken and their changing their business models.
4.2.2. Motivation of German Politics
First, the overarching goal to generally foster economic growth by making the
financial sector in Germany more competitive and fostering innovation there naturally
also benefitted the Landesbanken. The motivation for this general point has been
analyzed in length in section 3.2.2.
With the Landesbanken being the prestige objects for the Lander governments and
considering their significance for the regional economies, the German government and
particularly the Lander had a keen interest in keeping “their” Landesbanken intact and
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to ensure that they would remain competitive even after the abolishment of guarantor’s
liability and maintenance obligation. In the short run, that meant negotiating a long
transition period for Landesbanken in order for them to be able to slowly adjust to the
final abolishment of the state guarantees. But more importantly, in the long run, it
meant ensuring the Landesbanken’s profitability so they would be able to keep their
favorable ratings even without the state guarantees. This was important for three main
reasons. First, having a profitable and well-run Landesbank was a question of prestige
for the Lander and their political leaders. Moreover, the federal German Lander also
always competed against each other economically, so a functioning and competitive
Landesbank would certainly help with the image. Second, there were budgetary
interests, as the Lander were major shareholders of the Landesbanken and thus needed
them to at least be able to stand on their own feet and not necessitate financial support.
This also meant not having to potentially bail out Landesbanken in case they
experienced some kind of financial distress. Though the Lander did not explicitly
guarantee the Landesbanken’s well-being and solvency anymore after the European
Commission’s ruling, there would still be an implicit government guarantee of coming
to the Landesbanken’s rescue if need be. This became particularly evident during the
financial crisis, during which the government ended up providing much needed
monetary support for the Landesbanken, state guarantees for risky assets, etc. And
third, with the Landesbanken contributing about 25% of long-term lending to domestic
enterprises, they were simply considered economically vital to the regions and
consequently to the regional governments.
4.3. Action Possibilities of Relevant Actors
4.3.1. Action Possibilities of German Politics
As becomes apparent from the situational background and the motivation of the
government and the Lander, all options taken into account after the abolishment of
maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability had to essentially fulfill - above and
beyond everything else - EU (state aid) law. In addition to the general considerations
to foster the German financial sector as analyzed in section 3.3.1, this section
particularly looks at means that had been possible to achieving the overarching goal to
improve the Landesbanken’s profitability even without the state guarantees. It should
be noted that politics as such did not openly support Landesbanken to eventually make
the move towards a more capital market-oriented business model, but it indirectly
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contributed to this development by simply barring or making other choices very
difficult, if not impossible. This had to do, to a large part, with the conflicting interests
of – on the one hand – wanting to make the German financial system more compatible
and – on the other hand – wanting to keep the Landesbanken’s legal status and role for
the Lander unchanged.
On the one hand, one could have tried to assist the Landesbanken differently. As state
guarantees were politically barred by the EU’s decision, the Lander could have
exploited the option of raising the Landesbanken’s equity through their own budgets
under interest conditions in line with market requirements. However, financing a raise
in equity would have been rather costly considering the budgetary constraints of the
Lander in the then difficult economic conditions. Furthermore, the decision of the
European Commission that the WestLB had to pay back 1.4 billion euros for the WfA
to the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia may have deterred other Lander from even
trying, not even under fair market conditions.53 Also, as discussed earlier, the EU had
been very strict on any kind of state subsidies and anti-competitive measures, hence,
that option was rather unattractive. Moreover, this option also would not have tackled
the underlying problem that the Landesbanken had to find a sustainable business model
that would allow them to be more profitable.
Probably the most promising and effective option to deal with the Landesbanken’s
profitability issue would have been to privatize them. This option would have found
widespread support with international organizations, who had always viewed the
German 3 pillar system critically and who had heavily criticized the great number of
Landesbanken, if not the existence of Landesbanken altogether (IMF 2003b). Second,
it would have relieved the regional and municipal household budgets. And it, most
likely, would have led to a natural “market adjustment” as the market would have
“removed” unprofitable institutions, which then would have provided room for
synergy effects, cost reduction opportunities and greater market shares for individual
Landesbanken. However, the political side simply barred this option. First,
Landesbanken were considered the prestige objects of the Lander. As illustrated in
section 4.1.2, Landesbanken then were – besides mortgage banks – the primary lenders
53 Interestingly, the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia did, however, implement a capital increase of 1.5
billion euros at WestLB right after WestLB had been forced to pay back an almost equal sum to the
Land, thereby basically circumventing the EU’s decision.
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of credit to German enterprises and also the public sector, i.e. the Lander,
municipalities, and the federal government. Hence, regional politicians, whose
primary concern was the well-being of their state and their inhabitants, were naturally
reluctant to sell, privatize, or merge Landesbanken. Besides the political power play,
the fear of causing problems for the state’s economy when taking away the respective
Landesbank had Lander politicians refrain from such options, if in any way possible.
Also, as the political side had just fought very hard in Brussels to keep the “public-
law” status of Landesbanken and savings banks ensured in exchange for the
abolishment of the state guarantees, the privatization of Landesbanken would have
been perceived as a first move towards privatizing savings banks as well, something
that both the savings banks themselves and the political side wanted to prevented at all
costs (see more on this in chapter 5).
As the privatization option was not pursued, initiating and consenting to horizontal
mergers among Landesbanken would have been the next best option, but faced similar
resentments.54 Though mergers would have allowed Landesbanken to create bigger
units, to create synergies, and to reduce costs where possible, this option faced a lot of
resistance for two major reasons. One, the Minister Presidents of the German Lander
did not want to give up “their” Landesbanken. Giving up the Landesbanken would
have meant giving up power. As there had always been competition among the German
Lander, mergers of Landesbanken would have also implied that some of them were
not doing economically well, i.e. showing “weakness”. Also, merging Landesbanken
would have raised questions as to where the headquarters of the Lander-overarching
institutions should have been – again, a question of power. In addition, merging
Landesbanken or even dissolving some of them altogether, was presumed to be
disadvantageous for the entire region.
Two, mergers always involve job cuts. The issue of job cuts, especially in bigger
dimensions, as would have been the case when merging Landesbanken, is generally a
politically sensitive issue. If possible, it is to be avoided at all costs (also see section
3.3).
54 Generally, the options of privatization and mergers and acquisitions could also have been discussed
from the banks’ side as was done in the big banks’ case. However, as Landesbanken were political
institutions, the decision-making process was primarily driven by the political side.
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“We had many Landesbanken back then. Our goal was to have 3 Landesbanken. Why? Because
we knew exactly that there would not be enough room for 10 Landesbanken or however many
with their new business models [i.e. after maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability had
been abolished]. That could not possibly have worked. On the other hand, we were in no
position to tell the Lander to give up their Landesbanken and to dissolve them. That was always
a matter of infrastructure and location and, of course, jobs. And the Minister-Presidents also
wanted to keep their respective Landesbanken. So we told them: ‘Merge! This way you all get
to stay, just under a common roof.’ But that also only worked out in a few limited cases. So in
the end, we still had many Landesbanken and many of them soaked themselves with structured
securities and failed. […].” (Interview X, own translation)
Hence, under the premises that Landesbanken would remain the same in number and
continue to be publicly-law institutions, other means to support Landesbanken’s move
towards more profitability had to be exploited.
In addition to the options of streamlining and making Landesbanken more efficient,
politics had an interest in the Landesbanken also finding new business opportunities
to bring up their key financial ratios. Politics really could not help much to that regard
with the exception of supporting new business areas and facilitating the use of new
products and business opportunities, e.g. through political initiatives or regulatory
measures. As described in chapter 3, both of those options had been exploited. The
support and promotion of the securitization market in Germany was considered one of
the essential elements to reach the overarching goal of strengthening the German
financial center by the Ministry of Finance. For this purpose, the Ministry of Finance
even commissioned a research project to Boston Consulting Group in mid-2003 for a
comprehensive evaluation of the German securitization market and its potential
(Asmussen 2006: 10). Though German banks had already been conducting
securitization transactions (the originating banks being primarily big banks or special
purpose banks), the volume and number of the transactions had been comparatively
low and expensive (Boston Consulting Group 2004: 13). Boston Consulting Group
estimated that the volume of securitized transactions in Germany could actually be
doubled or tripled, and generally had very great potential. Of the entire category of
receivables of German banks, about 60% were considered securitizable, such as
consumer loans, loans to companies, private and commercial real estate financing
loans, etc. Since savings banks, cooperative banks and Landesbanken traditionally had
the largest share of those loan portfolios, more than 50% of the volume Boston
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Consulting Group had estimated to be securitizable related to receivables from the
savings banks group and the cooperative banks group (Boston Consulting Group 2004:
16-17). Hence, the greatest potential for the securities markets lay with the public-law
institutions, and was communicated as such to the Ministry of Finance.
Furthermore, as securitization was considered a useful means for banks to – among
other things – “free” their balance sheets from loans that bound valuable regulatory
capital, it made the most sense to securitize those kinds of receivables that bound the
most capital, i.e. unsecured loans and loans to firms who are in higher risk categories.55
In turn, this meant that loans from mortgage banks, for example, and loans to the public
sector in Germany would not have led to significant freeing of regulatory capital. This
was because loans from mortgage banks were usually secured and thus entailed less
risk for default, hence did not bind that much capital in the first place and consequently,
did not free as much regulatory capital when getting securitized. Also, loans to the
public sector in Germany were usually considered risk-free and thus did not bind any
capital at all, and therefore did not lead to significant freeing of regulatory capital
either. Therefore, what made the most sense economically was to aim for those loans
that bound more capital. As illustrated earlier, Landesbanken were the ones with a high
percentage of loans to firms, especially regional firms, thus had a lot of regulatory
capital bound.
In addition, though savings banks had the overwhelming majority of loans to private
households, i.e. consumer loans (also see chapter 5), Landesbanken, who acted as the
central banks and clearing institutions to savings banks anyway, and thus took over
the supra-regional business of the savings banks, would thus be the logical institutions
to securitize the bundled loans of various savings banks and to sell them off.
55 For example, pillar 1 of Basel I and Basel II necessitated for certain risks, including credit risks, to
be backed with capital (generally 8%). Credit risks could differ with regard to the amount a bank
would lose if the creditor defaulted, the likeliness of the creditor defaulting, and so on. For example, a
small firm in an economically weak area was more likely to default on its credit than a big DAX 30
company, but the credit amount of that firm may have also been smaller than the DAX company’s
credit amount. Hence, the credits were weighed differently according to their risk exposure (risk-
weighted assets), which essentially determined the required capital for that credit. For example, a loan
of 100 euros, which was weighed with 100% would have to be backed with 8 euros of capital
(100*1*0.08), whereas the same loan that was only weighed with 20% would only have bound 1.60
euros of capital (100*0.2*0.08). Under Basel I, loans of firms and private creditors were generally
weighed with 100%. That only changed with the introduction of Basel II, through which more
differentiated evaluations of credit risks became available.
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“Securitization was developed and considered as an instrument to establish the global financial
market. And securitization was supported by the German government in a decisive manner.
[…]. It was pushed by the government and the Landesbanken then also made sure that within
the savings banks group, they were the only ones allowed to be trading structured securities -
not the savings banks nor DekaBank, just the Landesbanken. […].” (Interview X, own
translation)
As discussed, the promotion of the securitization market by Boston Consulting Group
and the Federal Ministry of Finance primarily focused on the possibility to securitize
credits and credit risks as means to free regulatory capital, thus possibly providing
room for new business investments (e.g. further loan allocation to SMEs), to improve
liquidity management in the banks, or to diversify the risk portfolios. Boston
Consulting Group’s report to the ministry, however, also pointed to the possibility for
banks to use the securitization market to invest in securitized papers themselves
(Boston Consulting Group 2004: 18).
4.3.2. Action Possibilities of German Landesbanken
After the European Commission’s decision to abolish guarantor’s liability and
maintenance obligation in 2001, it became clear that Landesbanken had to implement
serious changes to be able to uphold similarly favorable long-term ratings after 2005
when the guarantees were fully abolished. With those guarantees gone, the refinancing
costs were expected to increase. Alternative forms of raising equity capital was
difficult, especially as their public-law structure restricted some possibilities. For
example, the emission of shares was impossible as Landesbanken were not publicly
traded companies. They could have changed their ownership status, i.e. switching from
a public-law institution to a private legal entity, which would then enable them to raise
additional capital beyond the possibilities already available to the shareholders. To that
regard, various models were pursued, such as splitting up the Landesbank into two
institutions – one public-law institution focusing on the development business as
before and one privately organized institution (i.e. a stock corporation) operating as
commercial bank. This model was implemented by WestLB and Landesbank NRW,
for example. Another model provided for a privately-owned holding company over the
Landesbank, which was pursued by BayernLB, for example. Or they could have
privatized altogether. But then, they would have exposed themselves to even tougher
market conditions and would have also experienced the pressure from private
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shareholders to improve their profitability (see 3.2.1). However, privatization was an
unwanted political option anyway.
An increase of endowment capital through the Lander would have been rather unlikely
as they, too, suffered from the difficult economic conditions and were under budgetary
constraints (see 4.3.1). A capital increase through savings banks, e.g. through silent
participations, would have been possible, because many savings banks have
traditionally had a surplus of liabilities. However, this option was limited, since the
savings banks, too, needed their capital to fulfil the increasing regulatory requirements
and to have sufficient capital for their own business activities. Moreover, an increase
in capital through silent participations had become more difficult because of new
regulatory standards set forth by the Basel Committee (Bundesaufsichtsamt für
Kreditwesen 2000: 45).
Securitization presented another alternative source of funding. As the Boston
Consulting Group paper suggested, securitization for the sake of liquidity access made
particularly sense for banks with less favorable ratings (Boston Consulting Group
2004). In that case, receivables with better creditworthiness than the bank’s
creditworthiness would be securitized, e.g. loans to the public sector, also a category
that Landesbanken had a big share in. As it was expected that the Landesbanken’s
rating would worsen after the maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability expired,
securitization also seemed to be useful for Landesbanken to that regard. Last but not
least, profit retention was also thinkable, but for that, an increase in profit was
necessary.
Hence, none of the alternative funding options seemed to allow for funding under the
same favorable conditions as with the state guarantees. As other means of getting
external financing was rather difficult and costly (see above), the consequence from
the long transition period was that Landesbanken made use of the favorable ratings
and cheap refinancing conditions. In consequence, Landesbanken kept issuing more
bonds under the still favorable ratings during the transition period than they had
actually needed. At the end of that period, the Landesbanken were soaked with
liquidity (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2006: 26).
“In the year the state guarantees ran out, 2005, Landesbanken took on much more capital than
they had needed. [...]. Let me give you the numbers: Normally, Landesbanken in Germany
would take on about 100 billion. For those 100 billion, they had use. You know that
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Landesbanken had especially given out big loans, [...]. That year, Landesbanken took on 300
billion. [...]. That means, they had taken on 200 billion in addition to what they actually needed.
And then they realized that they had a lot of liquidity but no business to invest it in. So they
were rather glad those subprime papers were on the market, which also paid decent interest.
[...].” (Interview III, own translation)
“I think, one important factor one should not forget is […] that the abolishment of guarantor’s
liability and maintenance obligation had not been solved the way it should have been solved,
namely to implement the changes as soon as Brussels had made a decision on the issue, but
instead a long transition period had been granted to Landesbanken. […]. The consequence of
such a long transition period was that Landesbanken reacted the way every business person
probably would have reacted, namely to use his comparative advantage and perpetuate it as
long as possible. Hence, they went to the capital market, used their refinancing advantage,
which resulted from the state guarantees, and soaked themselves with as much liquidity –
especially long-term capital – as somehow possible. The problem resulting from that was that
all this capital then needed investment and where did they find that? Where was the most
lucrative business? Unfortunately, in subprime securities…” (Interview XII, own translation)
“[...] If you are a bank, it is not useful to have that much liquidity if you do not have the
corresponding business opportunities. The traditional business of Landesbanken could not
possibly increase by the same extent capital was available. Capital has to bear interest -
calculation-wise for me as a bank, but I also have to pay something to the person who has
provided me with the capital. [...]” (Interview XIX, own translation)
However, this could not be a long-term solution. As these refinancing costs were
expected to rise eventually, changes needed to be implemented that would improve the
Landesbanken’s overall profitability and their financial strength. Essentially, like for
private big banks, this meant cutting costs and increasing income.
Cost-Cutting
Other than private big banks, for example, Landesbanken did not have the option of
decreasing their number of branches as they had none to begin with. However, the cost
side was still rather high. However, what could be done was to look into the option of
externally reorganizing the Landesbanken sector by exploring merger possibilities.
Unfortunately, this option was rather limited. As described earlier, privatization of
Landesbanken was politically barred and thus, mergers across pillars with private
commercial banks or cooperative banks, for example, were impossible. Hence, options
left were mergers within the respective pillar, i.e. with other Landesbanken (horizontal
integration) or with savings banks (vertical integration). Mergers with other
124
Landesbanken would have been a sound choice, as it would have presented ways to
cut costs through a cutback in personnel, created synergies and larger entities and thus,
accomplished greater economies of scale. It also would have meant having less
competition for the same business. However, this option, too, was politically unwanted
as no Land wanted to really give up its Landesbank (see section 4.3.1). Only a few
horizontal integrations (mergers between Landesbanken) eventually did take place, for
example, among Hamburgische Landesbank and Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein
Girozentrale forming HSH Nordbank in 2003, or the integration of Landesbank
Rheinland-Pfalz into Landesbank Baden-Württemberg in 2005. Overall, the number
of Landesbanken only decreased by one from 13 to 12 between the late 1990s and
2007 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b).
Consequently, one last merger option was left, i.e. merging with savings banks or, to
the very least, closely collaborating with them. Such vertical integrations included, for
example, the integration of Braunschweigische Landessparkasse into Norddeutsche
Landesbank in 2007, Berliner Sparkasse into Landesbank Berlin in 2005, Frankfurter
Sparkasse into Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen in 2005, and Südwestdeutsche
Landesbank and the Landeskreditbank Baden-Wuerttemberg’s commercial banking
business and the Landesgirokasse all merging to form Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg in 1999 (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2004: 89).
Moreover, the integration of Landesbank Sachsen and several Saxonian savings banks
into a financial holding company – the Sachsen Finanzgruppe – is a further example
of a merger to generate synergies and thereby cut costs. However, vertical mergers
were not really favored either, because savings banks liked to keep their independent
status and broad municipal presence.
If not integration, Landesbanken and savings banks also had potential for cooperation
on a number of levels. This kind of cooperation entailed streamlining the banks’
business through agreements of common rules on products, services, and work-
sharing, common risk management standards and policies, accounting standards, or
decision-making processes (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005:
105), using common resources and thereby decreasing costs, creating synergies from
common clients, etc. For example, Landesbanken were able to offer support to savings
banks with credit risk portfolio diversifications. As savings banks were bound by their
regional principle, their credit portfolios would be rather concentrated to a specific
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area, thus constituting a cluster risk to the bank. By means of credit derivatives, for
example, Landesbanken were able to change that (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2004). Furthermore, they also worked together on
project financing business (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005).
Aside from those external reorganizational options, costs could have been further
reduced through internal restructuring efforts as well. This would entail outsourcing
divisions, centralizing business decisions, formalizing and standardizing loan
processes (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2004: 89), focusing on
only important business areas while shutting others down, and generally streamlining
their businesses (various Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht annual
reports).
Moreover, just like for big banks, cost-cutting endeavors were countered by the
increases in costs for regulatory compliance, IT innovation, and, of course, the
aforementioned refinancing costs.
In sum, with some of the cost-cutting measures barred, i.e. reducing the number of
Landesbanken, the refinancing costs likely to rise, increased costs from tightened
regulatory requirements and IT innovations, profitability could not seriously be
strengthened via the cost-side. Not to forget, in the short-run, liquidity access had not
been the most pressing concern as the transition period could still be used and had been
used. Hence, both in the short-run and in the long-run, increasing the income side in
order to boost profitability was more important.
Increase Income
Like any other corporation, Landesbanken had to make sure that there was always
sufficient liquidity available for the operating business. However, liquidity in excess
of what was needed, had to be invested as it would lose value simply being deposited
in the current accounts. Hence, the Landesbanken had to find business opportunities
for the excess liquidity they had taken on when trying to make use of the soon to be
abolished state guarantees during the transition period, but those business
opportunities were also needed in the long-run to generally improve the profitability
ratios.
The first option to come to mind would have been to increase business in their
“traditional” business segment of long-term project financing. Though Landesbanken
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had traditionally been active on the international market as well, the economic
problems on the international financial markets, particularly also in the Asian and East
European areas, had increased the risks for that kind of business considerably.
Consequently, Landesbanken were rather trying to retract from that business area
instead of expanding it (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen 1999: 43,
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht: 24). Retreating from that kind of
international business, however, meant that the focus would then have to be on the
domestic side. This option then brought about new challenges. For one thing, there
were only so many projects available for funding on the national market, in particular
when keeping in mind that the banks’ risk management strategies intended for less
risky business opportunities, thus not taking on customers with unsound financial
standing that necessitated bigger risk provisions (thus offsetting any cost-cutting
measures). Moreover, competition in that segment was rather great as other
Landesbanken and big private banks were competing for the same customers. Again,
mergers with or acquisitions of other banks in order to create bigger units and thus
more business opportunities and market share of individual Landesbanken were barred
for legal and political reasons (see 4.3). Also, the margins had continuously been
declining, thus not offering much returns on those investments.
Extending the lending business to individual households or smaller companies was
similarly difficult. Landesbanken were not supposed to come into direct competition
with savings banks, particularly the larger ones. As there was an understanding
between savings banks and Landesbanken to “split business”, i.e. savings banks being
responsible for private households and smaller companies and Landesbanken taking
on the bigger companies and international clients – and to “not get into each other’s
way”, there was a strong incentive not to violate that understanding by creating
competition within the same pillar. Here, too, the profit margins would also have been
similarly low.
Increasing prices for products and services would not have been a viable option due to
the immense competition in the market. This option would also not have solved the
problem of finding suitable investment opportunities for the excess liquidity.
Consequently, like for big banks, the business opportunities had to be found in
alternative business segments. One possibility was to also get engaged in providing
investment banking services to corporate customers, for example. Though
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Landesbanken had an international presence and helped their corporate customers to
do business internationally, the experience in true investment banking activities were
limited. The competition within Germany from the private big banks, but even more
so, the competition from American investment banks who had much more qualified
personnel, resources and long-standing experience in that area, was great. In turn,
acquiring American or British investment banks like the big banks had done was no
feasible option for Landesbanken due to their legal status.
For Landesbanken, discharging their regulatory capital, finding an alternative source
of financing after maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability had run out, and
diversifying their risk portfolio were important arguments in getting involved in this
business segment. In addition, that way, they were also able to offer their customers
an alternative financing form to the traditional bank loan and earn money from the
transactions.
“Still other Landesbanks reduced their risk assets, thus improving their equity ratios. The credit
institutions reduced their risk assets by using a more restrictive lending policy, and also via the
synthetic securitisation of risk assets or other portfolio management activities.” (BaFin 2004
annual report: 106).
Also, when in 2003 talks began on founding an initiative to foster the securitization
market in Germany, i.e. the “True Sale Initiative”, it was first the big banks, the
cooperative central bank DZ Bank, and the special purpose bank KfW interested in
participating in such an initiative. An initiative under the lead of the KfW without any
participation of the savings banks group would have posed another serious threat to
the Landesbanken in particular. The special purpose vehicle of the True Sale Initiative
would have been able to buy claims off of the smaller banks, e.g. savings banks, and
eventually securitizing them and making profits from that transaction. Landesbanken
would have been left empty-handed. As KfW threatened to get involved in a business
segment that used to be dominated by the savings banks and Landesbanken, the
Landesbanken in particular were little amused considering their overall bad economic
situation.56
The only other remaining option then was to find attractive investment products on the
capital market. Securitized products were advantageous to that regard for multiple
56 Eventually, 13 banks participated in the True Sale Initiative under the leadership of the KfW,
among them BayernLB, WestLB, Helaba, HSH Nordbank, and DekaBank.
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reasons. The products offered great returns, thus bringing the income side up and, as
such, seemed suitable investment products for the long-run. They were highly rated,
thus presumed to be relatively safe. And they constituted products that the German
government, too, had considered valuable products, both in terms of investing in them
as well as creating them.
“The ‘imitation effect’ certainly also played a role here […]. I.e.: ‘What Deutsche Bank can
do, what Dresdner Bank can do, we can do, too.’ Hence, much of what especially WestLB did,
particularly also BayernLB, was active business, i.e. not just ‘we are buying some assets to
dispose of our liquidity’, but actually joining individual big deals and taking up capital
positions in some buyouts […]. It was the desire to play in the big leagues […]” (Interview
XVIII, own translation)
In addition, the leading investors in securitized products in Europe were also banks
(Boston Consulting Group 2004: 24). Hence, this again put pressure on the German
institutions to not miss out on possible profitable investment opportunities.
4.4. Chapter 4 Summary
Chapter 4 was concerned with the outline and discussion of the action possibilities of
Landesbanken and politics in light of the Landesbanken’s specific situational context
at the turn of the century. Aside from the general dire economic context that affected
all banking groups, two aspects of the situational context were particularly relevant in
the Landesbanken case. First, they were and have since been political institutions and
constituted the Hausbanken of the German Lander, and there have been great political
interdependencies between the Landesbanken and the Lander. This aspect
significantly limited the available action possibilities. Second, the European
Commission’s decision to abolish maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability for
public-law credit institutions in 2001 as a means to increase competitiveness in the
European Union and to get closer to the completion of the European single market in
financial services. Two imminent action needs were derived from that, which
eventually led to the shift in the Landesbanken’s business strategies.
Since the state guarantees had not been abolished right away, but had been granted a
considerably long transition period, Landesbanken used this time to get as much
liquidity under the still favorable market conditions, which then necessitated
meaningful investment in assets. Furthermore, Landesbanken needed to find a
profitable business model for the future that would then compensate for the state
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guarantees. Hence, similar to the private big banks, increasing profitability was the
long-term primary goal for Landesbanken, integrating the short-term aim of finding
investment opportunity for the excess liquidity. Hence, all action possibilities have
been evaluated on the basis of their impact potential to fulfil that goal.
Again, profitability should always be tackled from two sides – decreasing costs and
increasing income. The following table summarizes the Landesbanken’s main action
possibilities:
Action possibilities Impact
potential
Comments
Cu
tt
in
g
co
st
s
Internal
restructuring efforts
Outsourcing of activities /
cooperation with other banks
Medium Partially done, but countervailed by
various counter-developments, such as
increased regulatory compliance
requirements and IT restructuring due to
IT innovations
Streamlining of business
activities (focusing on main
business areas, cutting
unprofitable business
activities, reducing RWAs, etc.)
Medium
Reducing number of branches
and cutting personnel
Low No branch network to begin with; job cuts
politically unwanted
Privatization (as a means to
look for alternative refinancing
options)
- Political and personal barriers (prestige
objects of the respective Lander, alteration
of role of Landesbanken)
External
restructuring efforts
/ mergers and
cooperation
Landesbanken (horizontal
mergers)
Low Political barriers
Savings banks (vertical
mergers)
Medium Mostly cooperation
Cooperative banks - Legal barriers
Private commercial banks - Legal barriers
Foreign banks - Legal barriers
In
cr
ea
sin
g
in
co
m
e
Gain market share in
“traditional” retail
banking (maturity
transformation, etc.)
Natural growth domestically Low German market too competitive in that
segment; understanding to not get in the
way of savings banks’ business; regionally
limited; too little margins
Natural growth internationally Low Too many risk associated with foreign
lending business higher regulatory costs
Mergers / acquisitions Low Legal and political barriers (see above)
Find alternative
income sources
Investment banking Medium Too little expertise and qualified
personnel; acquisition of foreign
investment bank units impossible due to
legal barriers
Proprietary trading High High margins and high profitability; in line
with the “Zeitgeist” of the time; good
investment to stash excess liquidity
Table 10 - Summary of feasible action possibilities of German Landesbanken
Though the most promising cost-cutting endeavors would have involved creating
bigger units by merging various institutions in order to create synergies, cut personnel,
and generally streamline business, few were actually realized. Most merger options,
such as the ones across banking groups, were legally and politically barred. Others,
within the savings banks group, too, were politically difficult.
In addition, many Landesbanken generally closely collaborated with savings banks
and also used the favorable branding savings banks enjoyed with the German
population.
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All of those options were exploited, but were naturally limited, particularly
considering that increased risk provisions and increased regulatory standards partially
offset those cost-cutting measures.
Consequently, the focus was put on the income side, which also benefitted the short-
term problem of having to find suitable investments to stash the excess liquidity.
Gaining market share in the “traditional” corporate lending business was difficult as
the competition for those assets in the German market was fierce (private banks,
mortgage banks, foreign banks), only yielded low margins, and were further
complicated by the restriction to not get in the way of savings banks. Again, most
merger options, which would have helped increase the market share, were politically
and legally prevented. Hence, the only other options left were to find business
opportunities elsewhere. Landesbanken had no particular expertise in investment
banking and also faced tough competition from foreign banks and German big banks.
Consequently, proprietary trading and investing on the capital market, particularly in
securitized assets, presented the most logical option for a number of reasons:
(1) Securitized papers were the “state of the art” investment and usually Triple A-rated
papers, and thus constituted a sound investment.
(2) They were very profitable and as such, presented a good option to “kill two birds
with one stone”. They were suitable assets to invest the excess liquidity in, and they
were more profitable than other investment opportunities, which suited the general aim
to find new and profitable business opportunities.
(3) Politics generally supported the development of the securitization market and had
encouraged German banks to get involved. Aside from investing in securitized
products, the securitization market was also beneficial to discharging regulatory
capital, offering customers a broader financing base, and so on.
All in all, the globalization trend and the European Commission’s decision to abolish
maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability thus present external events that
greatly influenced the Landesbanken’s business strategy. As the hitherto existing path
had greatly decreased the returns and benefits from staying on that path, Landesbanken
were forced to rethink their options and eventually choose a different business focus
within the existing regulatory framework and institutional constraints. Similarly to the
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private big banks’ situation, politics indirectly contributed to that development by
preventing certain other options and making them less attractive.
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5. The Continuity of German Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks
The previous two chapters illustrated and demonstrated how and why private big banks
and Landesbanken were under particular pressure to change their business models, and
why politics was generally supportive of that move. As described in section 2.2, the
business models and behavior of savings banks and cooperative banks, however,
remained fairly constant over the same timeframe, even in those years leading up to
the financial crisis. The asset side of both savings banks and cooperative banks (see
Figure 5) shows a large consistency and continuity.
To this day, both savings banks and cooperative banks focus on the more traditional
lending and deposit- taking business with private households and small and medium-
sized firms, a business segment that had been largely unaffected during the 2008
financial crisis.
This may seem surprising at first as the previous chapters elaborately explained the
increased competitiveness on the German market due to the advent of foreign banks,
internet banks, and other competitors, the general difficult economic conditions both
in Germany and internationally, which strained the banks’ profitability, and the
increased interconnectedness and globalized environment that additionally intensified
the pressure on German banks to be profitable.
This chapter intends to illustrate particularly why savings banks and cooperative banks
did not follow the same path big banks and Landesbanken went, i.e. why they did not
branch off to a more capital market-oriented path, but more or less continued to stay
on their path. Much of that had to do with the specific legal forms of savings banks
and cooperative banks, the regional principle both banking groups adhered to, and their
particular connection to politics. All of these factors essentially constituted a “shield”
against the external forces that the other banking groups did not have. In fact, many of
the challenges private big banks and Landesbanken faced in the increased
internationalized setting affected savings banks and cooperative banks to a much lesser
degree. That does not mean that they were completely unaffected by those factors, but
it enabled them to proceed with their business models largely unchanged.
This chapter therefore pays special attention on the interconnectedness and the bonds
between regional and federal politics and savings and cooperative banks, which is the
biggest underlying reason for those two banking groups having been able to keep up
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their “shield”, i.e. having managed to keep the public and cooperative legal status as
well as the regional principle intact.
Similar to the previous chapters, the following sections elaborates on the particular
context relevant to savings banks and cooperative banks during the late 1990s and
early to mid-2000s. Given that context, the motivation and reasons to stick to their
traditional business model are elaborated upon. Slightly more focus is put on the
savings banks as they usually were the more dominant banking group of the two. While
cooperative banks were legally different organizations, they were usually treated the
same way as savings banks in public discussions, as their business models were
similar.
5.1. Situational Context of German Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks
5.1.1. General Economic Context of German Savings Banks and Cooperative
Banks
Just like the other two banking groups, savings banks and cooperative banks, found
themselves in the quickly changing globalized setting of the financial markets, the
attempts of the European Union to harmonize the European financial market, the
pressure of new market competitors that threatened to take away market shares, and
the low interest rate environment that made traditional business activities, such as
gaining income from maturity transformations, much more difficult. In addition, rising
regulatory and compliance costs put further pressure on them.
Aside from those critical points, the general economic outlook and conditions in
Germany already mentioned in section 3.1.1 also particularly affected the savings
banks and cooperative banks. As their primary business model was to lend credit to
small enterprises and private households and taking deposits from private households,
insolvencies of small- and medium-sized companies and private insolvencies that kept
mounting during the early 2000s, affected them particularly hard (Sachverständigenrat
2004: 356). Though the equity ratios of both cooperative banks and savings banks had
generally been less volatile over a longer period of time than those of private big banks,
they were still steadily declining. For example, the average equity ratio of savings
banks fell from over 20% in 1995 to just about 11% in 2003, even falling to 8% in
2002. Similarly, the average equity ratio of cooperative banks fell from close to 20%
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in 1995 to just slight above 10% in 2003 (see Deutsche Bundesbank 2004: 30;
Sachverständigenrat 2004: 357).
The Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht outlined the economic situation
of savings banks and cooperative banks multiple times in its annual reports:
“The profit situation of savings banks in 2001 was encumbered with increased risk provisions
on lending business, but particularly with sinking net interest income.” (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2003: 30).
“Last year’s unsatisfactory profitability in the savings bank sectors continued unabated. Risk
provisions on lending business had to be increased, in some cases dramatically, and write-
downs on securities business were also necessary. Meanwhile, net interest income continued
to fall, and credit institutions were unable to compensate for this decline via their net
commissions income.” (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2003: 63)
“On the cost side, credit institutions’ profitability was hit by high staff costs and climbing
administrative expenses, including large blocks of fixed costs. Risk provisions for losses on
loans also rose sharply in all types of credit institutions. […] On top of this, real estate
transactions proved particularly unprofitable for savings banks, cooperative banks, and
mortgage banks, especially in the new Bundesländer, i.e. former East Germany.”
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2003: 60).
The same – especially sinking interest income and high risk provisions – were the
reasons for cooperative banks to be under economic pressure.
“The flat interest curve caused the previously high earnings from maturity transformation to
fall heavily – especially in the case of savings banks and cooperative banks
(Genossenschaftsbanken). Therefore, the spread between yields on one- and 10-year German
federal securities at the end of 2006 was only 10 basis points, a year-on-year drop of 50 basis
points. With customer deposits tending to be short term and loan agreements longer term, this
situation led to a considerable drop in earnings.” (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2007: 20).
Savings banks have traditionally had a surplus of liabilities, i.e. more savings were
deposited with them than credit could be extended. This also had to do with the
dominance of savings banks and cooperative banks particularly in rural areas and areas
with weak infrastructures. As more and more people moved away from rural areas into
the cities, it was mostly the older population to stay in the rural regions and who
deposited their savings with the savings and cooperative banks. However, they usually
did not make any bigger investments and thus did not need external (bank) financing.
Similarly, areas with weak infrastructures did not have many firms in need of bank
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loans. Consequently, the demand for credit in the rural areas continued to decline.
However, this excess liquidity then was also needed to provide for increased risk
provisioning, increased capital requirements, and strengthening the equity base for
Landesbanken once state guarantees had been abolished.
5.1.2. Political Interconnectedness
Savings banks and cooperative banks have always assumed a particular role in the
German financial system, which is largely due to their histories (see 2.1). While they
had already been established with the intention to be the banks for craftsmen, for
private households, and smaller companies, this connection has remained intact to this
day. The market share of savings banks and cooperative banks has continuously been
very large, particularly in terms of numbers and retail business.
In the late 1990s, roughly 70% of all reporting institutions in Germany were credit
cooperatives, and about 17% were savings banks. Though minimally decreasing,
savings banks and credit cooperatives still made up roughly 84% of all reporting
institutions in Germany in the mid-2000s (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b). Hence, both
banking groups had an enormous presence in the entire country, especially in rural
areas.
In terms of balance sheet size, savings banks, too, had a considerable market share. In
fact, the aggregated balance sheets of all savings banks in Germany in 2008 amounted
to 1,071 billion euros, the aggregated balance sheets of the entire savings banks group
(including Landesbanken) even amounted to 2,685 billion euros (Deutsche
Bundesbank 2014b), which was more than the aggregated balance sheet total of all
private commercial banks, which “only” totaled 2,454 billion euros that year
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b). The aggregated balance sheet total of the cooperative
banks group (credit cooperatives and regional institutions of credit cooperatives)
summed up to 941 billion euros in the same year (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b).
Hence, also in terms of business volume, these two banking groups were very
important.
More importantly, between 1995 and 2006, over 50% of all savings deposits by
German private households were deposited with savings banks (Deutsche Bundesbank
2014b). Credit cooperatives furthermore took up about another 30% of savings
deposits. Together, those two groups occupied about 80% of German savings deposits.
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Figure 15 - Savings deposits by domestic private households according to banking group
Though the overall amount of savings deposits was generally declining, this shows the
enormous trust and connectedness of the German population with “their” savings
banks and cooperative banks.
Also, savings banks were the leading banking group to give out loans to private
households. The market share of savings banks in the business segment of loans to
private households constituted approximately 30% (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b, see
Figure 16). Cooperative banks provided another approximately 20%.
Figure 16 - Lending to private households according to banking group
These numbers show the enormous importance these two banking groups had for the
German population and, of course, politics. Naturally, such a large presence and
importance in the retail sector also created dependencies for politics. Similarly to the
Landesbanken’s importance in providing lending and support to municipalities and
Lander as well as to bigger firms, savings banks and cooperative banks fulfilled this
function for private households and smaller firms. Their presence particularly in rural
areas ensured the coverage of financial services in those areas, which was vital in times
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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where there was a general tendency to move to the bigger cities while the rural areas
tended to get deserted. In addition, savings banks were also important to municipalities
as they occupied a share of 15-17% of all lending to German municipalities throughout
the 2000s (see Figure 13).
[...] It certainly is a substantial criterion that we have a very strong alignment of interests here.
There is another thing that played a big role, namely that the savings banks had managed to
rally a very interested clientele around themselves through their corporate strategy. The
conditions at which German small and medium-sized companies had been able to refinance
themselves in the traditional loan business over decades were significantly better than those of
international competitors. With that, of course, they received political support in turn.
(Interview XVIII, own translation)
Furthermore, according to the German Savings Banks Association, the revenue the
savings banks groups generated was used “to sponsor a wide variety of community-
based activities”, such as “charitable causes and cultural and sports activities, as well
as research and scientific, environmental and business development projects”
(Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2012: 4). In fact, those sponsoring activities
have been estimated to amount to more than 500 million euros per year (Deutscher
Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2012). Similarly, civic engagement of the cooperative
banks group in terms of sponsoring and making donations have also been considerable.
For example, they amounted to 80 million euros in 2005 and to 96 million euros in
2007 (Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken 2010: 11).
Undoubtedly, the sponsoring activities of savings banks and cooperative banks first
and foremost directly benefited the sponsored projects, institutions, activities, etc. In
turn, savings banks and cooperative banks also benefited from those activities, because
it was good publicity, created visibility and a positive image with the local population.
The communities and municipalities benefited from the improved social, cultural, and
economic environment without having to exploit the own municipal budget.
Furthermore, politicians benefited from the savings banks’ contributions as they, as
the local representatives, got favorable publicity when joining the savings banks
representatives at the opening of an art exhibition, honoring athletes or musicians for
particular achievements, etc. Hence, regardless of the benefits from the sponsoring
activities for individual groups, they nevertheless also created dependencies between
the local politicians and the savings banks, respectively cooperative banks.
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Many of the local politicians, i.e. district administrators (Landräte), members of the
district councils, regional parliaments, but also of the federal parliament, have or have
had a mandate with a local savings bank or cooperative bank at some point of their
political career.57 Of the 16th electoral period (2005-2009), about 20% of the members
of parliament from the CDU/CSU parliamentary group were members of the advisory
councils of their local savings banks or cooperative bank, members of the board of
directors, or similar, compared with only about 2% holding some sort of mandate with
private banks.58
Moreover, the regional savings banks acts have generally provided specifications on
the savings banks’ supervisory board set-ups. Some of them specifically state that the
chairman of the savings banks’ supervisory board has to be the administrative head of
the public-law body (i.e. the mayor or district administrator) in cases where savings
banks are institutions under municipal trusteeship with public-law status, which is the
vast majority of savings banks (see, for example, § 10 section 1 of the Savings Banks
Act of Saxony).
“Savings banks have an enormous lobby power with politics for the following reason: every
second politically elected representative was or is a member of a savings banks committee or
board. [...].” (Interview III, own translation)
Also, the connections between the German Savings Banks Association and politics has
been great. For example, the current president of the German Savings Banks
Association, Georg Fahrenschon (since 2012), used to be a member of the German
Bundestag and member of the finance committee, responsible for matters concerning
financial market regulation, and later was Minister of Finance in Bavaria. His
immediate predecessor, Heinrich Haasis (president of the German Savings Banks
Association between 2006 and 2012), also held various political offices. Among other
57 During the legislative process of implementing the European CRD IV Directive, i.e. the Directive to
implement the Basel III recommendations, savings banks and cooperative banks with the support of
the German Association of Cities and Towns (Deutscher Städtetag) and other local politicians greatly
criticized the limitation of public mandates for members of the board of directors or supervisory board
members. The original draft had provided for such a limitation, see article 1 No. 48 of the draft
(Deutscher Bundestag 2012).
58 According to the biographical information of the 237 CDU/CSU MPs that had been members of the
parliament at some point during the 16th electoral period available on the Bundestag website, 49 were
associated with savings or cooperative banks or Landesbanken. Since the information was provided
voluntarily and sometimes only portrayed a snapshot of the MPs involvement in their communities,
the number of MPs having held or still holding mandates with savings banks and/or cooperative banks
can safely assumed to be much higher.
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things, he had been district administrator and member of the regional parliament in
Baden-Wuerttemberg. Horst Köhler (President of the German Savings Banks
Association between 1993 and 1998) used to also work for the Ministry of Finance,
the IMF, and eventually became Federal President of Germany.
“The German Savings Banks Association is so much closer to politics than any other bank
association, because they are tightly interwoven with one another. They know each other from
local politics or from regional politics. And human resource management of the German
Savings Banks Association makes sure that people with a political background are recruited
rather than people from the own organization. Cooperative banks are not be underestimated
either - there is at least one Volksbank in every constituency, if not more. And the Member of
Parliament know his cooperative banks, of course.” (Interview XV, own translation)
5.1.3. International and EU Influences
The German 3 pillar system was particularly criticized abroad. As already alluded to
in section 4.1.3, criticism of the German 3 pillar structure was foremost directed at the
savings banks group, and, to a lesser degree, the cooperative banks group. The large
percentage of banks that were public-law or cooperative institutions and not operating
under strictly profit-maximizing terms were presumed responsible for Germany’s
comparatively weak performance in the financial sector. In the opinion of many
international institutions, the German structure of the three major banking groups was
considered “outdated” and not fit for competition: “It does not correspond to the role
that the German economy plays and should play” (The Economist 2009b).
The IMF, for example, heavily criticized the German banking system as a system that
faced “specific short-term vulnerabilities” and one, which would “over a long horizon”
have to face serious challenges from its “chronic low and declining profitability”
(Hackethal and Schmidt 2005: 1). In its Financial System Stability Assessment, the
IMF stated that “the economic slowdown and unusually large loan losses (in part
international) compounded an underlying trend decline in the profitability of the
banking system […]” (IMF 2003a: 4).
Consequently, it was repeatedly proposed to dissolve the structure and to privatize the
savings banks and Landesbanken. For example, the 2003 IMF Germany staff report
read:
“36. The [IMF] mission welcomed the restructuring efforts but argued that they would need to
be taken further to foster innovation and a restoration of profitability. So far, consolidation
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gains had been modest in terms of cost and capacity savings. There was no single blueprint for
successful reform, but the public law structure of the Landesbanken and Sparkassen blocked
some avenues for restructuring. Creating the legal framework for transforming Sparkassen and
Landesbanken into private law joint stock corporations would open the door for private capital
and for market forces to guide restructuring, including through mergers across pillars.
Ultimately, this would require phasing out geographic restrictions on Sparkassen business (the
so called regional principle) as well as joint institutional guarantees (according to which all
depositors and creditors of public sector banks are protected by institutions in the sector as a
whole), which inhibited the exit of weak banks.
37. Further down the road, privatization should also be considered as it is unlikely that state
ownership of almost half of the banking system (measured by total assets) can be justified. The
potential for externalities or public goods that would be incorrectly private provide the usual
rationale for public banks, but it is unlikely that market failure of this nature is exceptionally
extensive in Germany. Potential welfare benefits could be attained with more narrowly targeted
forms of state intervention, and with less risk for public budgets. In the meantime, measures
should be taken to insulate the day-to-day management of public sector banks from local
politics. To foster a debate about the pros and cons of public ownership, public banks should
become more transparent about how they fulfilled their special mandate.” (IMF 2003b: 33)
Furthermore, “increased flexibility to broaden the restructuring effort would help
foster innovation and restore profitability”, e.g. by changing the “public-law banks” to
private law corporations in order to “facilitate the eventual tapping of private capital
and subsequent reorganization” (IMF 2003a: 4).
“Internationally, i.e. on the EU level, but also from the point of view of the American capital
market, the German 3 pillar system had always been eyed rather critically - and continues to
be eyed critically until this day - because of its high market share of public-law banks. ‘Public
banking’ has a negative connotation for the EU Commission, as well as for more capital
market-oriented nations. EU competition law clearly states that only those things should be
under public ownership that cannot be provided adequately by the market economy. But since
financial services and products could be adequately provided by the market economy, there
was no need for public ownership. The 3 pillar system technically is at odds with that. [...]”
(Interview XXV, own translation)
Particularly critical towards the German public-law structure of the savings banks
group has always been the EU, which the ruling to abolish maintenance obligation and
guarantor’s ability under Mario Monti in 2001 had already proven (see 4.1.3). Though
the abolishment of maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability had not affected
savings banks to the same degree as Landesbanken since their business model had not
consisted of cheap refinancing on capital markets and reinvesting that money
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elsewhere, they nevertheless had to comply with the rule. It had furthermore sent a
strong signal towards the savings banks sector that the European Commission viewed
that part of the German banking sector very critically.
The EU Commissioner of Competition between 2004 and 2010 succeeding Monti,
Neelie Kroes, had furthermore initiated a detailed retail banking sector inquiry in 2005.
The Commission had wanted to inquire whether certain structures within the different
national economies were hampering or restricting competition in the EU and thereby
offsetting the common market. The final report of the inquiry included criticism and
doubts about the cooperation and ownership structure of savings and cooperative
banks possibly raising competition problems.
“31. Co-operation between banks can result in economic and consumer benefits. It usually does
so where the banks involved are SMEs and jointly do not possess a significant market share.
Where independent banks with a significant combined market position enter into cooperation
with the object or effect of limiting competition among themselves or excluding new entrants,
however, effective competition can be impeded. In such cases, the Commission should
consider problems caused by coordination that goes beyond the strictly necessary to achieve
any pro-competitive benefits.” (European Commission 2007: 8).
This was clearly directed towards the German savings banks and cooperative banks as
they both possessed significant market shares, limited competition among themselves
via the regional principle (see section 2.1), and also cooperated with each other within
the entire group of savings banks, respectively within the cooperative banks group.
“It is correct that the EU and the IMF, for example, put pressure on Germany: ‘open up your
banking system’, ‘deregulate’. Especially the public-law institutions were the ‘bad guys’. [...].
First, they were unbreakable. They were not accessible to the capital market. Second, they were
the market leader and dominated the market. This meant, one could only access the German
financial market by cracking the market leader, preferably breaking it up completely. And the
EU was essentially driven by its competition policies at that time. The Commissioner for
Competition was the most powerful man back then. And he saw the public-law structure of the
institutions and considered that an obstacle in his attempt to implement uniform rules in
Europe. [...]” (Interview X, own translation)
Furthermore, the particular structure had not only been criticized internationally, but
also by national economic experts, such as Beatrice Weder di Mauro, member of the
German Council of Economic Experts between 2004 and 2012. According to her, it
was not clear “whether Germany needed such high participation of the public sector
in order to efficiently cover the needs of financing its Mittelstand” (Handelsblatt 2006,
142
own translation). She furthered argued that “the consolidation efforts within the
different pillars” had only “brought about little efficiency gains”, hence it was doubtful
“whether the existing system [was] flexible enough to survive in the increasing
international competitive environment.” (Handelsblatt 2006, own translation).
In its December 2003 report, the German Bundesbank acknowledged the IMF’s
assessment and recommendations regarding the German 3 pillar structure and stated
that “in light of the internationalization and capital market-orientation, even hitherto
approved structures have to be open for critical assessment” (Deutsche Bundesbank
2003: 45, own translation). It furthermore suggested that opening the public legal form
for private legal forms may be the basis for a carefully constructed restructuring
process through the owners and federal state legislators (Deutsche Bundesbank 2003).
Even more explicitly, the Bundesbank executive board member Edgar Meister
acknowledged that the complaints of the private banks were not completely unjustified
and that opening up savings banks for private investors should be made possible in the
medium-run (Financial Times Deutschland 2005).
All criticism came down to the following main arguments:
(1) The regional principle of the savings banks but also the cooperative banks, which
had originally been introduced to ensure banking services in all regions of Germany
including rural regions and those with weak infrastructures, was to prevent competition
among the savings banks and the cooperative banks, but also affected the entire
banking sector. As they were not allowed to “poach” in each other’s regions, it set
artificial barriers. This way, weaker savings banks were “kept alive” artificially even
though they may have been economically inefficient. Thus, stronger savings banks (or
cooperative banks) were prevented from gaining more market shares, and regular
market forces could not take effect that would have led to the market purging itself
from unprofitable companies.59 This issue was particularly countering the EU’s
competitive strategy and harmonization attempts.
(2) Because savings banks were public-law institutions and cooperative banks were
owned by their cooperative members, profit maximization played a minor role. Adding
to that was the fact that due to legal restrictions in the German Lander, they could not
59 The regional principle has been taken under scrutiny by the Monopolies Commission recently. See,
for example, the XXth main report of the Monopolies Commission (Monopolies Commissions 2014).
143
be bought by other (private) investors, i.e. private banks, investment banks, or other
savings banks, which essentially forbade group-overarching sales and acquisitions.
Some states allowed the sale of savings banks to other public institutions and public
bodies (Körperschaften).60 Hence, the pressure that, for example, private big banks
were experiencing by their domestic and foreign investors to improve earnings and to
improve the profitability ratios simply did not exist, or was not nearly as great. Savings
banks and cooperative banks both were not exposed to the same “threat” of being taken
over by other institutions if the numbers did not add up, because it was legally
impossible. The consequence from that was also that savings banks and cooperative
banks were able to offer products and services to customers at much more favorable
rates than was possible for private big banks. That means that rates that were
economically insufficient and that “regular” market forces would not have supported
were made possible as savings banks and cooperative banks were not subjected to the
dynamics of the globalized financial markets.
(3) The political interconnectedness between municipal, regional, and federal politics
and the savings and cooperative banks created mutual dependencies that upheld these
barriers (see 5.1.2).
Consequently, the private banks as direct competitors in the same market, but also the
IMF, the EU Commission, and the German Bundesbank to some extent (see above),
at the very least viewed those two banking groups with a critical eye and acknowledged
that there was the possibility that competition in Germany was distorted. Though
debated (see Deutsche Bundesbank 2003: 45-46), the mentioned barriers and resulting
distorted competition were considered at least partially reason for the weak
profitability of the German banking sector in general.
Overall, the two pillars of the German 3 pillar banking system had been perceived as
being at odds with the EU Commission’s intention to harmonize the EU financial
markets and integrate the single market. Not only did the European institutions
consider the German 3 pillar structure as an obstacle in their attempt to complete the
EU single market and improving competition, but savings banks and cooperative banks
60 A detailed overview of the regulation in each German Land regarding the possibilities or
restrictions on acquiring savings banks by investors, regarding the legal restrictions on the sale of
savings banks, and restrictions regarding the distribution of earnings/profits can be found in the
2004/2005 annual evaluation report of the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat
2004: 383-386).
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similarly viewed the increased Europeanization critically. They felt overwhelmed by
the new and increased regulatory requirements that came with the European
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (see section 3.1.2). The EU Commission
and their committees (Committee of European Banking Supervisors – CEBS,
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors - CEIOPS,
and Committee of European Securities Regulators - CESR)61 were much more
“shaped” by Anglo-Saxon thinking because many members of those committees were
Anglo-Saxon by origin. Naturally, the harmonized EU regulatory framework allowed
for less consideration of the specific structure and characteristics of the savings banks
and cooperative banks.
5.2. Motivation of Relevant Actors
5.2.1. Motivation of German Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks
Given the circumstances, two major motivating factors for savings banks and
cooperative banks could be identified. First, those two banking groups, too, needed
and wanted to stay profitable or improve their profitability. Though neither one of
them faced the same “takeover threat” and institutional pressure to maximize profits
the way private big banks did, the worsened economic conditions had also put them in
a more difficult economic situation. Though savings banks as well as cooperative
banks both had joint liability schemes that safeguarded the institutions’ liquidity and
solvency and thus also protected the depositors’ claims, these guarantee schemes and
joint liability schemes were strained due to the aforementioned economic conditions
and various cases that had already needed support and had made use of the liability
schemes (e.g. Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2003: 65, or
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2004: 93).
In addition, savings banks could also not count on communities or municipalities to
bail them out in times of financial distress, because their budgets were strained, too,
and because they were subject to European state aid law, which was rather strict.
Hence, keeping up profitability to stay in business was important.
61 Since 2011, the European supervisory authorities (European Banking Authority – EBA, European
Securities and Markets Authority – ESMA, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
– EIOPA) have assumed the tasks of the previous committees.
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Second, and this point is partially connected to the previous one, both banking groups
wanted to protect their respective status, i.e. their legal status (public, respectively
cooperative), the regional principle, the non-profit maximization orientation, etc. After
having already lost maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability, it was particularly
imperative for savings banks to ensure that the other arrangements to ensure their
status as public-law institutions would remain untouched.
“[…]. For […] the savings banks finance group, the third pillar, i.e. the public-law structure,
was vital for two reason. First, it was the guarantor for [the] municipal tie. If the legal structure
gets changed to a limited liability company structure, as, for example, had happened with the
public utility companies, the bargaining back and forth begins - first, the public utility
companies are being sold, now the communities want them back, etc. The municipal tie and
with that the rootedness [...] is important. The public-law structure comes from the regional
and local self-administration and is therefore the essential link to the communities. Second,
this system only works [...] if it is organized nationwide. However, if you start breaking up the
system and then you have certain areas that follow the rules and others that do whatever they
like regionally and sectorally, then [the savings bank’s] business model is void. [...].”
(Interview X, own translation)
Another example shows the imperative of keeping the public status. The EU’s advance
to abolish maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability had been viewed with great
skepticism from the start. Though the prospect of having to give up those state
guarantees had originally found strong opposition from within the savings banks
group, as well as from the politicians of the Lander, consensus among the Lander was
reached on that matter precisely in order to secure the savings banks group’s public
status. Because WestLB had to repay the advantage from the low-interest deal of the
integration of WfA as equity to the Land of Northrhine-Westphalia with an interest
rate of 27.5%, the savings banks feared to come under the scrutiny of the EU as well
and possibly being amerced with the same high interest rate for the deposits covered
by maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability (Interview X). If that had
happened, the savings banks group would have been “bankrupt within five years”
(Interview X). Hence, the Minister-Presidents of the German Lander could be
convinced to agree to give up the state guarantees. In turn, Monti then agreed to not
touch the public-law structure (Interview X).
The biggest “threat” to this goal certainly constituted the EU, in particular the EU
Commission with its intention to advance the common EU financial market and its
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critical view on the public-law structure of savings banks and Landesbanken. Then,
like today, both savings banks and cooperative banks complaint that the EU did not
understand the German system and would therefore not take their “particularities”
efficiently into account.
“Before the crisis, but even still today, foreigners viewed the public sector skeptically. They
do not really understand the cooperative sector, but consider it somewhat strange. Abroad, they
too see the high competitiveness on the German market, the insufficient margins and
possibilities for revenue in retail banking as a component or rather unwanted outcome of this
3 pillar structure. So there is more sympathies for the pure capital market-oriented model, i.e.
joint-stock banks that can disappear from the market if need be.” (Interview XI, own
translation)
Since more and more regulation came from the EU level in the course of the European
financial market harmonization process, savings banks and cooperative banks were
afraid that the new requirements were tailored more towards the Anglo-Saxon banking
model rather than the continental Europe banking model, thus forcing upon them
regulation that would overhaul their entire business model. Hence, the motivation here
was to ensure that European lawmakers would understand the German banking
structure and consider the peculiarities of the system when drafting financial market
regulation. On the other hand, they also needed to ensure that national representatives
at the European Council and the national legislative fought for the peculiarities of the
German system.
5.2.2. Motivation of German Politics
Political actors were driven by two major motivational factors that did not necessarily
mutually reinforce each other, but needed to be reconciled somehow. On the one hand,
politics needed to generally ensure a balanced budget, avoid unnecessary budgetary
strains, and the like. Well-functioning and profitable savings banks and cooperative
banks would be less likely to burden the public households by needing financial
assistance and would instead be more valuable to the local economy. They had a keen
interest in making the German economy and its financial system competitive, and were
a big supporter of the EU’s intention to harmonize the financial sector. Of course,
politics also was aware of the fact that the savings banks and cooperative banks pillars
were considered at odds with that.
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On the other hand, as described in section 5.1.2, there were strong interdependencies
between local and regional politicians and savings and cooperative banks. Any
politician was and is dependent on his or her constituency for good voting results,
reelection, etc. The wealthier the constituency, the better of the local or regional
community, the better the economic and social conditions locally, the more popular
the elected politician. As savings banks and cooperative banks provided services that
generally improved the local situation to that end, i.e. by providing lending to public
entities as well as to local private households and firms, even to those with less
favorable credit standings, by providing job opportunities, and by sponsoring various
cultural and sports events within the communities, savings banks and cooperative
banks had made themselves rather indispensable to local politicians.
In addition, since many local politicians were also affiliated with their local savings
bank or cooperative bank in terms of holding seats at the respective supervisory board,
advisory board, and similar, the motivation to also keep the status quo was equally
great.
Accordingly, local politicians were naturally receptive to the savings banks’ and
cooperative banks’ wishes and requirements, and generally supportive of keeping the
two pillars of the cooperative banks group and the savings banks group unchanged.
“The German banking system is political. It is not efficient. […]. But is has political
protection.” (Interview II, own translation)
5.3. Action Possibilities of Relevant Actors
5.3.1. Action Possibilities of German Politics
As mentioned in section 5.2, politics wanted to have well-functioning and profitable
institutions in their constituencies while also ensuring the “satisfaction” of savings
banks and cooperative banks. With the IMF and the EU Commission clearly taking
critical stands towards the German banking system, i.e. its large number of “public”
banks and those not operating under strictly profit maximization conditions, the
strained domestic economic conditions, and examples of other European countries
having taken on reforms to privatize large parts of their previous public-law banking
sectors (or parts of the banking sector), privatization of savings banks was at least an
option that needed to be considered. Other European Member States, such as Spain,
Sweden or Italy, had dissolved their public-law banks in various forms. Some of them
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had turned their public-law institutions into private organizations, some had turned
them into cooperative credit institutions, and some had changed them to private
foundations, which were borne by the municipalities, whereas the savings banks
themselves were sold to other private institutions (Italian model).62
One prominent example for a privatization attempt included the Sparkasse Hansestadt
Stralsund, formerly Sparkasse Stralsund, which later merged with Sparkasse
Vorpommern on 1 January 2005. Sparkasse Stralsund came into public focus when the
former mayor of Stralsund, Harald Lastovka, who had also been the chairman of
Sparkasse Stralsund’s supervisory board at that time, considered selling the savings
bank in order to generate revenue from that sale and thereby relieving the city’s budget.
Since the Savings Banks Act of Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania did not allow for the
sale of a savings bank to a private investor, the plan was to either sell the bank’s assets
to an investor, leaving behind an empty legal “shell” which would later be dissolved
(“asset deal”), or to merge the bank with a neighboring savings banks. The latter option
however meant that the municipal trustee would not have received much money from
that transaction (Spiegel 2003). Though both the supervisory board of the savings bank
as well as the Stralsund legislative assembly of the city (Bürgerschaft) under the
initiation of CDU and SPD had decided to investigate options for the sale of the
savings bank, political opposition and opposition from the savings banks sector and
the public was so great that the Land’s interior ministry even decided to suspend the
decision to look into sales options (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2004, Handelsblatt
2003). In March 2004, the Bürgerschaft, again with the support of both CDU and SPD,
decided to close the investigation procedure on the sale of the savings bank, and the
regional parliament of Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania passed an addendum to their
Savings Banks Act, which effectively made even the sale of the savings bank’s assets
impossible (Stern 2004). What had started as a possible exemplary case for opening
up the German 3 pillar structure not only failed in its attempt to do so, but even led to
a tightening of legislation.
In addition to Stralsund, the Stadtsparkasse Düsseldorf was also in consideration of
being privatized (Handelsblatt 2005), or being merged with two other savings banks,
i.e. Stadtsparkasse Köln and Stadtsparkasse Bonn. However, the strong veto power of
62 For a more elaborate discussion, see Sachverständigenrat 2004: 378-381.
149
savings banks via their local presence and interconnectedness with local political
representatives prevented the privatization attempt. Eventually, the merger only took
place between Stadtsparkasse Köln and Stadtsparkasse Bonn.
“[...]. Before the crisis, I think there have been sympathies for questioning the 3 pillar structure:
‘Does that really fit our idea of an open market economy if we have such a strong public-law
banking sector?’ Of course, this was only talked about behind closed doors, because many local
politicians were sitting on the various boards and committees of savings banks [...], so their
power was great. But I think, behind closed doors, even then one admitted that a stronger
market-economic orientation and ‘cracking’ the public-law ownership structure may not be
that bad overall. But no one actively pursued it because he knew he would get a bloody nose
trying to actively push for the issue.” (Interview XXV, own translation)
“There were serious deliberations regarding the German 3 pillar structure, and there was
serious pressure. [...]. Because [the public-law structure] was such a vital principle to [the
savings banks], [they] built up the political pressure [...]. Local representatives [...] were fed
with information, local authority associations, all of them. Communities like in Düsseldorf or
Stralsund were being isolated, which usually worked out. So, if - like in Schleswig-Holstein,
the Free Liberals wanted to push for a law that were to open the gates for privatization, [the
savings banks] talked to them rather plainly and openly threatened with campaigns. [...] And
then, of course, no regional government really dared tackling the issue anymore. Some tried,
e.g. Koch from Hesse or Müller in Saarland, [...]. The federal government was even less
resistant, though that depended a bit on what party was in the lead at that time [...].” (Interview
X, own translation)
Another example of a privatization attempt was the Bankgesellschaft Berlin, a
privately organized holding company of two privately organized banks – Berliner
Bank and Berlin-Hannoversche Hypothekenbank (Berlin-Hyp, a mortgage bank) – and
the Landesbank Berlin-Girozentrale, which also included Sparkasse Berlin.
Bankgesellschaft Berlin came under immense economic pressure in 2001 and had to
be financially aided by the Land Berlin.63 As the Land Berlin held 81% of the
Landesbank, the EU Commission initiated state aid investigations, and eventually
accepted the state aid provided by the Land Berlin, but with the condition that the
Bankgesellschaft had to be sold, including its public-law institution Landesbank Berlin
(Handelsblatt 2005). More importantly, the tendering procedure had to be “non-
discriminatory”, which meant allowing private investor bidders and allowing for the
63 The construct of the holding was very unusual and debated whether even having been rightly
lawful. The state aid of the Land Berlin for the Bankgesellschaft amounted to 9.7 billion euros
(European Commission 2004)
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possibility that a public-law institution would eventually be acquired by a private
bidder. Additionally, the EU Commission furthermore demanded that the German
Banking Act had to be changed as it contained a paragraph up until then that protected
the name Sparkasse. In other words, only public-law institutions were allowed to be
called Sparkasse. The EU Commission, however, considered this paragraph out of line
with EU law, i.e. incompatible with the freedom of establishment and free movement
of capital as it prevented “private investors from benefiting from the goodwill value of
the name” (European Commission 2006). The savings banks sector as well as the
German government wanted to prevent a precedent that would open up the
privatization debate again. After long and intense debates and discussions on both
sides, an agreement was eventually found that the German Banking Act did not have
to be changed, and that “in the case of privatization, Member States [could] require the
[Sparkassen] to continue to meet certain public service obligations”, such as “ensuring
the area-wide provision of service to economically weaker sections of the population
and to small and medium-sized businesses as well as guaranteeing the regional
principle in accordance with the relevant [Sparkassen] law” (European Commission
2006). In the case of the Berliner Sparkasse, it was agreed upon that it may continue
to use the name Sparkasse in case of privatization (European Commission 2006).
Though the Savings Banks Association had fought long and hard to prevent such thing,
the threat of the Bankgesellschaft possibly having to repay the state aid the Land Berlin
had provided in 2001 and 2002, was too great to not reach an agreement - the EU had
threatened to take this case to the ECJ.
Eventually, the Bankgesellschaft Berlin was broken up. Berliner Bank was sold to
Deutsche Bank, and the Landesbank Berlin including the Sparkasse Berlin was sold to
the Association of Savings Banks (Zeit Online 2007). The savings banks teaming up
to buy the Landesbank Berlin had again effectively prevented the first sale of a savings
bank to a private investor.
Overall, the end result of both the Landesbank being sold to the savings banks and the
agreement with the EU Commission on the proceedings with the Sparkassen name are
perfect examples of the savings banks group political and economic power. Though
the savings banks had to agree on a compromise with the EU, they managed to leave
the Banking Act untouched and pushed through that the name Sparkasse – even in
privatization case – was still coupled with the savings banks’ typical principles.
151
Proof of how intense and delicate the 3 pillar system and questions of privatization of
public-law institutions were, was the fact that the political initiative “Initiative
Finanzstandort Deutschland”, which had been founded to lobby for ways and means
how to support the German banking market, completely avoided all political topics
(Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2003). Though the initiative included banks from all 3 pillars,
the opinions on such topics as the 3 pillar system itself were just too different among
the various banking groups to manage to come to an agreement. The focus, instead,
was put on finding ways and means to financing the German Mittelstand and setting
the right framework for fostering private pension schemes.
Aside from the strong veto power of savings banks, politics also generally opposed the
privatization option for further reasons. Privatization would have completely
overhauled the entire business concept of savings banks. Privatized savings banks
would have had to completely succumb to the market forces. Due to the economic
problems many of the institutions faced, a big merger and acquisitions wave would
likely have followed, thus endangering the area-wide coverage of financial services
(see, for example, Schröder 1995), which, in turn, would have hurt the local economies
and households.
Similarly, mergers were also hardly favored, though the necessity was more imminent.
First, politicians relied on the tax income and the contributions savings banks and
cooperative banks gave to the communities. Second, they held the public mandate to
provide financial services in all areas – losing savings banks and cooperative banks in
certain areas or widening the coverage area of single savings or cooperative banks
would have resulted in certain rural areas losing attractiveness and people moving
away, which would have further damaged the local economies. Third, mergers and
acquisitions would also have implied massive job reductions - something both
politicians and German unions were strongly opposed to, especially since savings
banks and cooperative banks were important employers in all areas of the Federal
Republic, particularly in the economically weak areas. Fourth, savings banks and
cooperative banks mostly had a long-standing tradition with the respective
communities. Hence, there was an aspect of sentiment.
Hence, there was not much room for politics than to support the savings banks in their
attempt to keep their legal structure.
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5.3.2. Action Possibilities of German Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks
Given the premise that savings banks and cooperative banks were able to keep their
legal status including the regional principle and the non-profit-maximization-
orientation, savings banks and cooperative banks nevertheless both needed to address
their cost and income situations. Other than Landesbanken and big banks, however,
the impact potential to handle the profitability issue primarily via the cost-side was
much greater here.
Cost-Cutting
With a large number of institutions and dense branch network, and thus, rather high
staff and administrative costs, there was considerable potential on the cost side of the
institutions to improve profitability. Naturally, the legal structure in combination with
the regional principle had created economic inefficiencies. From a purely economic
point of view, the large number of institutions and branches, also in economically weak
and less populated areas of Germany, would not have been sustainable under “normal”
conditions, i.e. perfectly competitive markets, the pressure of private shareholders, etc.
However, as savings banks and cooperative banks lived off that market presence and
market share, they were rather reluctant to mergers. Group-overarching consolidations
and mergers were not possible and politically not wanted, particularly since mergers
with private banks, for example, would have meant having to give up the “municipal
trusteeship” structure and all the benefits that came with it. Essentially, it would have
altered the entire business model and made them private banks. Consequently, the only
options left to both savings banks and cooperative banks were mergers within their
respective bank groups.
“One of the things we did not get a whole lot of support in Germany were group overarching
consolidations. There was a small case somewhere, where a cooperative bank wanted to merge
with the local savings banks - both bank associations killed it. In other words, a cooperative
bank has to be in such bad shape that it cannot sustain itself anymore before it gets merged
with another cooperative bank. The same accounts for savings banks. […]” (Interview XIX,
own translation)
“I am fully committed to the German 3 pillar structure, no questions asked. I consider the
existence of savings banks and cooperative banks positive. The circumstances that have led to
that development may well all have been justified. However, I consider the practices we still
have today inacceptable. What would I recommend the pillar savings banks group and the pillar
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cooperative banking group? I would recommend to split up into bigger regions. For Bavaria, I
could envision three to four big regional savings banks that would be highly competitive with
their data and IT alliances. […]. The same would apply for cooperative banks. But what we
see today is that the executive manager of the cooperative bank xyz still has two or three
executive board members, who drive company cars, have management secretariats, etc. So,
would they ever agree to that? Of course not. Hence, a political decision would be necessary.
But they do not make that decision either. I personally would advise savings banks and
cooperative banks today to position themselves differently. Germany used to be the country of
‘petty princedom’, which had set us back tremendously. In banking, we are doing it all over
again.” (Interview XIII, own translation)
Between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, the number of bank institutions in Germany
decreased considerably, particularly in the cooperative banks group. The number of
cooperative banks more than halved between 1995 and 2007. More specifically, the
number decreased from 2,591 in 1995 to 1,232 institutions in 2007, which is an overall
reduction of more than 52%. Also, the number of savings banks also decreased by
almost 30%. Between 1995 and 2007, the number fell from 626 institutions to 446.
Altogether, the number of bank institutions in Germany decreased by almost 45%.
Most of the reductions took place between the years 1998 and 2003. Whereas the
cooperative banks group reduced the number of their institutions by somewhat more
than 3% in the years 1996 and 1997 compared to the previous years, the merger and
consolidation wave greatly accelerated after that. In 1998, the number of institutions
had fallen by almost 7% compared to the previous year, in 1999 it was almost another
10%, in 2000 almost 12%, and in 2001 and 2002 again ca. 10% and 8%, respectively.
Though still declining, the reduction process had decelerated in the mid-2000s (Figure
17).
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Figure 17 - Development of the number of German banks between 1995 and 2007
As the 2004/2005 report of the German Council of Economic Experts pointed out, the
consolidations of savings banks and cooperative banks, however, usually involved
cases of banks who needed restructuring, i.e. banks who were in financial distress
(Sachverständigenrat 2004: 372). Hence, the consolidations were not of strategic
nature but arose from pure necessity.
“During the year under review [2004], the number of savings banks fell from 689 to 477. This
continued the trend observed in the past few years for creating larger, better units. In addition
to the overall environment, which continues to stagnate, the credit institutions were faced with
tougher competition, in particular with direct and Internet credit institutions. Given this
environment, they are aiming for further consolidation and risk limitation.” (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005: 106).
As the German Savings Banks Association stated itself, the “decentralised structure”
and the “proximity” to the population were some of the characteristics through which
savings banks defined themselves (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2012).
Giving that up would have overhauled the entire business model and the foundations
upon which they had been established in the first place. Similar features applied to the
cooperative banks. The decentralized structure also ensured the close contact to the
political side.
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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In addition, the cost side could also have been reduced via greater cooperation and
pooling and centralizing certain functions among the institutions. Both banking groups
had great potential for that with their regional and federal banking associations,
respectively the central cooperative institutions. Though savings banks and
cooperative banks had generally been very small, certain functions, such as developing
group rating systems that could be used by all group member institutions could easily
be taken over by those central institutions and associations. This also had the advantage
of strengthening the unity within the respective banking group.
This was something that both banking groups did. For example, the cooperative banks
group installed a common controlling system that benefited the institutions’ risk
management assessment.
“Cooperative banks reinforced their alliances within their association during the year under
review [2004] and made progress in implementing the whole bank controlling system ‘VR
Control’. The aim is to use the computer-assisted system in the association to improve the
business and risk management for the individual credit institutions and thus to have a positive
impact on the earnings position.” (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005: 107).
Similarly, the savings banks group also put into place certain cooperative measures,
such as certain back office functions and IT services, risk assessment models, and the
like (see Deutscher Sparkasssen- und Giroverband 2012).
Increase Income
Though the traditional business had suffered due to decreasing returns from the
maturity transformation business, savings banks and cooperative banks were still less
under pressure to change their business models than private big banks or
Landesbanken had been. First, they already were the market leaders in retail banking
and occupied a fairly large share, thus generating sufficient volume to survive. Second,
they did not have the same pressure to maximize profit. This also allowed them to offer
products and services under better conditions than their competitors, thus enabling
them to keep that market share.
As both cooperative and savings banks had a high market share, increasing the prices
for bank products would have been thinkable. On the other hand, cooperative and
savings banks were direct competitors for the same customers and usually had the
same branch presence in the municipalities. Hence, if one bank had increased the
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prices, the other one would most likely not have, thus trying to attract the other bank’s
customers by continuing to offer products and services at lower rates. Thus,
competition in the banking market prevented that option.
Further increasing market share for individual savings and cooperative banks was
hardly possible for two major reasons. One, the market share of both banking groups
had already been very high (see 5.1.1). Two, the regional principle prevented those
banks from doing business in the business areas of neighboring savings and
cooperative banks.
Furthermore, alternative business segments such as investment banking and
proprietary trading were equally difficult for the vast majority of savings and
cooperative banks, because most of the institutions were simply too small64 to be
operating in these global business segments and were also lacking the experience.
As the capital requirements of Basel I and II had also affected savings banks and
cooperative banks and as these banks had large volumes of assets that consisted of
loans to firms and private households, many of them also “unsecured” and of less
creditworthy counterparts, those loans occupied a lot of valuable capital. Because of
that large share of consumer and corporate loans, the Boston Consulting Group had
identified savings banks, Landesbanken, and cooperative banks as the banks with the
greatest potential for securitization, in fact over 50% of all securitizable claims (Boston
Consulting Group 2004: 16). However, as BCG further described, the securitization
process necessitated certain requirements that small institutions usually could not
fulfill. For example, for securitization, certain data quality on the lenders needed to be
achieved, which many small institutions were unable to provide (Boston Consulting
Group 2004). Furthermore, certain expertise was required, which was costly. Hence,
securitization would only have made sense if the credit claims could have been pooled
at a bigger and centralized institution.
Since both cooperative banks and savings banks were too small to securitize products
themselves (see Boston Consulting Group 2004, Ricken 2008), it would have had to
64 For example, Stadtsparkasse Bad Sachsa today has 45 employees and a balance sheet sum of 127
million euros and Stadtsparkasse Felsberg employs 43 people and has a balance sheet sum of 160.64
million euros (according to the savings banks ranking 2013, as can be retrieved from the German
Savings Banks Association’s website; data retrieved on 6 March 2015).
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take place via the regional credit cooperatives DZ Bank or WGZ Bank, or the
DekaBank or Landesbanken for the savings banks group.
“[...]. Much of the international business was conducted via the central institutions, i.e.
Landesbanken or DZ Bank. Hence, there was no need for the local institutions [savings and
cooperative banks] to ‘get their fingers dirty’ and to enter these business activities directly.”
(Interview XVIII, own translation)
In fact, looking at the regional institutions of credit cooperatives, it becomes noticeably
that they both were much more active on the capital market than credit cooperatives in
general. In comparison, net interest received as % of operating income for regional
institutions of credit cooperatives made up between 60 and 70% between 1996 and
2001, even peaking at ca. 75% in 1998 and 71.2% in 2000, whereas net commission
income received remained fairly constant at approximately 20% over all those years
and beyond. What is remarkable, however, is that the net result from the trading
portfolios significantly increased from 6.3% in 2001 to 10.8% in 2002 and even
doubling at 21.2% in 2003, then remaining fairly constant at that rate until the outbreak
of the crisis (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b). For savings banks, the intention, too, was
to group the loans of the entire savings banks group, bundle them, and securitize them
via a central institution. Essentially, this is what happened. As indicated, for the
savings banks, credit receivables were bundled via the KfW or the Landesbanken
(Ricken 2008), and for credit cooperatives, it was DZ Bank, WGZ Bank, and DG Hyp
(Ricken 2008). Also, BayernLB and Helaba initiated a supraregional credit risk
pooling transaction of savings banks credits of 28 savings banks (Ricken 2008, Helaba
2006). Retrospectively, the Landesbanken, DZ Bank, WGZ Bank were the institutions
to get into trouble during the crisis (aside from the private big banks) (see, for example,
Spiegel Online 2009).
„The strategic alliance agreements with the Landesbanks will open up new divisions for the
individual savings banks in the future – above all for syndicated loans and project financing.
This earnings potential had previously been barred for most savings banks, as they are too
small and the transactions are highly complex. If they use the new business opportunities, the
credit institutions’ risk profiles will also change.” (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 2005: 105).
Similar arguments hold for the investment business. The small institutions were not
able to provide the expertise and IT equipment to go into serious trading activities
themselves. For that purpose, they would have had to go through centralized
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institutions, such as DekaBank, Landesbanken, or other bigger institutions.
Consequently, savings banks and cooperative banks did not come into direct contact
with the securitization process themselves.
5.4. Chapter 5 Summary
Similar to the two previous chapters, chapter 5 discussed the action possibilities of
savings and cooperative banks and politics within the context of an increasingly
Europeanized and globalized financial market. Different from the two other banking
groups, however, savings banks and cooperative banks largely continued along their
“trodden path” (Deeg) of focusing their business activities on local deposit-taking and
lending. Though the difficult economic conditions at the turn of the century as
illustrated in section 3.1.1 naturally also affected savings banks and cooperative banks,
the need and pressure to fundamentally change their business models was much lower
than that of private big banks and Landesbanken. Two reasons were relevant for that.
One, the need to tackle profitability the way the other two banking groups did was not
nearly as great. Both cooperative banks and savings banks were not publicly traded
companies and did not refinance themselves through the capital market. Hence,
pressure by private shareholders for profit maximization did not exist. Also, both
banking groups were clearly non-solely-profit-oriented in fulfilling their public or
cooperative mandate as stated in their bylaws, hence the pressure of the cooperative
owners, respectively the public body, to be profitable also had its limits. Adding to that
was the fact that due to their legal status, cooperative banks and savings banks were
protected from “hostile” takeovers through private (foreign) banks.
Two, the potential to nevertheless tackle the profitability issue with existing measures
was much greater for cooperative and savings banks that it had been for Landesbanken
and private big banks. For example, the potential to cut costs through mergers within
the respective banking group and outsourcing activities, centralizing business
functions via regional associations or the national associations (German Savings
Banks Association or Association of German Cooperative Banks) was much higher
than for private big banks, for example.
Moreover, though the income side had suffered through low interest rates, flat yield
curves, and general economic problems, both cooperative banks and savings banks had
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a considerable market share in the traditional retail sector with a secure and loyal
customer base, and thus market power.
Other business models that included deriving income through investment banking
advisory services, M&A transactions, or other investment services, as well as
proprietary trading activities would have necessitated bigger institutions that could
have afforded the necessary infrastructure and personnel to operate these kind of
transactions. Most cooperative and savings banks were simply too small. Only very
big institutions could do so or the transactions of that kind were done via the
Landesbanken or central cooperative institutions.
Action possibilities Impact
potential
Comments
Cu
tt
in
g
co
st
s
Internal
restructuring efforts
Outsourcing of activities /
cooperation with other savings
banks/cooperative banks
High Partially done, but countervailed by
various counter-developments, such as
increased regulatory compliance
requirements and IT restructuring due to
IT innovations
Streamlining of business
activities (focusing on main
business areas, cutting
unprofitable business activities,
reducing RWAs, etc.)
Medium
Reducing number of branches
and cutting personnel
High Drastic reductions in branches, albeit
hesitant to cut personnel
Privatization (as a means to
look for alternative refinancing
options)
- Strong political and personal barriers
External
restructuring efforts
/ mergers and
cooperation
Savings banks with savings
banks; cooperative banks with
cooperative banks
Medium Cooperation within other savings banks,
respectively cooperative banks; some
mergers among savings banks and
cooperative banks; generally, large
network of small savings banks and
cooperative bans preferred
Savings banks with
Landesbanken
Medium Cooperation in some business areas
Cooperative banks with
Landesbanken
- Legal barriers
Savings banks with cooperative
banks
- Legal barriers
Savings banks/cooperative
banks with private commercial
banks
- Legal barriers
Savings banks/cooperative
banks with foreign banks
- Legal barriers
In
cr
ea
sin
g
in
co
m
e
Gain market share
in “traditional” retail
banking (maturity
transformation,
etc.)
Natural growth domestically Medium Already high market share; understanding
to not get in the way of each other’s
business (regional principle); no need
Natural growth internationally Low Too many risk associated with foreign
lending business higher regulatory
costs
Mergers / acquisitions Low Legal and political barriers (see above)
Find alternative
income sources
Investment banking Low Too little expertise and qualified
personnel; too small; done via central
institutions, such as Landesbanken and
regional credit cooperatives; no need
Proprietary trading Low Too little expertise; too small; no need
Table 11 - Summary of feasible action possibilities for German savings banks and cooperative banks
Overall, the external “threat” of globalization and Europeanization could be handled
by the savings banks and cooperative banks with the existing means and subsequently
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did not cause a shift in business strategy. Politics, on the other hand, helped secure this
privileged status of both banking groups, and thus contributed to the continuity of
savings banks and cooperative banks.
161
6. Conclusion and Outlook
The study and analysis of financial systems is timelier than ever. It has been of great
interest to researchers particularly since the liberalization movements in the 1970s and
1980s, but has certainly reached a whole new level of interest globally since the latest
financial crisis of 2008. The challenges globalization and technological progress pose
for the decision-making processes of national lawmakers and the effectiveness of
national institutions in achieving certain desired outcomes in light of an increasingly
connected world market are nothing new. Particularly during the late 1990s and at the
beginning of this century, discussions both in science and in practice have been led not
just with regard to the chances of an increasingly “borderless” financial sector, but also
regarding its threats, such as concerns regarding consumer protection, or global
interdependencies. The 2008 crisis especially drew attention to the immense
interconnectedness of financial systems around the world, thus no longer being able to
balance out economic problems in different parts of the world, but instead mutually
reinforcing them. Furthermore, the crisis called into question as to how much control
and influence single nation states still had to regulate and influence wanted or
unwanted behavior of financial actors.
For political scientist, but also for researchers from other social and economic
disciplines, as well as policy-makers, this area may be of interest for a few reasons.
For example, it has called into attention the question of moral hazard and “too big to
fail” and how to effectively deal with that problem world-wide. As the financial sector
constitutes one of the sectors where the dynamics of globalization and technological
progress are especially palpable and “traditional” instruments of national institutions
(legal restraints, for example) become increasingly ineffective (banks being able to
relocate, people and firms being able to invest or buy products and services globally),
other instruments of global coordination in policy-making and supranational
institutions gain in importance.
Both market-oriented and bank-based financial systems were affected by the 2008
financial crisis. In fact, Germany’s banking sector, though traditionally embedded in a
bank-based system and thus less exposed to capital markets, was among the most
severely affected countries. Previous research indicated that the reasons for this
particular level of “affectedness” lay in the changes the German financial system had
undergone during the late 1990s to mid-2000s in reaction to the globalization and
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technological progress impact, which had led to the hybridization of the German
system. The hybrid system had combined elements of both bank-based and market-
oriented financial system and was, in parts, prone to excessive risk-taking. Given this
premise, the question was how and why the different banking groups had reacted to
the impacts of globalization and technological progress differently. Using a single case
study approach, which allowed for a more detailed analysis of the underlying
motivations and conditions, I analyzed the specific timeframe, during which the
German financial system was perceived to have undergone the “banking
financialization” phase. By means of combining elements from historical
institutionalism and actor-centered institutionalism, this thesis discussed in detail the
various options for action in the three major banking groups, thus showing that the
reaction to the changed economic environment against the backdrop of their respective
historical, legal, social, and economic premises yielded very different economic and
behavioral adjustments.
It demonstrated that those adjustment processes resulted in an intensification, and
actually doubling of the hybridization process that had started in the 1990s. Not only
did the banking system as such “bifurcate” into two systems, one continuing to follow
the old bank-based model of doing local deposit and loan business with small and
medium firms and households, and the other one increasingly engaging in international
investment business and securities trading (Deeg 2005). On top of that, the latter group,
which increasingly started to operate like typical market-oriented Anglo-Saxon style
banks in light of the incentives for greater international market orientation and risk
taking, nevertheless also still faced the traditional features of a bank-based financial
system at the same time, such as creditor protection schemes, risk-averse customers,
etc.
6.1. Summary of Results
For the purpose of being able to better show and demonstrate the different reactions
and situations among the German 3 pillar banking system, I regrouped the traditional
3 pillars into private big banks, Landesbanken, and the group of savings banks and
cooperative banks, and dealt with them accordingly in three separate chapters.
Though the globalization forces affected the entire banking system as such, there were
considerable differences between the various banking groups as to how they coped
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with the altered economic situation, i.e. the adjustments they made to their respective
business models. Starting with the outcomes, between the late 1990s and 2008, private
big banks and Landesbanken had gotten increasingly engaged in asset trading and
investment banking, and generally had had an increased foreign exposure on their asset
sides. On the other hand, no such extensive foreign exposures and changed business
behavior could effectively be traced on the savings banks and cooperative banks side
(see, for example, Enderlein 2013, section 2.2, and Figure 5). Hence, while no major
changes in the business models were visible in savings banks and cooperative banks,
indicating that they must have had the necessary institutional means to effectively deal
with an altered economic scenario (or simply had not been impacted by it), the
observed changes in the business models of Landesbanken and private big banks
pointed to the opposite, namely that their institutional framework had not been
sufficient and had to be altered in order for them to be able to adequately face the
economic challenges. The reasons for those observed differences were rooted in their
legal, historical, economic, political, and social set-ups.
German big banks were greatly affected by the globalization process, because they
were fully exposed to the global market forces and the increasing competitive pressure
resulting from new competitors entering the market (foreign banks, internet banks,
etc.) due to the nature of the legal set-up as privately organized banks owned by
international shareholders. While facing an already competitive domestic market and
new competition from newly developing internet banks and foreign banks, the pressure
from national and international institutional investors to become more profitable and
to improve their profitability ratios (manifested, for example, by take-over threats,
threats of selling company stocks and consequential decreasing stock values) kept
increasing. This situation was further complicated by domestic and global economic
problems in the early 2000s, which put additional strains on the big banks’ cost and
income sides.
At the same time, Germany’s economy was falling behind. Hence, the political actors
felt the need to foster economic growth and to keep the competitive edge in an
increasingly Europeanized setting, and to provide the support and framework for a
modern, competitive banking system that could compete with the financial centers in
New York and London. Germany as the leading economy in Europe and a big
supporter of the European project was under pressure both nationally and
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internationally. For instance, the IMF put pressure on Germany to reform its financial
system, including its 3 pillar structure. Particularly the large percentage of state-owned
banks in Germany was considered inefficient and a hindrance to the modernization of
the financial system. This eventually led to supportive liberalization policies and
initiatives to foster the financial sector in Germany altogether.
Consequently, feasible options for the group of private big banks were to either
improve the profitability ratios on the cost side by reducing costs and to improve the
income side. Essentially, both was done. In terms of cutting costs, extensive
restructuring measures, such as cutting back on personnel, closing branches,
streamlining the business and focusing on the major business areas, were implemented.
However, cost-cutting was only possible to a certain degree without doing more harm
than good (i.e. closing branches, especially in rural areas, bore the risk of losing even
more customers to the locally dominant savings banks and cooperative banks).
Improvements on the income side could have been attained through an increase in the
(“traditional”) lending business, which was difficult for private big banks since the
market share in this area was historically dominated by the savings and cooperative
banks. Moreover, takeovers of other banks in order to create bigger and more
profitable units would have been another option to improve the income side, but was
limited, since takeovers and mergers across the different banking groups were legally
prohibited, and because the synergy effects with other private banks were meager.
Consequently, the only feasible option left to still be able to react to the amounting
economic pressure was to improve the income side by rendering new business areas
accessible that promised more profitable returns of investments, such as the area of
investment banking, which was done e.g. through the purchase of investment banks,
such as the British Morgan Grenfell and the American Banker’s Trust by Deutsche
Bank, or the British Kleinwort Benson by Dresdner Bank. Those purchases and the
focus on those business areas, in turn, led German banks to adopt a more Anglo-Saxon
market-oriented business model. For example, buying entire investment banks
including their personnel that had the expertise in investment banking, which German
banks were lacking, clearly left its marks on the German banks and their way of doing
business. In addition to providing investment banking services to other customers,
proprietary trading also provided profitable opportunities to increase the income side.
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Landesbanken changed their business models in a similar direction as private big
banks. Landesbanken were regionally organized banks owned by their respective
German Lander and regional savings banks association. In addition to the same
difficult economic conditions private big banks had faced, Landesbanken found
themselves under pressure to find new business opportunities after the European
Commission had decided to abolish maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability.
These guarantees were considered to have secured Landesbanken more favorable
refinancing conditions on the capital markets due to the favorable ratings stemming
from public liability. The decision for the abolishment was rooted in the state aid
complaint by the Banking Federation of the European Union, i.e. the European
association of private banks including the private German banks, who had considered
this sort of public liability an unfair advantage for Landesbanken and savings banks,
since the cheaper refinancing costs would, in turn, enable them to offer their customer
products more cheaply. This complaint coincided with the general aim of the European
Commission to harmonize the EU financial markets and to increase competitiveness
across the Member States.
Two reactions were provoked by this decision. One, after it became clear that
maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability would be unsustainable,
Landesbanken and the Lander lobbied to evoke a long transition period instead of an
immediate abolishment.
This, in turn, led to the Landesbanken trying to make use of the favorable refinancing
conditions under guarantor’s liability as long as possible. Consequently, they
accumulated so much access liquidity that many more investment opportunities were
needed than the Landesbanken had at their disposal. Two, Landesbanken needed to
find a business model that would allow them to be more profitable in the long-run. The
“original” business model of funding business projects could only be extended to a
limited extent.
Consolidations of certain Landesbanken with other Landesbanken to further improve
competitiveness and profitability, if not privatizing them altogether, would have been
a viable option that would have allowed for greater market shares and fewer costs.
Politically, however, due to their Hausbank relationship with the respective Land and
the municipalities, the interdependencies and mutual interests of political and
economic actors were favorable to keeping the Landesbanken intact. Alternatively,
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new investment opportunities were found in the investment banking sector, including
the proprietary trading segment.
Savings and cooperative banks, on the other hand, hardly changed their business
models as their instruments and settings were sufficient in dealing with the new
situation. Though savings banks were banks under municipal trusteeship, whereas
cooperative banks were organized as cooperatives, their business models were rather
similar. Their focus was regional and they did not compete against one another within
their respective banking group. The economic pressure was coped with mostly by cost-
cutting means, such as consolidations that took place within those two banking groups,
typically among “neighboring” savings banks and cooperative banks, in order to create
symbioses, to cut costs, and to increase in size. Cost-cutting in order to improve
profitability as opposed to expanding income through alternative business
opportunities was favored. Also, savings banks and cooperatives were not privately
held companies, hence takeovers by foreign banks were de facto impossible. Also,
profit maximization orientation was not their primary business goal, which,
consequently, did not put them under the same institutional investors’ pressure as had
been the case for private big banks. Moreover, the resulting favorable conditions at
which private households and firms could get financing, secured them a strong
customer base. In addition, particularly the savings banks group, organized through
the Savings Banks Association, had and continues to have a strong lobby, which is
rooted with their regional ties in the communities and the corresponding political ties,
which stems from many directly elected members of regional parliaments, the federal
parliament, or district administrators of the Lander also holding offices in “their”
regional savings bank or cooperative banks. Hence, the mutual dependencies were
rather great. Though Germany had been criticized for its large number of state-owned
banks both internationally and on a European level, the political ties were simply too
tightly woven. No Lander government seriously attempted to change anything to that
regard, and neither did the federal government.
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Impact potential for
private big banks
Impact potential for
Landesbanken
Impact potential for
savings banks /
cooperative banks
Situational context:
Globalization/Europeanization / International
competitiveness
High High Low
Economic pressure High High Low
IT innovation High High High
Political ties Low High High
Action possibilities to improve profitability:
Cutting
costs
Outsourcing of activities High High High
Streamlining of business activities High High Medium
Reducing number of branches and
personnel
Medium Low High
Privatization - - -
Mergers / acquisitions Low Low Low
Increasing
income
Retail banking Low Low Medium
Investment banking Medium Medium Low
Proprietary trading High High Low
Table 12 - Summary of the banking groups’ situational context and feasible action possibilities
6.2. Post-Crisis Developments – An Outlook
Over six years have passed since the 2008 financial crisis, which marked the cut-off
date for the analyzed timeframe of my thesis. Nevertheless, I would like to provide a
brief outlook on a few developments in the German financial system that I consider
necessary mentioning.
The German banking sector in its structure has remained fairly the same. Aside from
a number of consolidations in all three major banking groups, the 3 pillar structure is
still intact. Since 2008, the number of banks has further decreased, the group of credit
cooperatives again reporting the greatest drop in institutions, followed by the savings
banks. Compared with previous years, however, the decrease in numbers has slowed
down considerably, and overall, remained fairly constant (Figure 18).
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Figure 18 - Development of the number of German banks since 2008
In fact, the savings banks seem to have come out of the crisis even stronger than before,
which is largely due to their relative stability during the crisis and the favorable public
perception of the banks. The problems encountered by the Landesbanken largely left
the image of the savings banks unreflected despite their belonging to the same banking
group.
Moreover, looking at the development of market shares in the German banking sector,
it becomes apparent that the distribution among the bank groups has not changed
significantly. Compared to the pre-crisis situation, savings banks continue to have
close to a 50% market share in savings deposits from private households, whereas
private banks and credit cooperatives more or less share the other half of deposits
(Figure 19). This is pretty much in line with the pre-crisis scenario.
The market shares in the business of lending to domestic private households and
enterprises (Figure 19) have, however, changed somewhat. Market shares in the
segment of long-term loans to domestic enterprises changed mostly in favor of savings
banks. They have managed to increase their market share from a pre-crisis share of
17% in 2005 to 24% in 2013, and cooperative banks also managed to increase their
share from 8% in 2005 to 12% in 2013. Both banking groups benefitted from a decline
in market share for Landesbanken (25% in 2005 vs. 21% in 2013) and mortgage banks
(20% in 2005 vs. 11% in 2013), whereas the market share for private banks remained
largely unchanged at roughly 20%.
Source: own representation based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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Figure 19 - Market shares of German banks in 2013
Similarly, in the segment of loans to domestic private households (Figure 19),
cooperative banks slightly improved their market share from 19% in 2005 to 21% in
2013, while private commercial banks also increased their market share from 26% in
2005 to 30% in 2013. Both groups, again, benefited from a decline in market share for
Landesbanken and mortgage banks.
However, aside from smaller shifts in market shares among the major banking groups,
the structure of the banking sector as such has remained the same. Also, no major
changes in the legal set-up of savings banks and cooperative banks have taken place.
More importantly, when discussing the German financial sector after 2008, the post-
crisis regulatory reforms both nationally and internationally need to be addressed. This
seems in order as it has dominated the public discussion on financial markets during
these past six years. It also provides a good indication of the lessons drawn by the
lawmakers in terms of the causes of the crisis, and the subsequent policy choices that
have been made since then.
Soon after the financial crisis hit the global financial centers, the world’s leading
industrial nations came together to formulate strategies for immediate responses and
goals in order to overcome the crisis situation, and to keep the impact on the “real
economy” to a minimum. The G20 summits in Washington, D.C. in November 2008,
in London in April 2009, and in Pittsburgh in September 2009 were characterized not
just by agreements on implementing measures to foster economic recovery and
stabilizing the global financial markets, but especially by the consensus that regulatory
reform was needed urgently. Most notably, the consensus among the G20 Heads of
State was that the regulatory standards had to be harmonized and that international
cooperation needed to be intensified in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage: “We are
Source: own representation and calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank macroeconomic time series data.
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committed to take action at the national and international level to raise standards
together so that our national authorities implement global standards consistently in a
way that ensures a level playing field and avoids fragmentation of markets,
protectionism, and regulatory arbitrage” (G20 2009: 7). Though it was agreed upon
that regulation was “first and foremost the responsibility of national regulators”, it was
also noted that the “financial markets are global in scope”, which necessitated
“intensified international cooperation among regulators and strengthening of
international standards, where necessary, and their consistent implementation” so as
to offset “adverse cross-border, regional and global developments affecting
international financial stability” (G20 2008: 2). One of the sentences repeated most
often in the context of German financial market regulatory reform process following
the crisis was the G20’s pledge from the 2008 Washington summit to “strengthen our
regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management, and ensure that all
financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as
appropriate to their circumstances” (G20 2008: 3).
In consequence, regulatory changes to fulfil that pledge were introduced, most notably
in the EU and Germany. In March 2009, the EU Commission set forth a roadmap on
improving financial market regulation, which planned for a financial markets reform
program intended to (1) “provide a supervisory framework that detects potential risks
early, deals with them effectively before they have an impact, and meets the challenge
of complex international financial markets”, (2) “fill gaps where European or national
regulation is insufficient or incomplete”, (3) “ensure that European investors,
consumers and SMEs can be confident about their savings, access to credit and their
rights as concerns financial products”, (4) “improve risk management in financial
firms and align pay incentives with sustainable performance”, and (5) to “ensure more
effective sanctions against market wrongdoing.” (European Commission 2009: 6/7).
In the course of the following years, the EU passed numerous directives and
regulations that either had to be passed by the EU Member States or directly took
effect. They were usually very comprehensive and accompanied by even more detailed
level II and III implementing measures. These regulatory reforms had the intention to
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achieve a maximum level of harmonization across the various Member States and
formed the basis of the so-called European Banking Union (single rule book).65
The measures implemented in Germany to stabilize the financial market were
consequently either implementations of EU directives or implementation laws of EU
regulations (Ausführungsgesetze).66 In addition to that, some national initiatives were
implemented that would, however, for the most part anticipate European legal
developments, such as the German law on high frequency trading, which would later
be dealt with similarly in the MiFID 2 Directive, or the German bank restructuring
law, which also greatly anticipated the developments of the EU single resolution
mechanism. Hence, it becomes increasingly clear that solutions to financial and capital
market problems are no longer found on a national level, but at least on the EU level.
The implemented regulatory measures can be broadly categorized according to their
intended goals. (1) As an immediate response to the crisis, measures aimed at
stabilizing the financial markets were introduced, such as the “Financial Market
Stabilization Act” (“Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz”), which established the
financial market stabilization fund as an instrument to overcome the then existing
liquidity bottlenecks in a timely manner and to strengthen the stability of the German
financial market. Those measures were simply directed at overcoming an imminent
crisis situation, rescuing individual banks, providing liquidity to the market, etc.
(2) Once the imminent crisis situation was contained, the regulatory efforts that
followed were directed at ensuring that further crises like the one that had just occurred
would be prevented. That means that regulatory changes were implemented that had
the goal to (a) prevent serious mistakes within the financial institutions, which would
get them into trouble in the first place. These laws included measures that were aimed
at provoking a change in the behavior of banks, i.e. to do less risky business operations,
for example by introducing heightened qualification standards for board members and
staff in certain key areas (e.g. compliance, sales, etc.), capping bonus payments,
increasing fines for misconduct, introducing improved risk management requirements,
65 In addition to the single rule book, the European institutions also agreed upon establishing a
common European supervisory authority (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) and a common
resolution mechanism (Single Resolution Mechanism, SRM) for the euro zone area and those
countries that wish to participate apart from the euro zone Member States.
66 A comprehensive list of the various legal acts passed in Germany after the crisis, including
references to European legal acts and agreements can be found in annex 2.
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and so on. Furthermore, the measures were (b) also intended to better absorb risks and
mistakes within the financial institutions. That meant, in particular, strengthening the
capital requirements (e.g. through the implementation of the so-called Basel III
package, i.e. the CRD IV Directive and CRR, or the Solvency II Directive in insurance
firms), and generally ensuring that banks would have a strong enough buffer to be able
to recover from losses without reaching a critical situation. Moreover, other measures
(c) were aimed at improving the supervisory mechanisms of the financial supervisory
authorities. To this regard, the biggest change in supervisory conduct certainly
constituted the establishment of the ECB as the institution to assume the specific
supervisory task within the Single Supervisory Mechanisms over financial institutions
in the euro area and those countries voluntarily joining the SSM. The ECB assumed
its task in November 2014, i.e. now directly supervises the largest and most significant
banks while closely cooperating with the respective national supervisory authorities
on supervising all other banks in the SSM. In addition, the establishment of the
European supervisory authorities (EBA, ESMA, EIOPA) in 2011 also intensified the
European regulatory oversight structure and strengthened the European institutions.
Also, in order to provide for the case that banks still failed despite all the mentioned
precautions, measures were put in place that (d) aimed at facilitating bank insolvencies
and bank restructuring mechanisms (e.g. the German Bank Restructuring Act, or the
European Bank Recovery and Resolution Mechanism Directive), which would allow
single banks to go bankrupt in an orderly manner and without causing bank runs and
panics on the capital markets as had partially been experienced during the 2008 crisis.
Moreover, in mid-2014, the regulation establishing a Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM) for those in the Banking Union was published, which effectively established a
board to adopt a resolution scheme in case of notification by the ECB of a failing or
likely failing bank. It furthermore established a Single Resolution Fund that is
contributed to by the supervised banks, and which may be drawn upon in case of a
failing bank.67
(3) Last but not least, there were those measures aimed at better protecting investors
and consumers of bank products and services, in particular small and private household
consumers (non-professionals).
67 For more details, see the European Commission’s website on both issues, SRM and SSM:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/banking-union/index_en.htm.
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Interestingly, a few of the implementation laws Germany passed even after the
breakout of the financial crisis of 2008, were implementations of EU directives that
had been passed on the EU level before the crisis and thus still had the “pre-crisis
mode” of EU financial market harmonization facilitating cross-border bank and non-
bank financial activities, such as the “Bilanzrechtmodernisierungsgesetz”, which was
intended to advance and modernize the German accounting system and included
various deregulation measures, because it implemented four EU directives from 2001,
2003, and 2006, but was passed in Germany only in 2009. Another one of those
examples includes the “Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Aktionärsrichtlinie”, which
implemented the Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 6 September 2006 amending Council Directive 77/91/EEC as regards the formation
of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their
capital, and was passed in Germany in 2009. The law included measures to modernize,
deregulate, and flexibilize the stock corporation law to unburden companies and to
improve the interests of shareholders. It also used various deregulation options as
provided for in the EU Directive.
To this date, new regulatory measures in Germany and in Europe are still being
introduced that aim at preventing future crises like the one of 2007/2008. Though many
laws and initiatives have been implemented already, European laws and regulations as
well as German initiatives keep being implemented and continue to have political
prominence. The resentment of the public against banks and other financial institutions
continues to be rather great to this day.
Naturally, it will take some time before the implemented measures can fully take effect
and before the measures can be adequately evaluated with regards to their
effectiveness, possible contradictions among individual measures, and the like. While
still new measures are being implemented and while particularly German center-
left/left parties consider the implemented measures as too weak and inefficient, the
financial sector contemplates about the burden and costs of the numerous measures.
These are particularly high when regulatory requirements are “doubled” by having a
national law that soon after is being overhauled by an EU directive or regulation.
According to a study by KPMG, the costs of regulation across all German credit
institutions accumulated over the timeframe 2010 to 2015 amount to approximately
8.6 billion euros (KPMG 2013). According to bank estimations, these regulatory costs
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have reduced the return on equity by about one fourth (KPMG 2013). As illustrated in
previous chapters, this may become particularly difficult as German banks have
traditionally been less profitable as their international peers. In light of the current
interest rate policy of the ECB, it will become increasingly difficult to generate
sufficient income (due to the small margins), while cutting costs will likely be difficult
due to the increased regulatory requirements. Though other EU Member States are
complicit with EU regulation, Germany certainly belongs to one of the “forerunners”,
meaning that on a number of occasions, it has been introducing national laws in
anticipation of EU regulatory developments. For example, the German Restructuring
Act has been introduced in anticipation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive, the Law to foster fee-based advisory financial services
(“Honoraranlageberatungsgesetz”) and the Law on High Frequency Trading have been
introduced in anticipation of MiFID 2. Other Member States refrained from doing that.
Also, Germany has exercised “gold-plating” of EU directives, i.e. adding additional
requirements to certain EU requirements, as was the case with the implementation of
the AIFM Directive, for instance. Whereas other states, such as Luxemburg, only
implemented the EU directive, Germany added additional requirements.
Overall, the regulatory developments after the financial crisis, i.e. the implementation
of a great number of directives and regulations, both on the national level and the EU
level, the volume of the measures, the speediness with which new regulation was and
continues to be passed, and the level of harmonization clearly shows the change of
attitude of the national and international decision-makers with respect to financial
market regulation. While new frameworks and rules to make the financial markets
more stable were necessary, as are suitable supra-national institutions and mechanisms
to effectively deal with the still increasing level of interconnectedness of financial
institutions, the overall demands and requirements for the financial institutions are
undoubtedly very high.
6.3. Practical Implications of Thesis Findings
The findings of the thesis, i.e. having gained a better understanding of the underlying
factors that influenced the decision-making processes of the respective actors and the
subsequent developments in the banking sector, should be useful for a number of
reasons. Understanding the dynamics of the German case in the years leading up to the
crisis may be helpful for policy-makers to generally get a better grasp of the dynamics,
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pressures, and different challenges of the different pillars of the German banking
system in the globalized financial markets context. This, in turn, may be helpful in the
discussion on finding the most effective and most suitable regulatory framework after
the 2008 crisis, as it gives insight to the factors that need to be considered when
drafting regulation. Vice versa, practitioners also might find this work helpful in
understanding the motivations and decision-making processes on the political agendas.
The contents of the thesis, i.e. the elaborate tracing and explanation of the situational
context and motivations and options that were decisive for the development of the
entire German banking system in the years leading up to the crisis, should be very
useful in anticipating certain developments. For example, as mentioned in section 6.2,
the German 3 pillar structure has remained intact during and after the crisis. If
anything, it has even gained in strength. While Landesbanken certainly have suffered
and continue to struggle to find a new suitable business model, savings banks and
cooperative banks have come out of the crisis even stronger. Though the interlinkages
and interdependencies between politics and savings and cooperative banks had already
been very strong in the pre-crisis setting, these connections have been reinforced and
strengthened after the crisis, largely due to the fact that those two banking groups had
more or less been unaffected by the crisis. As the public and politics are rather fond
and protective of the savings and cooperative banks, a change of course initiated
internally, i.e. from the national political level, with regards to a possible overhaul of
the 3 pillar structure has become even more unlikely. Much more likely, however,
seems a change in path due to another external event, i.e. an event similar to the
abolishment of maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability in 2001. The 3 pillar
structure in Germany continues to be viewed critically, especially from the EU
Commission, as it undermines the idea of full harmonization, or at least makes working
with Germany on that matter rather difficult. Hence, it seems likely that the EU
Commission will seize any opportunity to break up that system, e.g. by questioning
the regional principle of savings banks and cooperative banks (see, for example, the
evaluation of the Monopolies Commission regarding the competitiveness of the
financial markets68). Generally, the EU has been strengthened in the area of financial
68 See various press statements, e.g.
http://www.dsgv.de/de/presse/pressemitteilungen/140709_PM_Regionalprinzip_52.html ,
http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/regionalprinzip-wackelt-alarm-bei-den-
sparkassen/9931228.html.
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markets, and may use this influence to attempt another advance towards opening up
the 3 pillar structure eventually.
Also, while the economic situation in Germany is not comparable to the situation in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, certain parallels can be drawn nevertheless. The euro
zone currently encounters a historically low interest rate policy due to the sovereign-
debt crisis in many European Member States. Of course, this historically low interest
rate not only affects private households negatively in terms of their savings, but it also
has a negative effect on banks’ sources for revenue. Similarly to the developments in
the late 1990s and early 2000s when interest rates were low (though not quite as low
as today), the yield curve was flattening, and income from maturity transformation
kept on generating less and less revenue, banks today are again under similar pressure
to find alternative sources of income. Though the economic situation in Germany now
is comparatively good, and consequently, banks do not face the same rate of firm and
private insolvencies, the ECB’s interest rate policy affects the country and its banks
nevertheless. Though the number of bank institutions has been steadily declining (see
above), Germany continues to be considered “overbanked”. Hence, the overall
situational context and the consequences therefrom are very similar. If interest income
from maturity transformation does not yield sufficient revenue, other sources of
income will have to be found. The options, however, are rather limited. There is the
business of payment transactions, which is rather static and does not yield much
income either. There is income from commissions, which is usually investment
banking activities, wealth management and asset management. And there is income
from proprietary trading. However, since investment banking activities and, in
particular, proprietary trading activities, are currently politically hampered and
discouraged through various regulatory initiatives and discussions (e.g. separation of
investment and commercial and retail banking activities, greater capital requirements
on derivative instruments, possible introduction of a financial transaction tax, etc.),
increasing revenue through that business segment is also restricted and rather
expensive. In addition, with the relatively recent experience of the financial crisis in
mind, the willingness to cross the general public and political opinion is attenuated.
Also, if, as a consequence, banks give out loans more laxly in order to generate
sufficient revenue from interest rate business, then the risks of defaults also increase,
which – again – creates problems for banks.
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Furthermore, as stated earlier, the political resistance to allow for mergers and
acquisitions across banking groups but also within banking groups is the same as
described in the previous chapters. As a lesson from the crisis, the willingness to
tolerate bigger institutions has even declined. On the contrary, smaller institutions are
favored in order to avoid another “too big to fail” issue.
On the other hand, the pressure from (international) investors is likely to remain high,
which is primarily relevant for the private big banks, who are operating in an
international context. Likewise, Landesbanken still have not found another suitable
niche and are very much financially strained. Moreover, savings banks and cooperative
banks, whose dominant source of income continues to be interest income, are likely to
feel the consequences from the low interest rate policy, especially if it continues to
remain this low, which is rather likely given the ECB’s own statements (e.g.
Bloomberg 2014). Net interest received as percentage of operating income for
Landesbanken made up 94.5% in 2011 and 82.3% in 2012. For savings banks, the net
interest received made up 79.4% of operating income in 2012 (79.6% in 2011), which
is pretty much as high as during the early 2000s (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b). Credit
cooperatives’ (not including regional institutions of credit cooperatives) net interest
received is similarly high at 78.2% in 2012 and 78% in 2011 (Deutsche Bundesbank
2014b).
Though the German economy is still well off, the first concerns regarding sustainable
growth and future sources for economic growth have been voiced quite recently (Stern
2014, and similar articles). Hence, parallels can be drawn to the discussions led during
the early 2000s. This may be even more interesting as German banks will increasingly
come under pressure if none of the available income sources yield sufficient profit,
and costs also remain high due to the increased regulatory requirements and the
resulting compliance costs. It is particularly problematic for Germany since the
German economy continues to rely on bank loans for external financing. In fact, this
feature of the German financial system has actually been reinforced as well due to the
problems encountered with the capital markets during the latest crisis.
Moreover, just like in the 2000s, politics continues to be under pressure to incentivize
people to privately provide for their pensions in addition to the public pension
schemes, as the old pay-as-you-go system will be unsustainable in the long run. The
added pressure now is to find ways and suitable products people can invest in to
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privately provide for their old age. Life insurance contracts, building loan contracts,
Riester retirement plans and the like all suffer from the low interest rate policies.
Consequently, it becomes problematic if people either choose to refrain from going
into private pension schemes that are capital market funded provisions, or if they
choose riskier assets in order to generate higher returns.
Overall, based on the experiences with the German banking system, both in the years
imminent to the crisis and after the crisis, it is safe to conclude that further
consolidations and mergers in all three pillars are probably inevitable. Since the
internal motivation to open up the 3 pillar system remains limited, consolidations
within the various banking groups, however, should take place, and not just once one
of the banks is in financial distress but for strategic reasons. With fewer but bigger
institutions, the available business in the retail banking section should be sufficient to
sustain the remaining banks, and it should be helpful in making the German banking
sector more competitive.
Last but not least, comparing the developments in the German case in the 1990s and
2000s with the developments after the crisis, it also becomes clear that the drivers
today are much more initiated by politics. While the pre-crisis world was very much
market-driven and policies were a product of the market dynamics, the initiatives today
regarding regulation and behavioral conduct clearly come from political actors, both
nationally and internationally.
“It is pretty clear that the main driver of developments after the financial market crisis is
international politics, i.e. starting with the Heads of Government and State in Pittsburgh to IMF
to the central banks. Those are heavily driven by two general arguments: (1) ‘financial market
stability’ - this is what the central banks stand for, who in almost all OECD countries hold the
responsibility for the control and protection of financial market stability and financial market
integrity - and (2) the politicians’ task to make sure that something like the 2008 financial crisis
does not happen again. No bank must ever be found in that kind of distress again, and if it does,
the taxpayers must not be held accountable. There has been a clear change in perspective to
this end. Before the crisis, it was important to create the right regulatory framework that would
allow banks to become more globally involved. After the crisis, protection from the collapse
of banks and from utilizing taxpayers’ money has priority.” (Interview VII)
Overall, understanding the German case may helpful in finding the right answers to
the challenges lying ahead.
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6.4. Theoretical Implications of Thesis Findings
The thesis intended to contribute to the comparative political economy literature, or,
more specifically, to the literature on comparative financial systems. The approach
chosen to combine elements of historical institutionalism and process tracing and
elements of actor-centered institutionalism allowed for a much deeper level of analysis
of the specific situation and resulting choices made by various actors and the
consequent interplay of these choices. At the same time, it allowed for the coverage of
the entire hybridization phase, i.e. a much broader timeframe then just covering a
singular event in great detail. Hence, though the hybridization of the German system
has been discussed in previous research, less attention had been paid to the actors’
decision making processes and how and why certain factors influenced those
decisions. The thesis intended to close that gap. It thereby intended to lend support to
Deeg’s concept of path dependence as a “gradual” and “evolutionary” process. The
findings show that the observed changes within the different banking groups (or the
continuity within the banking groups) came about gradually and did not occur
suddenly. There was no radical break from the past, but the banks adapted to the
influencing factors that forced them to alter their business models progressively and
within the permissible given legal and social structures. Even then, the institutional
and legal set-ups remained fairly unchanged. With the exception of a few regulatory
changes already introduced in the 1990s to foster the financial market in Germany,
none of the implemented regulatory changes during that time period drastically
changed the structure of the banking system. Though in hindsight, the general support
of the political actors for the thriving of the German financial sector may seem
surprising, it, too, was a gradual and logical consequence from the general economic
situation and social mindset of that time. Likewise, the banks’ decisions to seek profits
in the securities and investment business, has been the logical consequence of a
sequence of preceding external events.
The findings of the thesis support the notion that actors can be moved of their paths if
external events make staying on their path impossible. As has been illustrated, both
private big banks and Landesbanken eventually reacted to the mounting pressure of an
increasingly globalized setting and the general difficult economic conditions, which –
in light of their entire institutional set-up – made continuing as before impossible. In
addition, Landesbanken particularly reacted to the decision of the EU to abolish
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maintenance obligation and guarantor’s liability. Political actors, too, reacted to the
external pressure of the EU and the general globalization trend in financial services
and adapted correspondingly. Savings and cooperative banks, on the other hand,
managed to stay on their path as these external events affected them less due to their
respective institutional set-up (i.e. enough potential for group-internal consolidations,
the legal set-up protecting them from hostile take-overs, large market shares, political
support for the continuation of the legal set-up, etc.). Hence, the hybridization can be
viewed as the logical consequence of the path dependent changes of the various
banking groups.
In addition to the discussion on path dependence, the German case may also prove
valuable to the discussion on hybrid models. While some researchers had come to the
conclusion that hybrid models who combine elements of the bank-based and market-
oriented approaches (Culpepper 2005, Jackson/Sorge 2012, Jackson/Deeg 2012), such
as Germany, may do better economically than other “pure” systems, the financial crisis
and the experience from the German case may raise doubt about that notion. The
German hybrid case has shown that it had created “moral hazard” problems and had
encouraged banks to take on more risks. Hence, the logical consequence then would
be to either move to either one of the more “pure” financial systems, or to develop into
a hybrid system that is less prone to moral hazard as was the case with the German
model before the crisis. When taking into account the developments after the crisis
(see section 6.2), in particular the regulatory and politically implemented changes, as
well as the changed mindset of the population, it becomes clear that the crisis has
actually reinforced the 3 pillar structure of the German banking structure.
“We are committed to the reliable 3 pillar structure of German credit institutions and will
adequately consider its particularities.” (CDU 2013: 44, own translation).
The crisis has clearly exposed the risks associated with the capital markets, and it could
mark a turning point and even constitute what supporters of path dependence consider
an “external event” that can again alter the paths of actors. At this point, it is certainly
too early to judge whether it will result in another significant change in path, i.e. a
move back towards a “pure” bank-based system. However, though the regulatory
changes and the current general public opinion indicate the preference towards a
traditional German deposit-taking and lending banking business, and a German
economy that continues to largely rely on bank financing instead of exploiting other
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alternative forms of financing, a move towards either one of the “pure” models (bank-
based or market-oriented) at this point of time seems unlikely for various reasons. A
transformation towards a complete market-oriented system in light of the latest crisis
situation is highly improbable. Under the impressions of the crisis, the German
population and political actors see their traditional 3 pillar banking system affirmed,
in particular, the business models of the German savings banks and cooperative banks.
On the other hand, a return to the old traditional model is also very unlikely since the
conditions under which the German financial system started to change in the first place
have not changed much. So far, the numbers suggest that there might not be as drastic
changes as might have been expected from the sheer volume of regulatory changes.
Even then, certain developments cannot be reversed. E.g. technological progress will
continue to be made, which necessarily will have an influence on how people do
(financial) business, and it will continue to foster cross-border activity. Furthermore,
the competitive environment will continue to exist. The challenges the German
banking system faced at the turn of the century are still not resolved. The private big
banks still have to find means to cope in the ever-growing competitive world market,
and profitable opportunities are needed like before. Hence, it is likely that the German
banking system will remain in its hybrid state, but with the regulators adapting the
legal framework so as to realign risk and responsibility and to avoid moral hazard.
Some of it was targeted with the implementation of the German Restructuring Law in
2010, or the “Trennbankengesetz” of 2013, which aimed at mitigating the connections
between the presumably “riskier” investment and proprietary trading business and the
loan and deposit business. On the European level, the Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive has been implemented in Germany already, and the revised Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 2) is well under way and will be implemented
in the Member States subsequently. However, it will take some time before the
effectiveness of those regulatory changes can be evaluated. Hence, this area of research
will be of high interest in the near future.
Also, in order to provide a more general idea on the success or failure of hybrids, one
would need to compare and contrast different hybrid financial systems with the
German case before and after the crisis, and try to identify reasons and patters, if
certain hybrids were successful during the crisis, or, if they had not been, how they
dealt with it afterwards.
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To this regard, future research should also include a general analysis of the effects of
the current regulatory changes on the respective financial systems within the different
EU Member States. This may give rise to revisiting the discussion on
convergence/divergence of financial system. So far, the German banking system in
particular continues to deviate from the more concentrated banking systems of, for
example, France or the UK. However, with the EU gaining in influence and aiming at
full harmonization in the financial sector, which leaves less room for Member States
to deviate, the question will arise whether the financial systems of the EU Member
States will eventually convergence to a common model.
The thesis’ focus on the impact of globalization and Europeanization on the actors and
the inclusion of the immediate responses to the crisis in section 6.2 may add to the
discussions of international relations. Mayntz and Scharpff (1995) had already asserted
that financial systems were one of the extreme cases where domestic regulation and
governmental influence or control were very limited in light of the globalization
process. According to them, the regime debate on how to handle and manage
regulatory problems in an increasingly globalized business sector had found answers
in the formation of international regimes, in global political networks, transnational
government networks, or non-governmental cooperation regime partners, of which
probably the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) or the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision could be cited as prominent examples. The
prominence of this debate certainly has spiked at new heights since the 2008 crisis, as
the need for “intensified international cooperation among regulators and strengthening
of international standards, where necessary, and their consistent implementation” was
important to “protect against adverse cross-border, regional and global developments
affecting international financial stability” (G20 2008: 2). It is safe to conclude that the
EU certainly came out much stronger from the crisis of 2008. Only looking at the
various supranational institutions that were founded after the crisis, e.g. the Financial
Stability Board as successor of the Financial Stability Forum, the European financial
supervisory authorities European Banking Authority (EBA), European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA), and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority (EIOPA), or the recently vested financial supervisory authority in the ECB,
underlines the arguments of supporters of international relations.
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Furthermore, the European regulatory framework has not just expanded in sheer
number of directives and regulations and the extent of those, but it has also tightened,
meaning that they leave much less room for national interpretation and discretions. As
has been demonstrated by other authors already (e.g. Lütz 2002), but also in this case,
the national parliament loses decision-making influence on the matter of banking
regulation. As has been explained, much of the pressure on Landesbanken and big
banks resulted from global developments. Additionally, the influence of the EU’s
Financial Services Action Plan and general competitiveness strategy on the political
and financial actors has also been made clear. As more and more decisions are made
on the European level and as less room is left for national discretions, the national
legislators lose political influence on those issues. The only means left to them are to
either voice their intentions and demands in parliamentary initiatives, which then gives
the German executive a clear mandate to lobby for in the European Council and the
negotiations, or the parliament and/or its members could lobby for their demands in
Brussels themselves. Either way, the situation has changed significantly and the path
altered, which makes it unlikely for it to be reversed. Though a few national initiatives
have still been implemented in the 2000s and after the crisis, and will probably still be
implemented in the future, it has become clear that the vast majority of financial and
capital market regulation has surpassed the national sphere. The determining decisions
are being made on the European level, and with the ECB taking up its new task as
European financial supervisory authority and the Banking Union being completed
soon, the trend to supranational regulatory solutions will continue. The question then
remains how the German financial system, which – despite the changes it has
undergone – still incorporates many features of the old, traditional system, will be able
to deal with the new regulatory framework. The intention of the EU is pretty
straightforward: full harmonization of the regulatory framework across all EU
Member States. So far, there have always been exceptions or mitigated rules for
smaller banks, funds, companies, etc., so as to adhere to the principle of proportion.
But it should also be clear that any exception Germany asks for will have to be an
exception in other EU Member States as well.
6.5. Conclusion
The case of the German financial system, in particular its banking sector, has
constituted a valuable research case for many researches, and continues to do so. It has
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been of interest because of its exemplary status as a model bank-based system, because
of its seemingly capability to effectively combining elements of bank-based and
market-based structures in a hybrid structure, and it caught the interest during the latest
financial crisis due to its relative affectedness despite its assumed stability. It is likely
to continue to be of interest as the 2008 crisis has led to a reinforcement of the
characteristic German 3 pillar structure. On the other hand, the crisis has also provoked
an intensification of the EU single market in financial services, an increased level of
cooperation among Member States and internationally, and an increased level of
harmonization of regulation among the EU Member States, all of which has been
greatly supported by German politics. As has been alluded to in the sections on
Landesbanken and savings and cooperative banks, these intentions of the EU,
however, are in stark contrast to leaving room for national peculiarities. Interestingly,
as the findings have shown, the pressure of the EU to harmonize the European financial
market in order to gain strength and economic growth, have constituted a relevant
factor in German actors to generally support the trend and foster the German financial
market. Hence, it remains to be seen how these conflicts of interest can and will be
solved eventually.
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Annex II - German Financial and Capital Market Regulation since the 14th Electoral Period69
German Law Title Contents German Federal Law
Gazette Reference
References to relevant EU Directives, EU Regulations and
International and European Decisions and Agreements
14th Electoral Period (26 October 1998 - 17 October 2002), Governing Coalition: Social Democratic Party and Alliance '90/The Greens
Gesetz zu dem Abkommen vom 18.
September 1998 zwischen der Regierung
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Europäischen Zentralbank über den Sitz der
Europäischen Zentralbank
Ratification of the Headquarters Agreements between the European Central
Bank and the German government concerning the seat of the ECB in
Frankfurt: definition of the legal framework for the ECB's operation in
Frankfurt, exemption of the ECB from tax and financial market regulations,
diplomatic privileges and exemptions for members of the ECB Board and
their family members, protocol specifications on the privileges and
immunities of the European Communities, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 1998, No. 51, 29
December 1998,
p.2995; promulgation
published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 1999, No. 12, 6 May
1999, p.367
 Headquarters Agreements between the European Central
Bank and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany concerning the Seat of the European Central Bank
(dated 18 September 1998)
Überweisungsgesetz Implementation of the European Directive on cross-border credit transfers:
information of customers on the duration and costs of credit transfers, credit
transfers in due time, money back guarantee on credit transfers not executed
or not executed correctly
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
1999, No. 39, 26 July
1999, p. 1642
 Directive 97/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 January 1997 on cross-border credit transfers
Gesetz zur Änderung insolvenzrechtlicher
und kreditwesenrechtlicher Vorschriften
Implementation of the European Directive on settlement finality in payment
and securities settlement systems, especially to avoid domino effects when a
bank that is connected to a payment system becomes insolvent, definition of
settlement systems, and provisions regarding the deadlines of settlement
payments in insolvency cases
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
1999, No. 54, 10
December 1999, p.
2384
 Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment
and securities settlement systems
Gesetz über die Umwandlung der
Deutschen Siedlungs- und
Landesrentenbank in eine
Aktiengesellschaft (DSL Bank-
Umwandlungsgesetz) - DSLBUmwG)
Establishment of the premises for the complete privatization of DSL Bank:
conversion of DSL Bank into a corporation outside the provisions of the
German Transformation of Companies Act, transfer of the federal share onto
Deutsche Postbank, maintenance of the right to issue covered bonds instead
of issuing German Pfandbriefe, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
1999, No. 56, 22
December 1999, p.
2441
-
Gesetz zur Durchführung der Richtlinie des
Rates der Europäischen Union zur
Änderung der Bilanz- und der
Konzernbilanzrichtlinie hinsichtlich ihres
Anwendungsbereichs (90/605/EWG), zur
Implementation of various EU directives and ECJ decisions: integration of
certain corporate corporations into annual accounts requirements, improved
sanctioning in cases of non-disclosure of annual accounts, raising of the
threshold levels for the separation of small, medium and large companies,
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2000, No. 8, 8 March
2000, p. 154
 Council Directive 90/605/EEC of 8 November 1990
amending Directive 78/660/EEC on annual accounts and
Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts as regards
the scope of those Directives
69 Data as of 18 March 2015. The overview includes financial and capital market regulatory acts passed in Germany that seemed relevant to credit institution and insurance
company undertakings. It does not include those legal acts pertaining to the rescue measures of certain countries that have become necessary during the sovereign debt crisis of
2010, nor does it include tax acts or acts on agreements regarding foreign development banks. The representation is my own, but is based on information on the respective legal
acts attained from the Deutsche Bundestag’s Parliamentary Material Information System (“Dokumentation- und Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge” – DIP),
which can be accessed through the website at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21.web/bt.
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German Law Title Contents German Federal Law
Gazette Reference
References to relevant EU Directives, EU Regulations and
International and European Decisions and Agreements
Verbesserung der Offenlegung von
Jahresabschlüssen und zur Änderung
anderer handelsrechtlicher Bestimmungen
(Kapitalgesellschaften- und Co-Richtlinie-
Gesetz - KapCoRiLiG)
reduction of the threshold levels for consolidated accounts, expansion of the
consolidated account according to international rules in securities trading, etc.
 Implementation of the decision of the European Court of
Justice of 29 September 1998 regarding disclosure of annual
accounts
Gesetz über Fernabsatzverträge und andere
Fragen des Verbraucherrechts sowie zur
Umstellung von Vorschriften auf Euro
Implementation of European Directives regarding consumer protection in
distance contracts and regarding producer liability: increased level of
protection for consumers when buying products or services at a distance,
obligation to inform the consumer regarding his right of rescission within 7
days in distance contracts, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2000 No. 28, 29 June
2000, p. 897; correction
published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2000, No. 34, 27 July
2000, p. 1139
 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in
respect of distance contracts
 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of
consumers' interests
 Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 10 May 1999 amending Council Directive
85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning liability for defective products
Gesetz zur Änderung des
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes,
insbesondere zur Durchführung der EG-
Richtlinie 98/78/EG vom 27. Oktober 1998
über die zusätzliche Beaufsichtigung der
einer Versicherungsgruppe angehörenden
Versicherungsunternehmen sowie zur
Umstellung von Vorschriften auf Euro
Implementation of the European Directive on the supplementary supervision
of insurance undertaking in an insurance group: requirement of
supplementary supervision on single insurance companies within an
insurance group regarding sufficient capitalization and solvency, measures to
improve shareholder controls, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2000, No. 58, 27
December 2000, p.
1857
 Directive 98/78/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 October 1998 on the supplementary
supervision of insurance undertakings in an insurance group
Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur
Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung
(Namensaktiengesetz - NaStraG)
Amendment of the provisions on registered stocks in order to incorporate
new and particularly technical developments
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2001, No. 4, 24 January
2001, p. 123
-
Gesetz zur Reform der gesetzlichen
Rentenversicherung und zur Förderung
eines kapitalgedeckten
Altersvorsorgevermögens
(Altersvermögensgesetz - AVmG)
Reform of the old pension system (pay-as-you-go system), promotion of an
additional capital-based old age pension through tax relief and state
allowances, enhancement of the occupational pension scheme, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2001, No. 13, 26 March
2001, p. 403
-
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German Law Title Contents German Federal Law
Gazette Reference
References to relevant EU Directives, EU Regulations and
International and European Decisions and Agreements
Gesetz zur Reform der gesetzlichen
Rentenversicherung und zur Förderung
eines kapitalgedeckten
Altersvorsorgevermögens
(Altersvermögensgesetz - AVmG)
Implementation of one part of an original draft of an old-age pension
provisions act subject to approval with the focus on strengthening and
enhancing private old pension schemes, including changes in the
occupational pension schemes, introduction of pensions funds, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2001, No. 31, 29 June
2001 p. 1310
-
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2000/52/EG der Kommission vom 26. Juli
2000 zur Änderung der Richtlinie
80/723/EWG über die Transparenz der
finanziellen Beziehungen zwischen den
Mitgliedstaaten und den öffentlichen
Unternehmen (Transparenzrichtlinie-Gesetz
- TranspRLG)
Implementation of the Commission Directive 2000/52/EC of 26 July 2000
amending Directive 80/723/EEC on the transparency of financial relations
between Member States and public undertakings: improvement of the
Commission oversight on competition in the Member States, particularly with
respect to public undertakings and private undertakings that are granted
special or exlusive rights or are entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest by requiring detailed data about the internal
financial and organizational structure of such undertakings, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2001, No. 43, 22
August 2001, p. 2141
 Commission Directive 2000/52/EC of 26 July 2000
amending Directive 80/723/EEC on the transparency of
financial relations between Member States and public
undertakings
Gesetz zur Anpassung bilanzrechtlicher
Bestimmungen an die Einführung des Euro,
zur Erleichterung der Publizität für
Zweigniederlassungen ausländischer
Unternehmen sowie zur Einführung einer
Qualitätskontrolle für genossenschaftliche
Prüfungsverbände (Euro-Bilanzgesetz -
EuroBilG)
Changeover of certain accounting regulations to Euro, relief of foreign credit
institutions and corporations from obsolete publication requirements,
introduction of an external quality control for cooperative auditing
associations
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2001, No. 66, 14
December 2001, p.
3414
-
Gesetz zur Neuordnung des
Schuldbuchrechts des Bundes und der
Rechtsgrundlagen der
Bundesschuldenverwaltung
(Bundeswertpapierverwaltungsgesetz -
BWpVerwG)
Improvement of the Federal Debt Administration: revision of the tasks of the
Federal Debt Administration (now Federal Securities Administration),
increase in the efficiency when selling government securities, identification
of financial instruments for direct borrowing of debt, provisions regarding
direct distribution, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2001, No. 67, 17
December 2001, p.
3519
-
Gesetz zur Regelung von öffentlichen
Angeboten zum Erwerb von Wertpapieren
und von Unternehmensübernahmen
Regulatory requirements regarding the public offering to acquire securities,
especially regarding company takeovers, including the limitation of the
takeover process, introduction of a mandatory offer to minority shareholders,
establishment of the BAWe as control committee, introduction of certain
information requirements, introduction of certain guidelines for the bidder,
etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2001, No. 72, 22
December 2001, p.
3822
-
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Gazette Reference
References to relevant EU Directives, EU Regulations and
International and European Decisions and Agreements
Siebentes Gesetz zur Änderung des
Gesetzes über die Deutsche Bundesbank
Adaptation of the Bundesbank structures to the European System of Central
Banks, strengthening of the Frankfurt headquarters as contact institution of
the ECB Council, establishment of a Bundesbank executive board, obligation
of the Bundesbank to set up a standard cost accounting system
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2002, No. 21, 28 March
2002, p. 1159
 European System of Central Banks (ESCB)
Gesetz zur Änderung von Vorschriften über
die Bewertung der Kapitalanlagen von
Versicherungsunternehmen und zur
Aufhebung des Diskontsatz-Überleitungs-
Gesetzes (Versicherungskapitalanlagen-
Bewertungsgesetz - VersKapAG)
Accounting evaluation of share ownership of insurance companies as assets Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2002, No. 22, 3 April
2002, p. 1219
-
Gesetz über die integrierte
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
Establishment of the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht as a
new public supervisory authority for banks, insurance companies and
financial service providers and pooling of the competences of the
Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das
Versicherungswesen and the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel,
specification of the cooperation with Deutsche Bundesbank, financing of the
supervisory authority through the allocation of the costs to the financial
institutions and companies to be supervised, specification of the seat of the
supervisory authority to be in Bonn and Frankfurt am Main
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2002, No. 25, 25 April
2002, p. 1310
-
Gesetz zur weiteren Fortentwicklung des
Finanzplatzes Deutschland (Viertes
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz)
Improvement of the competitiveness of German stock exchanges in the
international context and with regard to consumer protection, revision of the
brokerage law, decoupling of the admission to listing from price
determination, amendments of various investment and securities regulations,
including ad hoc publishing and compensation claims of investors, expansion
of business options of capital companies under the consideration of investors
interests, improvements of the bank supervision, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2002, No. 39, 26 June
2002, p. 2010;
correction published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2002, No. 42, 29 June
2002, p. 2316
-
Gesetz zur weiteren Reform des Aktien-
und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und
Publizität (Transparenz- und
Publizitätsgesetz)
Further reform of the stock corporation and accounting law: provisions
regarding transparency and publicity in corporate law, regulations regarding
the better information of the supervisory board, admission of new
communication methods in corporate law, involvement of the supervisory
board in the finalization of company company group finanical statement, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2002, No. 50, 25 July
2002, p. 2681
-
Fünftes Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes
über die Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank
Strengthening of the government influence on the bank's boards, exercise of
governmental supervision through the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture
and Consumer Protection instead of through the Government Commissioner
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2002, No. 52, 29 July
2002, p. 2782
-
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Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekämpfung
der Geldwäsche und der Bekämpfung der
Finanzierung des Terrorismus
(Geldwäschebekämpfungsgesetz)
Amendment of the German Money Laundering Act in reaction to the latest
terrorist threats: requirement of all financial sector institutions to file
suspicion reports, improvement of bank-internal security systems against new
methods of illegal financial transactions, cooperation of financial supervisory
authorities and investigation authorities, inclusion of bulk business with non-
cash financial transactions, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2002, No. 57, 14
August 2002, p. 3105
 Standards of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (FATF)
 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive
91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purpose of money laundering
15th Electoral Period (17 October 2002 - 18 October 2005), Governing Coalition: Social Democratic Party and Alliance '90/The Greens
Gesetz zur Förderung von
Kleinunternehmern und zur Verbesserung
der Unternehmensfinanzierung
(Kleinunternehmerförderungsgesetz)
Lowering of bureaucratic burderns for small business owners and
entrepreneurs: raising the threshold level above which bookkeeping becomes
mandatory, introduction of simplified profit determination mechanisms,
standardization of income surplus calculations, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2003, No. 39, 8 August
2003, p. 1550
-
Gesetz zur Neustrukturierung der
Förderbanken des Bundes
(Förderbankenneustrukturierungsgesetz)
Restructuring of the public development banks: asset transfer from Deutsche
Ausgleichsbank onto KfW and dissolution of Deutsche Ausgleichsbank,
restructuring of KfW according to the provisions of the European
Commission, especially specification of development activities and
outsourcing of non-development-related business activities to a bank
subsidiary, detailed provisions on the development tasks of the
Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2003, No. 42, 21
August 2003, p. 1657
 Decision of the European Commission of 27 March 2002 on
independent development banks under public law
Gesetz zur Umsetzung aufsichtsrechtlicher
Bestimmungen zur Sanierung und
Liquidation von Versicherungsunternehmen
und Kreditinstituten
Implementation of various EU Directives to complete the EU single market
on financial services and for the improvement of consumer protection:
execution of the solvency procedure in the home country, equal treatment of
creditors across Europe, harmonization of the provisions on collecting fees or
charges, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2003, No. 59, 16
December 2003, p.
2478
 Directive 2001/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 March 2001 on the reorganisation and
winding-up of insurance undertakings
 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up
of credit institutions
 Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance
 Directive 2002/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 5 March 2002 amending Council Directive
73/239/EEC as regards the solvency margin requirements for
non-life insurance undertakings
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Gesetz zur Modernisierung des
Investmentwesens und zur Besteuerung von
Investmentvermögen
(Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz)
Implementation of the UCITS III Directive: coordination of laws and
regulations on management companies and undertakings for collective
investments in transferable securities, improved investor protection,
amendment of tax provisions to the European principles on taxing investment
funds, simplified prospectus, expansion of permissable business activities of
investment companies and the use of derivatives, provisions regarding the
admission of hedge funds as well as investment companies with variable
capital, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2003, No. 62, 19
December 2003, p.
2676
 Directive 2001/107/EC and 2001/108/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 January 2002 amending
Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to
undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities (UCITS) with a view to regulating management
companies and simplified prospectuses (UCITS III)
Fünfunddreißigstes
Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz zur Umsetzung
des Rahmenbeschlusses des Rates der
Europäischen Union vom 28. Mai 2001 zur
Bekämpfung von Betrug und Fälschung im
Zusammenhang mit unbaren
Zahlungsmitteln (35. StrÄndG)
Implementation of the Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001
combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment:
harmonization of the law of jurisdiction in the EU in cases of fraud and
counterfeiting of non-cash payment transactions, especially Eurocheque,
Eurocheque card, credit card, bills of exchange and cybercrime, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2003, No. 65, 27
December 2003, p.
2838
 Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating
fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment
Gesetz über die Zustimmung zur Änderung
der Satzung des Europäischen Systems der
Zentralbanken und der Europäischen
Zentralbank
Ratification of the European Council Decision of 21 March 2003 regarding
an amendment to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and
the ECB: provisions on the voting distribution within the ECB Council as
well as the distribution and rotation of voting rights of the national central
bank presidents
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 2004, No. 1, 12
January 2004, p. 2;
promulgation published
in Bundesgesetzblatt
Teil II 2004, No. 19, 23
June 2004, p. 845a
 European Council Decision of 21 March 2003 regarding an
amendment to the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and the European Central Bank
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2002/47/EG vom 6. Juni 2002 über
Finanzsicherheiten und zur Änderung des
Hypothekenbankgesetzes und anderer
Gesetze
Implementation of Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements:
strengthening of the European financial system, promotion of the movement
of capital and services within the EU, increase of the safety of mortgage
bonds, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, No. 15, 8 April
2004, p. 502
 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements
Gesetz zur Förderung von Wagniskapital Improvement of the fiscal framework conditions for initiators of venture
capital companies through the introduction of the half-income procedure for
the increased gain from the sale of company participations (carried interest)
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, No. 41, 5 August
2004, p. 2013
-
Gesetz zur Verbesserung des
Anlegerschutzes
(Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz -
AnSVG)
Implementation of the European Market Abuse Directive: expansion of the
prospectus requirement to non-securitized types of investments, strengthening
of investor liability claims, reform of the stock exchange council
composition, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, Nr.56, 29 October
2004, p. 2630
 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market
manipulation (market abuse)
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Gesetz zur Änderung der Vorschriften über
Fernabsatzverträge bei
Finanzdienstleistungen
Implementation of the Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of
consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC
and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC: information requirements with respect
to consumers, rights of rescession and promotion of out-of-court dispute
settlements, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, No. 64, 7
December 2004, p.
3102
 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance
marketing of consumer financial services and amending
Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and
98/27/EC
Gesetz zur Einführung internationaler
Rechnungslegungsstandards und zur
Sicherung der Qualität der
Abschlussprüfung
(Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz - BilReG)
Strengthening of the trust in the validity of company annual accounts as well
as the role of financial auditors, implementation of European accounting
provisions
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, No. 65, 9
December 2004, p.
3166
 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of
international accounting standards
 Council Directive 2003/38/EC of 13 May 2003 amending
Directive 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types
of companies as regards amounts expressed in euro
 Directive 2001/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 September 2001 amending Directives
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC and 86/635/EEC as regards the
valuation rules for the annual and consolidated accounts of
certain types of companies as well as of banks and other
financial institutions
 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 June 2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC,
83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and
consolidated accounts of certain types of companies, banks
and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings
 EU Commission Recommendation on independence of
statutory auditors of 16 May 2002
Gesetz zur Kontrolle von
Unternehmensabschlüssen
(Bilanzkontrollgesetz - BilKoG)
Prevention of balance sheet manipulation to the disadvantage of investors on
the capital market, audit of capital market-oriented companies' financial
reporting by a private committee ordered by the government, sampling
inspections for balance sheet errors, audit by BaFin in cases where companies
do not cooperate voluntarily, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, No. 69, 20
December 2004, p.
3408
-
Gesetz zur Änderung des
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes und anderer
Gesetze
Closing of various regulatory gaps regarding insurance supervision Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, No. 69, 20
December 2004, p.
3416
-
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Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2002/87/EG des Europäischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 16. Dezember 2002
(Finanzkonglomeraterichtlinie-
Umsetzungsgesetz)
Implementation of the European Directive on the supplementary supervision
of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a
financial conglomerate through changes in the German Banking Act and
Insurance Supervision Act: improved assessment of solvency risks, risk
concentrations, group-internal transactions, as well as risk management,
avoidance of double allocation of capital and group-internal creation of
capital, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, No. 72, 27
December 2004, p.
3610
 Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and
investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending
Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC,
92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives
98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council
Gesetz zur Einführung der Europäischen
Gesellschaft (SEEG)
Implementation of additional provisions regarding the Council Regulation on
the Statute for a European company
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2004, No. 73, 28
December 2004, p.
3675
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001
on the Statute for a European company (SE)
 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001
supplementing the Statute for a European company with
regard to the involvement of employees
Gesetz zur Neuordnung des
Pfandbriefrechts
Revision of the legal requirements regarding the issuance of German
Pfandbriefe and abolishment of the special banks principle, extension of the
right to issue Pfandbriefe to all credit institutions that satisfy certain criteria
and that have received the permission to do so by BaFin, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2005, No. 29, 27 May
2005, p. 1373
 Abolishment of maintenance obligation and guarantor's
liability
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2003/71/EG des Europäischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 4. November 2003
betreffend den Prospekt, der beim
öffentlichen Angebot von Wertpapieren
oder bei deren Zulassung zum Handel zu
veröffentlichen ist, und zur Änderung der
Richtlinie 2001/34/EG (Prospektrichtlinie-
Umsetzungsgesetz)
Implementation of the European Prospectus Directive: provisions and
requirements for the drawing up, approval and publication of a prospectus
when securities are offered publicly or admitted to trading on organized
markets,etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2005, No. 36, 27 June
2005, p. 1698
 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be
published when securities are offered to the public or
admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC
Gesetz über die Offenlegung von
Vorstandsvergütungen
(Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz
- VorstOG)
Requirement for listed stock companies to disclose individual management
salaries within the scope of the annual accounts
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2005, No. 47, 10
August 2005, p. 2267
-
Gesetz über das Zweckvermögen des
Bundes bei der Landwirtschaftlichen
Rentenbank und zur Änderung des
Gesetzes über die Landwirtschaftliche
Rentenbank
Closing of a regulatory gap regarding the federal government's special-
purpose assets at the Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2005, No. 49, 17
August 2005, p. 2363
-
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Gesetz zur Einführung von Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahren
Simplification of the assertion of compensation for those investors who have
suffered dispersed and relatively low-value damage through the introduction
of an exemplary process in capital market disputes, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2005, No. 50, 19
August 2005, p. 2437;
correction published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2005, No. 67, 31
October 2005, p. 3095a
-
Siebtes Gesetz zur Änderung des
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes
Amendment of the Insurance Supervision Act according to European
provisions specified in the Directive on the activities and superivison of
institutions for occupational retirement provision, provisions on the cross-
border business activities of pension funds and pension schemes, provision to
supply information to occupational pension scheme members
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2005, No. 53, 1
September 2005, p.
2546
 Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of
institutions for occupational retirement provision
Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und
Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts
(UMAG)
Facilitation of the enforcement of legal action due to the liability of managing
and supervisory boards for damages to the company (internal liability),
allowing for the possibility of submitting liability claims through minority
shareholders at a threshold level of 100,000 euros, introduction of a so-called
"business judgement rule" to ensure corporate freedom of decisions, revision
of the question and speaking rights of shareholders at the general meeting as
well as the action for anulment against resolutions of the general meeting, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2005, No. 60, 27
September 2005, p.
2802
-
16th Electoral Period (18 October 2005 - 27 October 2009), Governing Coalition: Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and Social Democractic Party
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2004/25/EG des Europäischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 21. April 2004
betreffend Übernahmeangebote
(Übernahmerichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz)
Implementation of the EU Directive on takeover bids and establishment of
certain guidelines for the conduct of takeover bids and provision of an
adequate level of protection for shareholders, establishment of common
principles and general requirements throughout the European Community
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2006, No. 31, 13 July
2006, p. 1426
 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der neu gefassten
Bankenrichtlinie und der neu gefassten
Kapitaladäquanzrichtlinie
Implementation of EU requirements regarding the completion and
stabilisation of the EU single market for financial services (Basel II),
introduction of new capital requirements for credit institutions and
investment firms for better risk assessment when lending credit and
conducting other business: assessment of business transaction in a more risk-
differentiated way, individual risk classification of credit takers and business
partners, development of risk measurement systems to adequately assess the
capital requirements, advancement of risk management systems, improved
disclosure requirements for more transparency and market information
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2006, No. 53, 22
November 2006, p.
2606
 Basel II
 Re-casting Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and Council
Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital
adequacy of investments firms and credit institutions
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Gesetz zur Neuregelung des
Versicherungsvermittlerrechts
Implementation of the EU Directive on insurance mediation in order to
harmonize the European insurance mediation market and improve customer
protection: introduction of a licence permission of insurance mediators,
qualification requirements, minimum requirements on advisory, information
and documentation obligations, obligatory professional liability insurance,
etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2006, No. 63, 22
December 2006, p.
3232
 Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance mediation
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Regelungen über
die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer bei
einer Verschmelzung von
Kapitalgesellschaften aus verschiedenen
Mitgliedstaaten
Implementation of Article 16 of the EU Directive on cross-border mergers of
limited liability companies from various Member States: protection of the co-
determination rights of employees of those companies involved in cross-
border mergers
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2006, No. 65, 28
December 2006, p.
3332
 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of
limited liability companies
Gesetz zur Änderung des
Transparenzrichtlinie-Gesetzes
Implementation of the Commission Directive amending the Directive on
transparency of financial relations between Member States and public
undertakings as well as on financial transparency: maintenance of separate
accounts for all companies that receive state compensation for supplying
services of general economic interest
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2006, No. 65, 28
December 2006, p.
3364
 Commission Directive 2005/81/EC of 28 November 2005
amending Directive 80/723/EEC on the transparency of
financial relations between Member States and public
undertakings as well as on financial transparency within
certain undertakings
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2004/109/EG des Europäischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 15. Dezember 2004 zur
Harmonisierung der
Transparenzanforderungen in Bezug auf
Informationen über Emittenten, deren
Wertpapiere zum Handel auf einem
geregelten Markt zugelassen sind, und zur
Änderung der Richtlinie 2001/34/EG
(Transparenzrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz -
TUG)
Implementation of the EU-Directive on the harmonization of transparency
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are
admitted to trading on a regulated market: requirements regarding the report
and disclosure of changes in voting rights shares, regarding the delivery of
information on execution of claims on securities, as well as regarding the
publication and storage of important capital market information, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 1, 10 January
2007, p. 10
 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of
transparency requirements in relation to information about
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a
regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC
Gesetz zum Pfändungsschutz der
Altersvorsorge
Improvement of protective rules regarding the exemption of garnishment of
retirement pensions of the self-employed (in this case, life insurances)
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 11, 30 March
2007, p. 368
-
Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des
Umwandlungsgesetzes
Implementation of EU Directive on cross-border mergers limited liability
companies and implementation of various recommendations regarding the
improvement of corporate governance aspects
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 15, 24 April
2007, p. 542
 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of
limited liability companies
Gesetz zur Schaffung deutscher
Immobilien-Aktiengesellschaften mit
börsennotierten Anteilen
Regulation regarding aspects of company and tax law with respect to the
introduction of German Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) as a means for
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 23, 1 June
2007, p. 914
-
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indirect real estate investments with tax transparent taxation without product
regulation through BaFin
Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes sowie zur
Änderung des
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetzes und
anderer Vorschriften
Implementation of the EU Directive on reinsurance, adaptations to the
German Regulation on the capital adequacy of pension funds in order to
comply with the EU Directive on activities and supervision of institutions for
occupational retirement provisions
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 23, 1 June
2007, p. 923
 Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance and amending
Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC as well as
Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC
 Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of
institutions for occupational retirement provision
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über
Märkte für Finanzinstrumente und der
Durchführungsrichtlinie der Kommission
(Finanzmarkt-Richtlinie-
Umsetzungsgesetz)
Implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
and partially also implementation of the Directive implementing MiFID as
core legislative piece for the harmonization of EU financial market regulation
in the securities sector on the basis of the Lamfalussy process: various pre-
and post-trade-transparency requirements and publication requirements for
trading platforms, organizational requirements for securities services
providers and rules of conduct with customers, regulation requirements
regarding reporting lines and information channels between regulatory
authorities, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 31, 19 July
2007, p. 1330
 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments
amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC
 Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006
implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational
requirements and operating conditions for investment firms
and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive
Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes
über die Deutsche Bundesbank
Changes in the law on Deutsche Bundesbank regarding a more efficient
organization of the executive level of Deutsche Bundesbank by downsizing
the number of executive board members to six.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 31, 19 July
2007, p. 1382
-
Gesetz zur Reform des
Versicherungsvertragsrechts
Complete overhaul of the insurance contract law: improvement of consumer
protection, strengthening of insurance holders' rights, new provisions on
advice and information obligations, new provisions on contract durations,
rights on revocation, withdrawal and termination of contracts, modernization
of life insurance law, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 59, 29
November 2007, p.
2631
-
Gesetz zur Änderung des
Investmentgesetzes und zur Anpassung
anderer Vorschriften
(Investmentänderungsgesetz)
Strengthening of Germany as an interesting investment fund location:
deregulation through adaptation of the harmonization standards of the UCITS
directive, simplification of supervisory frameworks, information obligations
and authorization requirements by the German federal supervsiory authority
BaFin, modernization of investment funds, promotion of product innovations
through two new asset classes, investment opportunities in PPP, improved
investor protection and corporate governance, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 68, 27
December 2007, p.
3089
 Commission Directive 2007/16/EC of 19 March 2007
implementing Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment
in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards the clarification
of certain definitions
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Neuntes Gesetz zur Änderung des
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes
Implementation of a Federal Constitutional Court judgement regarding
regulations on portfolio transfer and profit participation in life insurance
contracts, adaptations of the German insurance supervision to the changed
international standards for financial supervision, especially regarding internal
company risk management, opportunity for a timely preparation of the
insurance industry for the upcoming European Solvency II regulatory
standards, streamlining of the supervision of life insurance companies
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2007, No. 70, 31
December 2007, p.
3248
 Anticipated European regulatory standards in the insurance
industry (Solvency II regime)
Gesetz zur Modernisierung der
Aufsichtsstruktur der Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(Aufsichtsstrukturmodernisierungsgesetz)
Reorganization of the management structure of the German Federal
Supervisory Authority BaFin: broadening and diversification of the decision-
making basis, contribution of expert know-how from autonomous executive
directors aside from the BaFin president, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2008, No. 12, 4 April
2008, p. 493
-
Gesetz zur Begrenzung der mit
Finanzinvestitionen verbundenen Risiken
(Risikobegrenzungsgesetz)
Designing of framework conditions in order to complicate and respectively
prevent financial investor activities that are macroeconomically and
microeconomically unwanted without, however, impairing financial and
corporate activities that are fostering efficiency, in particular establisment of
transparency in order to create a sufficient information basis for all actors:
provisions on concerted actions with other investors, reporting and
notification requirements, share register for registered shares, increased
monitoring of the risks radiating from hedge funds and private equity funds
by BaFin and Bundesbank, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2008, No. 36, 18
August 2008, p. 1666
-
Gesetz zur Modernisierung der
Rahmenbedingungen für
Kapitalbeteiligungen (MoRaKG)
Improvement of the framework conditions of venture capital and holding
companies in order to advancing the provision of private equity capital for
young and medium-sized companies: tax benefits, requirements regarding the
business activity, configuration of the supervision
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2008, No. 36, 18
August 2008, p. 1672
-
Gesetz zur Ergänzung der Bekämpfung der
Geldwäsche und der
Terrorismusfinanzierung
(Geldwäschebekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz
- GwBekErgG)
Implementation of the EU Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/70/EC in order to
expand the range of tools to fight terrorist financing, introduction of a more
flexible standardization regarding customer due dilience
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2008, No. 37, 20
August 2008, p. 1690;
correction published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 20, 23 April
2009, p. 816
 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and
terrorist financing
 Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 laying
down implementing measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the
definition of politically exposed persons and the technical
criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures and
for exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on
an occasional or very limited basis
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Gesetz zur Umsetzung eines
Maßnahmenpakets zur Stabilisierung des
Finanzmarktes
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz -
FMStG)
Establishment of a non-legal fund ("financial market stabilisation fund") as
instrument to overcome the existing liquidity bottlenecks in a timely manner
and strengthening of the stability of the German financial market,
concretisation of further particulars regarding the management and
framework conditions in a accompanying legal decree; guarantee
authorization up to 400 billion euros and loan authorization up to 100 billion
euros
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2008, No. 46, 17
October 2008, p. 1982
 Resolutions of the EU Council of Finance Ministers of 7
October 2008 and the meeting of the Heads of States or
Government of the Eurozone Member States on 12 October
2008 2008
 Resolutions of the European G8 Heads of States or
Government at their meeting in Paris on 4 October 2008, and
the meeting of the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors on 10 October 2008
Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-
Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von
Missbräuchen (MoMiG)
Reform of the limited liabilities law: deregulation, facilitation, acceleration,
and price reduction for business start-ups, acceleration of the register entry
process by decoupling potential authorization processes, strenthening of the
international competitiveness, origination of a authentification-free model
statute, lowering of the minium common capital stock from 25,000 euros to
10,000 euros and admission of a so-called limited liable entrepreneurial
company as subform of the limited liability company ("Mini-GmbH") with
no common capital stock while preserving and modernizing the liable capital
system, bona fide transaction of limited liability company shares, countering
abuse in limited liability company liquidation, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2008, No. 48, 28
October 2008, p. 2026
-
Gesetz zur steuerlichen Förderung der
Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligung
(Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligungsgesetz)
Expansion of tax incentives to foster employee participation plans Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 12, 11 March
2009, p. 451
-
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der
Beteiligungsrichtlinie
Implementation of the EU directive regarding the procedural rules and
evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase
of holdings in the financial sector: harmonization and improvement of the
evaluation process of qualifed holdings, disclosure obligation, evaluation of
the reliability of the interested buyer, cooperation among the supervisory
authorities of the Member States, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 13, 17 March
2009, p. 470
 Mandate of the EU Finance Ministers of September 2004 to
examine and assess possible obstacles for cross-border
mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector
 Resulting EU directive: Directive 2007/44/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007
amending Council Directive 92/49/EEC and Directives
2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC as
regards procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the
prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of
holdings in the financial sector
Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung des
Pfandbriefrechts
Adaptations to the changing requirements in the covered bonds business as
well as strengthening and preservation of the internationally top-ranked
German covered bond: technical amendments, expansion of various business
areas, improvement of syndicated financing, introduction of the Airplane
Pfandbrief, adaptations to and configuration of the financing system of the
German Financial Supervisory Authority BaFin
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 16, 25 March
2009, p. 607
-
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Gesetz zur weiteren Stabilisierung des
Finanzmarktes
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungs-
gesetz - FMStErgG)
Broadening of the action possibilities by making changes to the German
corporate and take-over law, nationalization of a financial institution as
option of last resort for a limited period of time
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 18, 8 April
2009, p. 725
-
Gesetz zur Modernisierung des
Bilanzrechts
(Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz -
BilMoG)
Advancement of the established German Commercial Code accounting law
as a cheaper and easier alternative to the international accounting standards
IFRS, implementation of 4 EU directives: deregulation of the legal obligation
to keep records and do accounting for sole proprietors, facilitation of size-
dependent simplification measures and exemption for capital companies,
strengthening of information structures of the annual accounts and
consolidated accounts by modernizing the accounting standards, adaptations
in the area of auditing law, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 27, 28 May
2009, p. 1102
 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual
accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing
Council Directive 84/253/EEC
 Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 June 2006 amending Council Directives
78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of
companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts,
86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated
accounts of banks and other financial institutions and
91/674/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated
accounts of insurance undertakings
 Directive 2001/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 September 2001 amending Directives
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC and 86/635/EEC as regards the
valuation rules for the annual and consolidated accounts of
certain types of companies as well as of banks and other
financial institutions
 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 June 2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC,
83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and
consolidated accounts of certain types of companies, banks
and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der
aufsichtsrechtlichen Vorschriften der
Zahlungsdiensterichtlinie
(Zahlungsdiensteumsetzungsgesetz)
Implementation of the EU Payment Services Directive to establish a modern
and legally coherent payment services area the European internal market
through a specific authorization process and specific supervisory provisions
regarding the new institution category of payment institutions, execution by
the German Federal Supervisory Authority BaFin
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 35, 29 June
2009, p. 1506
 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the
internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC,
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive
97/5/EC
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Gesetz zur Änderung des
Einlagensicherungs- und
Anlegerentschädigungsgesetzes und
anderer Gesetze
Implementation of the European Directive on deposit-guarantee scheems
regarding the coverage level and the payout delay, improvement of early
detections of risks and of damage prevention measures, concretization and
changes of regulations regarding the financing of compensation schemes and
regarding the cooperation of the German Federal Supervisory Authority
BaFin with foreign branches
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 35, 29 June
2009, p. 1528;
correction published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 38, 3 July
2009, p. 1682
 Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC on
deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and
the payout delay
Gesetz zur Reform des
Kontopfändungsschutzes
Reform of bank account garnishment protection (e.g. introduction of a bank
account protected from garnishment ("Pfändungsschutzkonto"), upon this
uniform garnishment protection up to at least the amount of an automatically
protected monthly basic allowance to secure one's living, further garnishment
protected in-payments, extension to earnings of non-dependable employees,
discharge for loan institutions and enforcement courts, further individual
adaptations)
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 39, 10 July
2009, p. 1707
-
Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der
Finanzmarktstabilisierung
Measures to "free" bank financial statements of finance holding companies or
credit institutions of risky structured securities at short notice: option of
transfering the securities to special purpose vehicles ("bad banks") with a
discount from the book value in exchange for bonds guaranteed by the
financial market stabilization fund
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 43, 22 July
2009, p. 1980
-
Gesetz zur Stärkung der Finanzmarkt- und
der Versicherungsaufsicht
Improvement of the intervention possibilities of the German Financial
Supervisory Authority BaFin in times of crisis under consideration of
ongoing European and international reform plans: stipulation of higher
capital and liquditiy requirements, notification obligation for risk
concentrations within groups, tightening the requirements for members of
control committees, stipulation of a capital add-on, early bank supervisory
measures, changes in the area of insurance supervision, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 48, 31 July
2009, p. 2305
-
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der
Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie, des
zivilrechtlichen Teils der
Zahlungsdiensterichtlinie sowie zur
Neuordnung der Vorschriften über das
Widerrufs- und Rückgaberecht
Implementation of the civil law part of the EU Directive on payment services
in the internal market and credit agreements for consumers: harmonization of
the legal framework for credit non-cash payments in the internal market as
well as consumer rights provisions regarding promotion, information
requirements, revocation, early repayment and compensation; elimination of
legal uncertainties regarding certain legal instructions, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 49, 3 August
2009, p. 2355
 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the
internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC,
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive
97/5/EC (Text with EEA relevance)
 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers
and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC
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Gesetz zur Umsetzung der
Aktionärsrechterichtlinie (ARUG)
Improvement of investor information at public limited liability companies,
facilitation of cross-border exercising of shareholder rights; modernization,
deregulation, and flexibilization of the stock corporation law to unburden
companies and in the interest of the shareholders; use of deregulation options
of the Directive 2006/68/EC to raise capital through non-cash deposits and
the acquisition of own shares; containment of abusive shareholder complaints
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 50, 4 August
2009, p. 2479
 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of
shareholders in listed companies
 Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 September 2006 amending Council Directive
77/91/EEC as regards the formation of public limited liability
companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital
Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der
Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG)
Setting of behavioral incentives for sustainable and long-term corporate
development by having the management board compensation determined by
the supervisory board, facilitation of subsequent reductions, personal liability
of supervisory board members in cases where compensations are inadequate,
no option of delegating the decision to a committee, redemption of equity
options after four years at the earliest, improvement of transparency for
shareholders and the public, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 50, 4 August
2009, p. 2509
-
Gesetz zur Neuregelung der
Rechtsverhältnisse bei
Schuldverschreibungen aus
Gesamtemissionen und zur verbesserten
Durchsetzbarkeit von Ansprüchen von
Anlegern aus Falschberatung
Extension of the creditors' competences to majority decisions on terms and
conditions of bonds, fundamental overhaul of the process of creditor voting,
clarification of collective action clauses in accordance with the
internationally customary clause contents, abolishment of the hitherto
existing limitation to domestic issuers, rules of transparency regarding the
terms and conditions of bonds, extension of the limitation period of damage
compensation claims regarding wrongful advice as well as facilitation of
enforceability
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 50, 4 August
2009, p. 2512
-
Gesetz zur Erleichterung der Sanierung von
Unternehmen
Extension of the time limitation for using the modified term of over-
indebtedness of the insolvency code until the end of 2013, which had been
modified in the fall of 2008 as a reaction to the financial crisis in order to
prevent insolvencies
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2009, No. 63, 29
September 2009, p.
3151
-
17th Electoral Period (27 October 2009 - 22 October 2013), Governing Coalition: Christian Democractic Union/Christian Social Union and Free Democratic Party
Ausführungsgesetz zur Verordnung (EG)
Nr. 1060/2009 des Europäischen
Parlaments und des Rates vom 16.
September 2009 über Ratingagenturen
(Ausführungsgesetz zur EU-
Ratingverordnung)
Appointment of BaFin as the responsible authority in Germany for the
supervision of rating agencies, provisions on the payment of fines in case of
violating the provisions laid down in the EU Regulation on credit rating
agencies, provisions regarding the funding, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2010, No. 32, 18 June
2010, p. 786
 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating
agencies
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Gesetz zur Vorbeugung gegen
missbräuchliche Wertpapier- und
Derivategeschäfte
Ensuring the stability and functionality of financial markets through the
prohibition of naked short-selling of shares, eurozone sovereign debt and
unsecured credit default swaps in EU Member States, authorization of the
German Federal Supervisory Authority BaFin to prohibit further business
transactions under certain circumstances, introduction of a 2-level
transparency system for net-short positions, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2010, No. 38, 26 July
2010, p. 945
-
Gesetz über die aufsichtsrechtlichen
Anforderungen an die Vergütungssysteme
von Instituten und
Versicherungsunternehmen
Implementation of international principles and provisions to better tie
compensations to the longer-term corporate success (instead of providing
incentives for short-term gains), supplementing the existing legal minimum
requirements for risk management by requirements of suitable and
transparent compensation schemes in the financial sector that are targeted
towards sustainable development goals (of the company), establishment of
the possibility for BaFin to prevent inappropriate bonus payments, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2010, No. 38, 26 July
2010, p. 950
 "Principles for Sound Compensation Practices" by the
Financial Stability Board of 2 April 2009 and "Principles for
Sound Compensation Practices - Implementation Standards"
of 25 September 2009
 "High-level Principles for remuneration policies" of 20 April
2009 by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors
(CEBS)
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading
book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of
remuneration policies
Gesetz zur Einführung einer
Musterwiderrufsinformation für
Verbraucherdarlehensverträge, zur
Änderung der Vorschriften über das
Widerrufsrecht bei
Verbraucherdarlehensverträgen und zur
Änderung des Darlehensvermittlungsrechts
Introduction of a contractual information templates with legal status
regarding the right of rescession for consumer loan contracts following
existing information templates; amendments to and clarifications regarding
brokering of loans law and regarding the right of withdrawal from consumer
loan contracts, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2010, No. 39, 29 July
2010, p. 977
-
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der geänderten
Bankenrichtlinie und der geänderten
Kapitaladäquanzrichtlinie
Implementation of EU Directives to incorporate and process lessons from the
financial crisis: closing of various regulatory gaps regarding the supervision
of credit institutions, improved risk management provisions, increased capital
requirements and better-quality capital, provisions on securitization,
improved European cooperation of national supervisory authorities, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2010, No. 58, 24
November 2010, p.
1592
 Commission Directive 2009/27/EC of 7 April 2009 amending
certain Annexes to Directive 2006/49/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards technical provisions
concerning risk management
 Directive 2009/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 May 2009 amending Directive 98/26/EC on
settlement finality in payment and securities settlement
systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral
arrangements as regards linked systems and credit claims
 Commission Directive 2009/83/EC of 27 July 2009
amending certain Annexes to Directive 2006/48/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards technical
provisions concerning risk management
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 Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 September 2009 amending Directives
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks
affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items,
large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis
management
Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und
geordneten Abwicklung von
Kreditinstituten, zur Errichtung eines
Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute
und zur Verlängerung der Verjährungsfrist
der aktienrechtlichen Organhaftung
(Restrukturierungsgesetz)
Establishment of a national bank resolution and recovery mechanism for
banks in trouble without threatening the stability of the financial system: 2-
level-approach to reorganize credit institutions, establishment of supervisory
instruments that allow for earlier regulatory intervention and timelier
management of crisis situations, establishment of a bank restructuring fund to
finance restructuring and resolution measures of systemically relevant banks
in the future, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2010, No. 63, 14
December 2010, p.
1900
-
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Zweiten E-Geld-
Richtlinie
Implementation of the EU Directive on the taking up, pursuit and prudential
supervision of the business of electronic money institutions to harmonize the
legal framework in the EU, abolishment of deficits identified by the Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering regarding the fight against money
laundering and terrorist financing, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 8, 8 March
2011, p. 288
 Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and
prudential supervision of the business of electronic money
institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC
 Germany report of the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF) of 18 February 2010
Gesetz zur Stärkung des Anlegerschutzes
und Verbesserung der Funktionsfähigkeit
des Kapitalmarkts (Anlegerschutz- und
Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz)
New provisions regarding the regulation and supervision of the capital
market, eradication of existing deficits, protection against inadequate or false
advice given to consumers by giving BaFin the rights to more effectively
penalize infringements, registration and qualification proof for employees in
the sales section, improved capital market transparency through the
introduction of new information and publication requirements for previously
unrecognized financial instruments in order to prevent intransparent building
up of shareholder positions, resolution provisions for open-ended real estate
funds, improved provisions to avoid suspending the redemption of shares
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 14, 7 April
2011, p. 538
-
Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekämpfung
von Geldwäsche und Steuerhinterziehung
(Schwarzgeldbekämpfungsgesetz)
Elimination of deficits identified in the Germany report of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering and terrorist financing:
inclusion of market manipulation, insider trading, and product piracy in the
list of offenses in the field of money laundering, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 19, 2 May
2011, p. 676
 Germany report of the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF) of 18 February 2010
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Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2009/65/EG zur Koordinierung der Rechts-
und Verwaltungsvorschriften betreffend
bestimmte Organismen für gemeinsame
Anlagen in Wertpapieren (OGAW-IV-
Umsetzungsgesetz - OGAW-IV-UmsG)
Implementation of various EU Directives concerning the efficiency of the
investment fund business, modernization of the regulatory and supervisory
framework: provisions on cross-border collective portfolio management, fund
mergers and sale, introduction of master-feeder-structures and notification
procedures, improved cooperation among supervisory authorities, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 30, 25 June
2011, p. 1126
 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to
undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities (UCITS)
 Commission Directive 2010/43/EU of 1 July 2010
implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational
requirements, conflicts of interest, conduct of business, risk
management and content of the agreement between a
depositary and a management company
 Commission Directive 2010/42/EU of 1 July 2010
implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards certain provisions
concerning fund mergers, master-feeder structures and
notification procedure
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2010/78/EU vom 24. November 2010 im
Hinblick auf die Errichtung des
Europäischen Finanzaufsichtssystems
Implementation of the so-called Omnibus I Directive that became necessary
to amend various existing EU Directives to incorporate the newly established
European supervisory authorities ESMA, EBA, and EIOPA: inclusion of
BaFin into the European System of Financial Supervision with reporting and
information requirements as well as confidentiality obligations for
employees, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 62, 8
December 2011, p.
2427
 Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives
98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC,
2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC,
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the
powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European
Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority
(European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority)
and the European Supervisory Authority (European
Securities and Markets Authority)
 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union
macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and
establishing a European Systemic Risk Board
 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and
repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC
 Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No
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716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision
2009/79/EC
 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and
Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and
repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 of 17 November
2010 conferring specific tasks upon the European Central
Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic
Risk Board
Gesetz zur Novellierung des
Finanzanlagenvermittler- und
Vermögensanlagenrechts
Improvement of consumer protection through the introduction of new
regulatory provisions in the "grey market": tightening of the prospectus
requirements, requirement to disclose commissions and to keep records on
investment consultations in the "grey market" sector, certain information and
documentation requirements and consultation requirements for commercial
financial brokers, introduction of information briefs
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 63, 12
December 2011, p.
2481
-
Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der
Sanierung von Unternehmen
Reform of the insolvency law to facilitate the continuation of enterprises that
can be restructured in order to safeguard jobs; strengthening of the self-
administration and position of so-called clearing houses, expansion of the
insolvency plan procedure, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 64, 13
December 2011, p.
2582; correction
published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 67, 21
December 2011, p.
2800
-
Gesetz zur Optimierung der
Geldwäscheprävention
Further amendments to existing legislation to eliminate deficits identified by
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering and terrorist
financing; implementation of the European Directive on the prevention of the
(mis-)use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and
terrorist financing
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2011, No. 70, 28
December 2011, p.
2959
 Germany report of the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF) of 18 February 2010
 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and
terrorist financing
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Zweites Gesetz zur Umsetzung eines
Maßnahmenpakets zur Stabilisierung des
Finanzmarktes (Zweites
Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz - 2.
FMStG)
Establishment of limited possibilities to grant and expand measures in
accordance with the Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act in cases of
systemic crises as well as the determination of increased capital requirements
by BaFin, specification of framework conditions
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2012, No. 10, 29
February 2012, p. 206
 Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 21
September 2011 regarding foreign currency risks, as well as
statement by the ESRB chairman Trichet of 10 October 2011
 Statement of the G20 finance ministers and central bank
governors of 23 September 2011
 Decision of the European Council of 26 October 2011
regarding capital requirements of banks and support through
the Member States
Gesetz zu dem Abkommen vom 18.
Oktober 2011 zwischen der Regierung der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Europäischen Aufsichtsbehörde für das
Versicherungswesen und die betriebliche
Altersversorgung über den Sitz der
Europäischen Aufsichtsbehörde für das
Versicherungswesen und die betriebliche
Altersversorgung
Ratification of the Seat Agreement between EIOPA and Germany of 18
October 2011: establishment of Frankfurt/Main as the headquarter location of
EIOPA, regulation of the rights and authorities of EIOPA and its staff
members in Germany
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 2012, No. 12, 20
April 2012, p. 338;
promulgation published
in Bundesgesetzblatt
Teil II 2012, No. 24, 3
August 2012, p. 743a
 Seat Agreement between EIOPA and its hosting country
Germany of 18 October 2011
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2010/73/EU und zur Änderung des
Börsengesetzes
1:1 implementation of the Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 2003/71/EC
on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or
admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are
admitted to trading on a regulated market
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2012, No. 28, 29 June
2012, p. 1375
 Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives
2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and
2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market
Gesetz zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetzes und zur
Änderung anderer Vorschriften
Provisions on permantly maintaining the investor-related model case
procedures by abolishing the deadlines regarding changes after positive
evaluation
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2012, No. 50, 25
October 2012, p. 2182
-
Gesetz zu dem Abkommen vom 7.
Dezember 2011 zwischen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem
Vereinigten Königreich Großbritannien und
Nordirland zur Vermeidung der
Doppelbelastung bei der Bankenabgabe
Ratification of the Convention between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance
of Double Charging of Bank Levies: specification of who has the primary
responsibility to raise contributions to the restructuring fund, respectively the
bank levy, and how contributions to one country's fund can be credited
towards contribution requirements of the other country
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 2012, No. 33, 2
November 2012, p.
1234; promulgation
published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 2013, No. 26, 19
September 2013, p.
1280a
 Convention between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Federal Republic of Germany
for the Avoidance of Double Charging of Bank Levies
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Gesetz zur Ausführung der Verordnung
(EU) Nr. 236/2012 des Europäischen
Parlaments und des Rates vom 14. März
2012 über Leerverkäufe und bestimmte
Aspekte von Credit Default Swaps (EU-
Leerverkaufs-Ausführungsgesetz)
Implementation of those provisions that have not already been implemented
with the "Gesetz zur Vorbeugung gegen missbräuchlichen Wertpapier- und
Derivategeschäfte" (see above) and provisions laid down in the Regulation
(EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps that
warrant national execution: definition of BaFin and, if applicable, the
management board of the stock exchange as the responsible authorities,
definition and enforcement of sanctions against violations, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2012, No. 53, 15
November 2012, p.
2286
 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and
certain aspects of credit default swaps
Gesetz zur Stärkung der deutschen
Finanzaufsicht
Strengthening of the cooperation of important institutions in the area of
financial stability through the establishment of a financial stability
committee, implementation of provisions regarding the cooperation with
BaFin and solving disputes with BaFin, improved payment of BaFin
employees, strengthening of consumer rights and greater consideration of
consumer questions through the establishment of a consumer advisory board
at BaFin and complaint procedures, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2012, No. 56, 3
December 2012, p.
2369
-
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2012/6/EU des Europäischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 14. März 2012 zur
Änderung der Richtlinie 78/660/EWG des
Rates über den Jahresabschluss von
Gesellschaften bestimmter Rechtsformen
hinsichtlich Kleinstbetrieben
(Kleinstkapitalgesellschaften-
Bilanzrechtsänderungsgesetz - MicroBilG)
Implementation of Directive 2012/6/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 14 March 2012 amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC on
the annual accounts of certain types of companies as regards micro-entities:
lowering the burden for micro-entity companies with regards to
comprehensive provisions on annnual accounts, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2012, No. 61, 27
December 2012, p.
2751
 Directive 2012/6/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 March 2012 amending Council Directive
78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of
companies as regards micro-entities
Drittes Gesetz zur Umsetzung eines
Maßnahmenpakets zur Stabilisierung des
Finanzmarktes (Drittes
Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz - 3.
FMStG)
Prolonged possibility to take measures to secure financial stability according
to the Financial Stabilization Fund Act until end-2014, opening of the
financial stabilization fund for new applications, interlocking of the
stabilization fund with the bank restructuring fund, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2012, No. 61, 27
December 2012, p.
2777
-
Ausführungsgesetz zur Verordnung (EU)
Nr. 648/2012 über OTC-Derivate, zentrale
Gegenparteien und Transaktionsregister
(EMIR-Ausführungsgesetz)
Implementation of provisions that have became necessary through Regulation
(EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July
2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories:
clearing obligation for standardized OTC derivative contracts, execution
requirement via central counterparts, obligation to reporting derivative
transactions to a transaction registry, and the admission and ongoing
supervision of central counterparts and enhanced cooperation of supervisory
authorities, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 6, 15
February 2013, p. 174
 Agreements reached at the G20-summit in Pittsburgh in 2009
regarding the increase in transparency and security of OTC
derivatives trading
 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central
counterparties and trade repositories
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Gesetz zur Ergänzung des
Geldwäschegesetzes (GwGErgG)
Act to amend the "Geldwäschegesetz" (see above): extension of particular
money laundering obligations to the legally operating online gambling game
organizers and brokers by taking into account international and European
provisions to that regard
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 9, 25
February 2013, p. 268
 Changes in the legal framework because of the Changes to
the State Treaty on Gaming
 Standards of the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) on
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism
and proliferation
 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and
terrorist financing
Gesetz zur Begleitung der Verordnung
(EU) Nr. 260/2012 zur Festlegung der
technischen Vorschriften und der
Geschäftsanforderungen für
Überweisungen und Lastschriften in Euro
und zur Änderung der Verordnung (EG)
Nr. 924/2009 (SEPA-Begleitgesetz)
Implementation of necessary provisions due to Regulation (EU) No 260/2012
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing
technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in
euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009: establishment of BaFin as
national authority responsible for the supervision of payment transaction
providers, temporary continuation of the electronic direct debiting system and
the current account identifier system, general admission of transfers to EU
forein accounts, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 16, 8 April
2013, p. 610
 Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical
and business requirements for credit transfers and direct
debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009
Gesetz zur Änderung
versicherungsrechtlicher Vorschriften
Implementation of various corrections to the insurance law regarding private
health insurances: implemenation of EU provisions in the remaining
insurance sectors, such as the ECJ decision regarding gender bias in
insurance contracts
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 20, 30 April
2013, p. 932; correction
published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 41, 26 July
2013, p. 2584
 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance
marketing of consumer financial services and amending
Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and
98/27/EC
 Decision of the European Court of Justice of 1 March 2011
regarding sex discrimination in insurance contracts
Gesetz zur Vermeidung von Gefahren und
Missbräuchen im Hochfrequenzhandel
(Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz)
Strengthening of the financial stability through the limitation of the particular
risks from electronic algorithmic high frequency trading of financial
instruments, closing of regulatory gaps regarding high frequency traders
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 23, 14 May
2013, p. 1162
-
Gesetz zur Verbesserung der steuerlichen
Förderung der privaten Altersvorsorge
(Altersvorsorge-Verbesserungsgesetz -
AltvVerbG)
Provision of further incentives for private capital-based old-age pension
schemes
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 31, 28 June
2013, p. 1667
-
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Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2011/89/EU des Europäischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 16. November 2011 zur
Änderung der Richtlinien 98/78/EG,
2002/87/EG, 2006/48/EG und
2009/138/EG hinsichtlich der zusätzlichen
Beaufsichtigung der Finanzunternehmen
eines Finanzkonglomerats
Merging of existing regulations according to the Financial Conglomerates I
Directive, no lowering of already existing regulatory provisions that go above
the provisons of the Directive
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 33, 3 July
2013, p. 1862
 Directive 2011/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 November 2011 amending Directives
98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2006/48/EC and 2009/138/EC as
regards the supplementary supervision of financial entities in
a financial conglomerate
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2011/61/EU über die Verwalter alternativer
Investmentfonds (AIFM-Umsetzungsgesetz
- AIFM-UmsG)
Implementation of the European AIFM Directive: creation of a coherent legal
framework for investment funds and their managers, enhancement of the
existing regulatory and supervisory framework and adaptation to the EU
provisions, harmonized rules across the European single market regarding
investment funds and investor protection
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 35, 10 July
2013, p. 1981
 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to
undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities (UCITS)
 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU)
No 1095/2010
 Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on European venture
capital funds
 Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on European social
entrepreneurship funds
Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau und
weiterer Gesetze
Authorization of the Federal Ministry of Finance to define detailed, specific
and flexible supervision provisions for the KfW, allocation of the supervision
task to the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority BaFin,
respectively Deutsche Bundesbank, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 36, 12 July
2013, p. 2178
-
Gesetz zur Förderung und Regulierung
einer Honorarberatung über
Finanzinstrumente
(Honoraranlageberatungsgesetz)
Definition of fee-based advisory services in addition to the existing
commission-based advisory services in anticipation of the amended Markets
in Financial Insturments Directive (MiFID 2)
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 38, 18 July
2013, p. 2390
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on markets in financial instruments repealing
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council (MiFID 2)
Gesetz zum Vorschlag für eine Verordnung
des Rates zur Übertragung besonderer
Aufgaben im Zusammenhang mit der
Aufsicht über Kreditinstitute auf die
Europäische Zentralbank
Establishment of the possibility for the German Council Representative to
consent to the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 2013, No. 20, 30 July
2013, p. 1050
 Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation
(EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the
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conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank
pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013
Gesetz zur Abschirmung von Risiken und
zur Planung der Sanierung und Abwicklung
von Kreditinstituten und Finanzgruppen
Introduction of the obligation for credit institutions to draw up emergency
reorganization plans in prepartion of crisis situations, introduction of the
obligation for BaFin to draw up resolution plans and further preventive
measures in case the reorganizational endeavors fail, separation of customer
business from the banks propietary trading and other risky business activities
within credit institutions, punishability for executives in risk management
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 47, 12
August 2013, p. 3090
 "Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for
Financial Institutions" of the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
of Oktober 2011
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and
amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC,
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC,
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation
(EU) No 1093/2010
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2013/36/EU über den Zugang zur Tätigkeit
von Kreditinstituten und die
Beaufsichtigung von Kreditinstituten und
Wertpapierfirmen und zur Anpassung des
Aufsichtsrechts an die Verordnung (EU)
Nr. 575/2013 über Aufsichtsanforderungen
an Kreditinstitute und Wertpapierfirmen
(CRD IV-Umsetzungsgesetz)
Implementation of the Basel III recommendations via the European Capital
Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the corresponding Capital
Requirements Resolution (CRR): increased requirements regarding the
quality, quantity and international comparability of core capital,
establishment of new liquidity provisions to ensure bank solvency in crisis
times, improved risk management, transparency and disclosure requirements
for banks, tightened control and sanctioning possibilities of the bank
supervisors, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 53, 3
September 2013, p.
3395
 Basel III regulatory framework for more resilient banks and
banking systems of December 2010
 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC
 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Gesetz zur Änderung des
Handelsgesetzbuchs
Modernization of the fine proceedings recarding the Law on Electronic
Commercial Registers and Registers for Cooperative Societies as well as the
Company Register (EHUG) in order to implement disclosure requirements
for accounting documents, other amendments to the Commercial Code Law
taking into account EU provisions on that matter
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 60, 9 October
2013, p. 3746
 Directive 2012/6/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 March 2012 amending Council Directive
78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of
companies as regards micro-entities
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18th Electoral Period (Since 22 October 2013), Governing Coalition: Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and Social Democratic Party
Gesetz zur Anpassung des
Investmentsteuergesetzes und anderer
Gesetze an das AIFM-Umsetzungsgesetz
(AIFM-Steuer-Anpassungsgesetz - AIFM-
StAnpG)
Amendments of tax and non-tax provisions, especially to the investment tax
act, that have become necessary because of the previously implemented
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2013, No. 76, 23
December 2013, p.
4318
 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to
undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities (UCITS)
 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU)
No 1095/2010
Gesetz zur Anpassung von Gesetzen auf
dem Gebiet des Finanzmarktes
Editorial changes to four financial market acts subsequent to the complex and
quick implementation of various financial and capital market regulation
provisions during the 17th electoral period
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2014, No. 30, 18 July
2014, p. 934
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 694/2014 of 17
December 2013 supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to
regulatory technical standards determining types of
alternative investment fund managers
 Proposed changes to article 33 of the Directive 2011/61/EU
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and
amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and
Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010
within the context of the amendment of the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004)
 Directive 2011/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 November 2011 amending Directives
98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2006/48/EC and 2009/138/EC as
regards the supplementary supervision of financial entities in
a financial conglomerate
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Gesetz zur Verringerung der Abhängigkeit
von Ratings
Implementation of EU provisions on institutions of occupational retirement
provision, undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities
(UCITS), and alternative investment fund manager (AIFM) in respect to
over-reliance on credit ratings, supervision and sanctioning by national
supervisory authorities, establishment of the possibility of passing on
information of the national supervisory authorities to the European
supervisory authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2014, No. 59, 18
December 2014, p.
2085
 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating
agencies
 Directive 2013/14/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 May 2013 amending Directive 2003/41/EC on
the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational
retirement provision, Directive 2009/65/EC on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment
in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU
on Alternative Investment Funds Managers in respect of
over-reliance on credit ratings
 Article 20 paragraph 1 of Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013
on European venture capital funds
 Article 21 paragraph 1 of Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013
on European social entrepreneurship funds
Gesetz zur Absicherung stabiler und fairer
Leistungen für Lebensversicherte
(Lebensversicherungsreformgesetz -
LVRG)
Establishment of various measures in order to secure agreed-upon interest
rate guarantees of private life insurances by preventing unjustified fund
outflows
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2014, No. 38, 6 August
2014 p. 1330
-
Gesetz zu dem Übereinkommen vom 21.
Mai 2014 über die Übertragung von
Beiträgen auf den einheitlichen
Abwicklungsfonds und über die
gemeinsame Nutzung dieser Beiträge
Ratification of the intergovernmental agreement on the transfer and
mutualization of contributions to a single European resolution fund (SRF) of
21 May 2014 that will be established as part of Europe's banking union:
transfer of contributions by banks raised at national level to the SRF
according to harmonized criteria, implementation of various modalities
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 2014, No. 31, 22
December 2014, p.
1298
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013
conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment
firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC,
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU)
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council
 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules
and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of
a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution
Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
235
German Law Title Contents German Federal Law
Gazette Reference
References to relevant EU Directives, EU Regulations and
International and European Decisions and Agreements
 Intergovernmental Agreement on the transfer and
mutualisation of contributions to a single resolution fund of
21 May 2014
Gesetz zur Änderung der
Finanzhilfeinstrumente nach Artikel 19 des
Vertrags vom 2. Februar 2012 zur
Einrichtung des Europäischen
Stabilitätsmechanismus
Authorization of the German governor to consent to the resolution proposal
of the ECB Governing Council to establish an instrument that allows for the
direct capitalization of institutions under certain provisions
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 2014, No. 28, 5
December 2014, p.
1015; promulgation
published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil
II 2014, No. 31, 22
December 2014, p.
1356a
 Euro Area Summit Statement of 29 June 2012 to establish the
possibility for the direct recapitalization of institutions after
the establishment of a single supervisory mechanism
 Resolutions of the European Stability Mechanism Board of
Governors on the establishment of the instrument for the
direct recapitalization of institutions
 Article 19 of the Treaty to establish the European Stability
Mechanism (2 February 2012)
Gesetz zur Änderung des ESM-
Finanzierungsgesetzes
Law to change the "ESM-Finanzierungsgesetz" in order to incorporate the
newly established financial instruments for direct capitalization, specification
of parliamentary control and information rights
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2014, No. 55, 4
December 2014, p.
1821; promulgation
published in
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2014, No. 59, 18
December 2014, p.
2193
 See above
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie
2014/59/EU des Europäischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 15. Mai 2014 zur
Festlegung eines Rahmens für die
Sanierung und Abwicklung von
Kreditinstituten und Wertpapierfirmen und
zur Änderung der Richtlinie 82/891/EWG
des Rates, der Richtlinien 2001/24/EG,
2002/47/EG, 2004/25/EG, 2005/56/EG,
2007/36/EG, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU und
2013/36/EU sowie der Verordnungen (EU)
Nr. 1093/2010 und (EU) Nr. 648/2012 des
Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates
(BRRD-Umsetzungsgesetz)
Consolidation of various already implemented financial market regulatory
measures and implementation of the European Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive to allow for the orderly dissolution of banks without
threatening financial market stability, establishment of FMSA as the national
German resolution authority, introduction of reorganization and resolution
plans, introduction of resolutions instruments, etc.
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I
2014, No. 59, 18
December 2014, p.
2091
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment
firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC,
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU)
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013
conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions
 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
